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1 CHAPTER 1:  SETTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE THESIS 
 
This thesis discusses the critical question of when conduct should be 
criminalised; more specifically, when should making and/or distributing visual 
recordings be criminalised?  This conduct is a pertinent example of the 
difficulties involved in the question of criminalisation given the recent 
prevalent use and improved capabilities of technologies such as digital 
cameras,1 mobile phone cameras, video cameras, web cams, the Internet, email 
and the blogosphere; the inconsistent legislative responses nationally and 
internationally to proscribing an increasing range of perceived anti-social 
behaviours; and the numerous instances of making and distributing visual 
recordings that highlight privacy concerns.2  While the notion of ‘visual 
recordings’ is explored in more detail below, it essentially canvasses both 
moving and still images, and includes photographs and film, which are made by 
people rather than by government or corporate entities. 
 
The 21st century world is one of dynamic technological change and it is a part 
of contemporary culture to upload photographs and post videos to the Internet.  
The Internet also offers users the ability to store, organise photographs and 
video clips, and share them with the virtual community. Various websites 
facilitate this conduct, for example, flickr,3 Myspace,4 Facebook5 and 
Youtube.6  These websites record their popularity, for example, by the number 
of views attributed to a video and the number of photographs uploaded in the 
last minute.  The online audience for and content of these sites is significant and 
growing:  in a random minute, flickr recorded that approximately 5000 
photographs were uploaded.7  From an Australian perspective, an Internet 
Activity Survey conducted in March 2007 indicated there were 5.67 million 
household Internet subscribers.8  Therefore, the widespread use of these 
                                                 
1 Small cameras are being embedded in everyday devices such as teddy bears, clocks and exit 
signs: Canada, Department of Justice Canada, Voyeurism as a Criminal Offence:  A 
Consultation Paper (2002) 1.  See also Canada, Department of Justice Canada, Voyeurism as a 
Criminal Offence - Summary of Submissions (2002).  There is a trend to embed small cameras 
in everyday objects, for example, teddy bears, clocks, smoke detectors, exit signs and pens:  
Clay Calvert and Justin Brown, 'Video Voyeurism, Privacy, and the Internet:  Exposing Peeping 
Toms in Cyberspace' (2000) 18 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 469, 480. 
2 Linda Lavarch (Minister for Justice and Attorney-General), Australian States and Territories 
to Look at Adopting Queensland Secret Filming Laws (2006) Queensland Government 
<http://www.cabinet.qld.gov.au/MMS/StatementDisplaySingle.aspx?id=47477> at 28 July 





7 This changing statistic is recorded at http://www.flickr.com.   
8 Australian Bureau of Statistics, 8153.0 Internet Activity, Australia, Mar 2007 (2007) 
Australian Bureau of Statistics <http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/8153.0/> at 29 
October 2007. 
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technologies has prompted legislatures to determine when making and/or 
distributing visual recordings should be criminalised. 
 
Determining the boundaries of the criminal law has become a serious 
contemporary problem because there is a trend towards criminal law 
encroaching upon conduct that was ‘previously thought to be civil or regulatory 
in character’.9  The development of the criminal law has been described as an 
‘unprincipled[,]…chaotic…[and] a lost cause’.10  Further, it has been said that 
it is quickly approaching a ‘watershed point’; that is, the criminalisation ‘of 
almost everything’.11  While not every type of conduct is criminalised, the 
criminal law has certainly expanded to deal with contemporary situations, 
especially in the area of technology.   The question remains whether the 
boundaries of the criminal law should keep randomly expanding in a reactive 
and unprincipled way to deal with contemporary problems.   
 
This introductory chapter will provide an insight into visual recording and 
distribution instances reported by the media, to highlight the broader issue of 
determining what conduct at the margins should be criminalised.  This chapter 
will also identify the central issues, key concepts, and map out the structure of 
the thesis. 
 
1.1 Conduct at the Margins of Criminal Law 
 
Making and/or distributing visual recordings has been chosen for examination 
in this thesis over other examples of criminal conduct because it is topical in the 
21st century12 and a number of jurisdictions have recently provided a legislative 
response to this conduct.13  Further, recent media reports (some of which are 
discussed below) are littered with examples of this type of incident, while it has 
been said that the community is ‘outraged’ by such conduct.14  Whether making 
and distributing visual recordings should be criminalised has not been explored 
in a scholarly manner.  This thesis will fill this gap by using a principled 
approach to the issue of criminalisation.  The criminalisation of the making 
and/or distribution of visual recordings is ripe for discussion given the 
                                                 
9 John C Coffee, 'Paradigms Lost:  The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models - And 
What Can Be Done About It' (1992) 101 The Yale Law Journal 1875, 1875. 
10 Andrew Ashworth, 'Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?' (2000) 116 The Law Quarterly 
Review 225, 225. 
11 Erik Luna, 'The Overcriminalization Phenomenon' (2004-2005) 54 American University Law 
Review 703, 746. 
12 See generally the media reports below. 
13 See especially Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) s 216G-N, which came into effect in December 2006;  
Criminal Code (Qld) s 227A-C, which came into effect in December 2005;  Criminal Code 
(Can) s 162, which came into effect in November 2005;  Sexual Offences Act 2003 (UK) s 67, 
which came into effect in May 2004;  and Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) s 21G-H, which 
came into effect in March 2004. 
14 Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, Unauthorised Photographs on the Internet and 
Ancillary Privacy Issues (2005) <http://www.ag.gov.au> at 1 October 2005, 9. 
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widespread use and availability of potentially intrusive technology (such as 
mobile phone cameras, digital cameras, and video cameras) and the easy 
availability of, and access to, websites that encourage the community to upload 
still and moving images for public dissemination via the Internet.   
 
Unlike, for example, murder and rape,15 which are obvious crimes, making 
and/or distributing visual recordings does not sit squarely within the core of the 
criminal law.  The criminalisation of this conduct pushes the boundaries of the 
criminal law and forces it to protect privacy interests, which are arguably more 
suited to protection by tort law, although not as yet in Australia.16   
 
In his landmark article on privacy, Prosser identified that the law of privacy in 
the United States can be divided into four distinct torts:17 intrusion upon 
seclusion, false publicity, appropriation and disclosing embarrassing private 
facts to the public.18  Australia has not yet rejected or endorsed the tort of 
privacy.  For example, Kirby J in the 2001 High Court of Australia case of 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd19 
postponed the decision on whether there should be a tort of privacy in 
Australia.  Australia may embrace the tort of privacy in an appropriate case, 
given the developments of the tort of privacy in New Zealand.20  From time to 
time, there have been comments suggesting that an Australian tort of privacy is 
possible, for example, as mooted by Skoien DCJ in the District Court of 
Queensland in Grosse v Purvis21and Hampel J in the Count Court of Victoria in 
Doe v Australian Broadcastin 22g Corporation.  
                                                
 
However, this is not to say that it has never previously been contemplated that 
the criminal law could be used to regulate a right to privacy.  Warren and 
Brandeis, in their classic 1890 article on privacy in America, claimed that a tort 
for damages should be available and that it would be ‘desirable that the privacy 
of the individual should receive the added protection of the criminal law, but 
for this, legislation would be required.’23  Their comment recognises from 
earlier times the possibility of overlap between tort law and criminal law.   
 
 
15 It is acknowledged that determining the scope of murder and rape may be less than clear-cut. 
16 In relation to tort, see generally S Warren and L Brandeis, 'The Right to Privacy' (1890) IV 
Harvard Law Review 193, 219 and Andrew McClurg, 'Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet:  
A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places' (1995) 73 NC Law Review 989, 1025. 
17 William L Prosser, 'Privacy' (1960) 48 California Law Review 383, 389. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 63 at [189]. 
20 See generally Hosking & Hosking v Simon Runting & Anor [2004] NZCA 34. 
21 Grosse v Purvis [2003] QDC 151.  In particular, Skoien DCJ stated, ‘It is a bold step to take, 
as it seems, the first step in this country to hold that there can be a civil action for damages 
based on the actionable right of an individual person to privacy.  But I see it as a logical and 
desirable step.  In my view there is such an actionable right’: [442]. 
22 [2007] VCC 281 at [161] – [162]. 
23 S Warren and L Brandeis, 'The Right to Privacy' (1890) IV Harvard Law Review 193, 219. 
 6
Another reason why making and/or distributing visual recordings pushes the 
boundaries of criminal law is that this conduct is different, for example, from 
non-fatal offences against the person as it does not involve a threat of physical 
harm or actual physical harm like assault, assault occasioning bodily harm, 
grievous bodily harm or unlawful wounding.  While making and/or distributing 
visual recordings is more akin to the offence of stalking, that offence would 
generally not be satisfied because the person visually recorded is often not 
aware of visual recording at the time it is done, and does not have, for example, 
an apprehension or fear of violence at that time.24  Advances in technology 
allow a person making a visual recording to zoom in on the person being 
recorded.  The size of visual recording equipment has decreased, and enables 
the person making the recording to embed it in, for example, shoes or a 
backpack, unbeknown to the person being recorded.  Thus, the person recorded 
may be unaware of another person visually recording them because it is done 
covertly, without their knowledge or consent. 
 
Making and/or distributing visual recordings is more prevalent today than ever 
before because of the availability of sophisticated technology, but it is not a 
new phenomenon.  In 1890, Warren and Brandeis anticipated the need to 
protect privacy from people who make surreptitious and instantaneous 
photographs.25  More explicitly, the literature approximately 100 years later 
discusses an incident where a female, who was leaving a funhouse with her two 
children, was photographed when an air jet unexpectedly blew her skirt up in 
the air, such that her underwear was visible in the photograph.26  The 
photographer published the photograph on the front page of a newspaper.  As a 
result of this, the female was ‘embarrassed, self-conscious, upset…was known 
to cry on occasions’27 and brought a civil action on the basis that her privacy 
had been invaded.  The Alabama Supreme Court concluded that the female had 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances because the intrusion 
                                                 
24 See especially Criminal Code (Qld) s 359B and R  v Davies [2004] QDC 279, 5, where 
McGill DCJ states that apprehension or fear has to be assessed at the time when the conduct 
occurs.  In that case, a step-father visually recorded his step-daughters showering in their 
bathroom without their knowledge.  The brother of the step-daughters later found the video 
camera in the ceiling vent of the bathroom and reported it to police.  The step-father was not 
convicted of stalking because the fourth element of stalking relating to apprehension, fear and 
detriment was not satisfied. 
25 S Warren and L Brandeis, 'The Right to Privacy' (1890) IV Harvard Law Review 193, 195 
and 211. 
26 Andrew McClurg, 'Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet:  A Tort Theory of Liability for 
Intrusions in Public Places' (1995) 73 NC Law Review 989, 1045;  Lance Rothenberg, 'Re-
thinking Privacy:  Peeping Toms, Video Voyeurs, and the Failure of Criminal Law to 
Recognize a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Public Space' (1999-2000) 49 American 
University Law Review 1127, 1148 and  Clay Calvert and Justin Brown, 'Video Voyeurism, 
Privacy, and the Internet:  Exposing Peeping Toms in Cyberspace' (2000) 18 Cardozo Arts and 
Entertainment Law Journal 469, 490. 
27 Clay Calvert and Justin Brown, 'Video Voyeurism, Privacy, and the Internet:  Exposing 
Peeping Toms in Cyberspace' (2000) 18 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 469, 
490. 
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was indecent, vulgar, embarrassing and without the female’s volition.28   This 
incident occurred in the 1960s, but numerous incidents of unsavoury visual 
recording and distribution have been reported beyond 2000. 
 
The Australian Standing Committee of Attorneys-General highlights several 
prominent instances of making and distributing unauthorised visual recordings 
in its 2005 discussion paper.29  One of these instances involved photographing 
children at South Bank Parklands in Brisbane without the knowledge or 
permission of their parents.30  When the children were photographed, they were 
dressed in swimming costumes and playing in a public park.  The images were 
brought to the media’s attention when they were uploaded to a website.  The 
website had no links to pornography or paedophilia, but it raised concerns about 
whether the person uploading the recordings to the Internet had a perverted 
purpose and, ultimately, after media exposure, the author of the website 
removed the images.  At the time of the incident, the conduct was not 
criminalised in Queensland, but the media claimed the community was 
outraged by such conduct,31 although no evidence was provided to back up this 
assertion.  While this instance is instinctively concerning, the criminalisation of 
such conduct is relatively problematic, as will be discussed in later chapters.  
The South Bank Parklands instance starkly illustrates the difficulties in 
balancing the privacy of the person photographed and the freedom of 
expression of the photographer.  The criminal law needs to keep abreast of 
advances in technology and contemporary behavioural patterns.  This thesis 
will determine whether a principled approach to criminalisation supports the 
criminalisation of this type of conduct. 
 
Further instances discussed in the Australian Standing Committee of Attorneys-
General Discussion Paper include photographing, without their knowledge, 
                                                 
28 Daily Times Democrat v Graham 276 Ala 380 (1964).  Note that this is a civil case and not a 
criminal case. 
29 Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, Unauthorised Photographs on the Internet and 
Ancillary Privacy Issues (2005) <http://www.ag.gov.au> at 1 October 2005, 5-6.  Note that this 
discussion paper suggests that visual recordings are unauthorised where the person visually 
recorded does not consent to the visual recording and where the person visually recorded is 
unaware that the visual recording has been made. 
30 Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, Unauthorised Photographs on the Internet and 
Ancillary Privacy Issues (2005) <http://www.ag.gov.au> at 1 October 2005.  See also ‘Parents 
warned over online beach photos’, The Age, 27 January 2005.  Public places are places where 
members of the public may choose to go:  Ward v Marsh [1958] ALR 724, 725, per Lowe J.  
See also 'Torquay Man's 'Abhorrent' Collection 10,000 child porn pics', Geelong Advertiser 7 
July 2006,  'Cyber Law to be Tightened, Says Maran', The Hindu (India), 13 July 2006,  
Caroline Overington, 'Sugar and Spice...or Kiddie Porn?' The Australian 10 October 2006,   
Privacy International, 'Privacy Advocates Call for Closed-circuit TV Controls' (1995) 2 Privacy 
Law and Policy Reporter 91, Robin Perrie, 'Keep 'em Peeled', The Sun (Newcastle), 1 
September 2006, for a discussion of prominent examples relating to children or a discussion 
pertaining to public places. 
31 See especially the media reports highlighted in Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, 
Unauthorised Photographs on the Internet and Ancillary Privacy Issues (2005) 
<http://www.ag.gov.au> at 1 October 2005, [12]. 
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Melbourne school boys dressed in half of their rowing suits,32 and a 16 year old 
surf lifesaver.33  Similar instances have occurred outside Australia, where for 
example, in New Zealand, a man filmed school girls walking along a public 
street, through a gap in a curtain in a bus parked on a public street.34  In all of 
these examples, there was no pre-existing relationship between the person 
making the visual recording and the person visually recorded, the people 
visually recorded were children, the children were clothed, the visual recordings 
were made in public places and were made without the knowledge or express 
consent of the people visually recorded.   
 
Many instances of making and/or distributing visual recordings involve visual 
recordings of women and children, and have a voyeuristic aspect.  According to 
the 2002 Canadian Consultation Paper on Voyeurism, most victims of sex 
crimes are women and children.35  There are many instances where women 
have been visually recorded whilst doing every day activities in places that may 
be accessed by the public.  For example, photographing topless female bathers 
at a public beach,36 photographing up the skirts of females while they are in 
shopping malls,37 and photographing a female dressed in outer clothing sitting 
                                                 
32 Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, Unauthorised Photographs on the Internet and 
Ancillary Privacy Issues (2005) <http://www.ag.gov.au> at 1 October 2005, 5.  See further 
'Vic-Police Powerless to Act on Gay Website Containing Schoolboys', Australian Associated 
Press, 22 February 2002 .  
33 Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, Unauthorised Photographs on the Internet and 
Ancillary Privacy Issues (2005) <http://www.ag.gov.au> at 1 October 2005, 5.  See 'Teen Put 
on Gay Site May Lead to Camera Ban', Herald Sun 3 April 2002, for further details about this 
example. 
34 New Zealand, New Zealand Law Commission, Intimate Covert Filming Study Paper, Study 
Paper No. 15 (2004) 41,  Police v R (20 February 2004) District Court Dunedin, Judge 
O’Driscoll.  Hosking v Runting [2004] NZCA 34 is an analogous New Zealand case, which 
involved photographing and publishing the photographs in a magazine of a celebrity’s children 
wearing outer clothing in a public place.  
35 Canada, Department of Justice Canada, Voyeurism as a Criminal Offence:  A Consultation 
Paper (2002) 4. 
36 Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, Unauthorised Photographs on the Internet and 
Ancillary Privacy Issues (2005) <http://www.ag.gov.au> at 1 October 2005, 19.  See also 
Kelley Burton, 'Erosion at the Beach:  Privacy Rights Not Just Sand' (2006) 11 Privacy Law 
and Policy Reporter 216, 'Topless Photos Prove Costly', Herald Sun 2 December 2004,  
'Parents Warned Over Online Beach Photos', The Age 27 January 2005 , Australian Police 
Arrest Nudists (2000) BBC News at 23 August 2005 and Natasha Bita, 'Italian Beaches Littered 
by Laws', The Australian (Florence), 15 August 2005, for more information about these beach 
examples.  A further example in a public place was discussed in Kate Uebergang, 'Fetish 
Stalker Fined', The Courier Mail (Brisbane), 10 August 2006, but note that this example does 
not relate to a beach. 
37 Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, Unauthorised Photographs on the Internet and 
Ancillary Privacy Issues (2005) <http://www.ag.gov.au> at 1 October 2005, 19.  See also 
'Second Man Held Over Snaps of Women at Tennis', Sydney Morning Herald, 22 January 2007,  
'Victorian Charged Over Indecent Schoolies Photos', (Gold Coast), 2006,  'Schoolies Urged to 
Look out for Peers', Courier-Mail (Gold Coast), 20 November 2006,  Teacher Refused Bail in 
'Upskirt' Case (2007,) News Limited <http://www.news.com.au> at 12 May 2007,  Jessica 
Marszalek, 'Peeping Tom, Thieves Target Schoolies', The Australian (Gold Coast), 21 
November 2006,  'Not a Pretty Picture in this Legal Minefield', Sydney Morning Herald 
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on a step outside a Canadian building and subsequently publishing it in a 
magazine.38  In this second set of examples, there was no pre-existing 
relationship between the person making the visual recording and the person 
visually recorded, the people visually recorded were female and the visual 
recordings were made in public places such as a public beach or shopping 
centre. 
 
The criminalisation of these examples of making visual recordings in a public 
place is potentially problematic, because it may protect privacy interests at the 
expense of individual autonomy in the sense of an individual’s freedom to 
make visual recordings.  Further, if the visual recording is made without the 
knowledge or express consent of the person visually recorded, it may be 
difficult to catch the person making the visual recording at the time they make 
the visual recording.  Other issues that arise from these examples are whether 
the person making the visual recording intended to visually record the 
individual recorded; whether the person visually recorded impliedly consented 
to being recorded because they were in a public place; whether visually 
recording a person is the same as observing a person; whether children should 
be protected over and above adults; and whether there is any harm attached to 
making a visual recording.  The problems associated with criminalising the 
subsequent distribution to the Internet of these examples of visual recordings 
made in public places relate to enforcement, protecting privacy interests, 
respecting individual autonomy, whether the person visually recorded 
consented, the culpability of the person distributing the visual recording, and 
the harm and immorality in distributing the visual recording.   
 
                                                                                                                                  
(Sydney), 30 August 2005, ; Chris McLeod, 'Sneaky Cameras' (2003) (August) Australian 
Press Council News 7,  Andrew McClurg, 'Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet:  A Tort 
Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places' (1995) 73 NC Law Review 989, 1150-65, 
Lance Rothenberg, 'Re-thinking Privacy:  Peeping Toms, Video Voyeurs, and the Failure of 
Criminal Law to Recognize a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Public Space' (1999-
2000) 49 American University Law Review 1127,  New Zealand, New Zealand Law 
Commission, Intimate Covert Filming Study Paper, Study Paper No. 15 (2004) 2, 'Teacher 
'Films up Teen's Skirt' at Shopping Centre', Sydney Morning Herald 12 May 2007,  Tram 
Voyeur 'Filmed Up Skirts' (2007) News Limited <http://www.news.com.au/story> , Crackdown 
Planned on Pervert Photos (2007) News Limited <http://www.news.com.au/story> . 
38 Aubry v Editions Vice-Versa [1998] SCR 591.  See also 'N.S. Voyeur Convicted under New 
Law', Canada Digest (Amherst), 29 September 2006,   'Voyeur Guilty', The Plain Dealer 
(Cuyahoga Falls), 28 September 2006,  'First Voyeurism Sentence 'a slap in the face,' says 
woman who proposed law', Halifax Chronicle-Herald (Amherst), 1 September 2006,  'N.S. 
Man who Videotaped Girl in Shower Pleads Guilty to Voyeurism', Halifax Chronicle-Herald 
(Amherst), 30 August 2006,  'Peeping Tom Incident Prompts 'Fishbowl' Warning', Times-
Colonist (Victoria, Canada), 4 August 2006, 24, 'Teacher Appears in Court Today', Vancouver 
Sun 24 August 2006, 22, 'Man Convicted under New Voyeurism Law Gets 90 Days in Nova 
Scotia Jail', Halifax Chronicle-Herald (Amherst), 29 September 2006,  Petti Fong, 'Former 
Teacher Pleads Guilty to Voyeurism', The Globe and Mail (Vancouver), 15 July 2006,  JWL, 
'HFX OUT HQQ', Halifax Chronicle-Herald (Amherst), 29 September 2006, and note that all 
these examples are Canadian. 
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Other instances of making and/or distributing visual recordings have involved 
more private settings than public parks and public beaches.  They may also 
involve a focus on private body parts and sit more readily in the realm of 
criminal law than the earlier example of visually recording a child playing in a 
public park.  In particular, the 2004 New Zealand Law Commission study paper 
highlights incidents such as filming teenage girls undressing in their bedroom, 
filming boys undressing using a hand-held camera behind a one-way window, 
installing a camera in a dressing room to film female performers, filming a 
woman trying on a swimsuit at a market changing booth, filming women using 
a tanning salon, filming cheerleaders undressing using a video camera behind a 
two-way mirror and filming females as they used the home bathroom of the 
person making the visual recording.39  Similar incidents have been reported in 
                                                 
39 New Zealand, New Zealand Law Commission, Intimate Covert Filming Study Paper, Study 
Paper No. 15 (2004) 2.  See also Giller v Procopets [2008] VSCA 236 where the Victorian 
Court of Appeal provided a civil remedy (damages) to the plaintiff where her ex-boyfriend 
published a video of the couple engaging in consensual sexual activity.  Also note the parallels 
between the conduct covered in this thesis and some examples of cyberbullying.  In particular, 
cyberbullying included photographing an overweight Japanese boy whilst he is changing in a 
locker room and distributing the photograph within seconds to classmates:  Darby Dickerson, 
'Cyberbullies on Campus' (2005-2006) 37 University of Toledo Law Review 51;  Paris S Strom 
and Robert D Strom, 'Cyberbullying by Adolescents: A Preliminary Assessment' (2005) 70 The 
Educational Forum 21.  Similar incidents involved photographing athletic students in a state of 
undress in locker rooms and showers:  David A Myers, 'Defamation and the Quiescent Anarchy 
of the Internet: A Case Study of Cyber Targeting' (2005-2006) 110 Pennsylvania State Law 
Review 667.  Cyberbullying included the classmates of a boy posting on the Internet a film of 
the boy emulating a Star Wars fight:  Marilyn A Campbell, 'Cyber Bullying:  An Old Problem 
in a New Guise?' (2005) 15 Australian Journal of Guidance & Counselling 68.  Further, it 
included posting photographs of students in compromising positions on a website:  Marilyn 
Campbell, 'Cyber-Bullying:  The Case for New School Rules' (2005) (May) Principal Matters 
6.  Another example was posting on the Internet photographs of an ex-girlfriend masturbating:  
Shaheen Shariff and Rachel Gouin, Cyber-Dilemmas: Gendered Hierarchies, Free Expression 
and Cyber-Safety in Schools <www//oii.ox.ac.uk> at 23 November 2006. Cyberbullying has 
been defined as ‘the use of information and communication technologies to support deliberate, 
repeated, and hostile behaviour by an individual or group, that is intended to harm others’:  Bill 
Belsey, Cyberbullying: An Emerging Threat to the "Always On" Generation (2006) 
<http://www.cyberbullying.ca/> at 23 November 2006.  It includes outing, which is defined as 
the ‘public display, posting, or forwarding of personal communication or images, especially 
communication that contains sensitive personal information or images that are sexual in nature’:  
Anne Bamford, 'Cyber-bullying' (2005) 25 Classroom 18.  Cyberbullying is very broad and 
extends beyond covert and non-consensual visual recordings.  It also includes manipulating 
visual recordings, but this conduct and a general exploration of cyberbullying is well beyond 
the scope of this thesis.  Further literature on cyberbullying includes Renee L Servance, 
'Cyberbullying, Cyber-harassment, and the Conflict Between Schools and the First Amendment' 
(2003)  Wisconsin Law Review 1213 and Amanda Froude, 'Cyber bullying' (2005) 35 
Independent Education 38.  Also see literature on voyeurism and prohibited visual recordings, 
for example, 'Law School Student's Roommate Shocked He was the Star in a Shower Scene:  
Campus Soap Opera', National Post 21 June 2006,  Paul Lewis, 'Suspended Sentence for 
Student Voyeur', The Guardian 8 September 2006, 16 'Senate Passes Bill to Prohibit Employers 
from Taping Employees in Changing Rooms', US Federal News (New York), 25 May 2006,  
'Shower Spy is Spared Prison', Daily Mirror 8 September 2006, 35 'Former State Worker 
Appeals Sentence for Taping Girls', Associated Press Newswires (Santa Fe), 18 June 2006,  'An 
Unnecessary Video Intrusion: Security Worries Don't Justify Assault on Personal Privacy', 
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Canada, including a man who filmed his female colleagues using a co-ed 
washroom;40 a man who videotaped his consensual sexual activities with a 
female without her knowledge and showed them to his friends at a party;41 and 
a landlord who installed a video camera in the air vent of a rental apartment 
tenanted by a female.42  This last Canadian incident is analogous to incidents in 
the United Kingdom where landlords fixed spy holes into bathrooms;43 in New 
South Wales where a man filmed his female flatmates whilst they were 
showering;44 and in Queensland where a stepfather filmed his adult 
stepdaughters showering.45  Another intimate example involved a man peeping 
through a bedroom window and photographing a female while she was 
sleeping.46   
 
In most (but not all) of these last instances, the recordings occurred in private 
places, and there was a pre-existing relationship between the person making the 
visual recording and the person visually recorded.  The people visually 
recorded were mostly women or children, and the visual recordings were made 
in private places where the person visually recorded was engaging in a private 
activity such as showering, undressing or engaging in sexual activities.47  
Criminalising some of these instances of visual recording is less problematic 
because this conduct ostensibly is starting to take on some criminal law 
                                                                                                                                  
Calgary Herald 11 July 2006,  Jeremy Armstrong, 'Tan Horror Man Guilty', Daily Mirror 
(Staffs), 3 June 2006,  Nancie L Katz, 'Ladies' Room Perv Avoids Jail', New York Daily News 
(Brooklyn), 6 September 2006, 29,  Aaron H Kastens, 'State v Stevenson, The "Peeping Tom" 
Case:  Overbreadth or Overblown?' (2001)  Wisconsin Law Review 1371, Diane Wood, 'Toilet 
Voyeur Sent to Prison; Man's 'Disgusting' Crimes Included Filming Kids, Friends in Bathroom', 
Kitchener-Waterloo Record 10 June 2006, and note that these examples have been derived from 
Canada and the United States of America. 
40 Canada, Department of Justice Canada, Voyeurism as a Criminal Offence:  A Consultation 
Paper (2002) 1.  This is similar to an example in Hobart, where a primary school cleaner drilled 
a hole in the ceiling of a toilet and installed a camera to view female students and teachers using 
the toilet:  Glenn Cordingley, Cleaner Photographs Kids on Toilet (2007) News Limited 
<http://www.news.com.au/story> at 11 May 2007. 
41 Canada, Department of Justice Canada, Voyeurism as a Criminal Offence:  A Consultation 
Paper (2002) 6. 
42 Ibid 1. 
43 England and Wales, Home Office, Setting the Boundaries:  Reforming the Law on Sex 
Offences (2000), 12.  Compare Michael A Scarcella, 'Homeowner's Hidden Camera Helps Send 
Voyeur to Jail', Sarasota Herald-Tribune (Manatee County), 14 August 2006, and Raymond 
Wacks, 'Home videos:  Is the Surveillance of Domestic Helpers Lawful?' (2000)  Privacy Law 
and Policy Reporter 49. 
44 NSW, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 27 February 2004, (Ms Angela 
D’Amore). 
45 R v Davies [2004] QDC 279.  This case is similar to an incident reported by the media, where 
an ex-policeman filmed two girls showering in his home.  The two girls were aged 9 and 14 
years old, and the camera was hidden in a towel:  Ex-policeman Filmed Girls in Shower (2007) 
News Limited <http://www.news.com.au> at 18 May 2007. 
46 Rebecca Cavanagh, Snapped Naked While Sleeping (2007) News Limited 
<http://www.news.com.au/story> at 9 June 2007. 
47 Note that while up-skirt filming focuses on a person’s private body parts and/or underwear, it 
does not fall within this group of instances because it generally occurs in public places rather 
than in a bathroom, toilet, bedroom or communal change room. 
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features, for example, intentional conduct directed at identifiable victims, and is 
more likely to be harmful and indecent.   
 
In this technologically advanced era, the criminal law has been forced to 
address this conduct and this has resulted in legislative responses nationally and 
internationally.  Irrespective of whether the recording occurs in a private or 
public place, similar issues arise.  For example, whether the harm associated 
with the conduct is serious enough to justify criminalisation, whether the 
individual autonomy to make visual recordings (freedom of expression) should 
outweigh the social welfare interest of privacy, whether the person making 
and/or distributing the visual recording is culpable and whether the person 
visually recorded consented to the visual recording.   
 
Overall, making and/or distributing visual recordings and the response of 
criminalising conduct in general, invokes a range of concepts.  Some of the 
central concepts include criminalisation, harm, morality, culpability, consent, 
public and private dichotomy, privacy, visual recording, distributing and 
voyeur.  These central concepts and the central issues of this thesis will be 
briefly introduced below and will be explored in more detail throughout the 
thesis. 
 
1.2 Central Issue and Concepts 
 
The central question in this thesis is:  When should making and/or distributing 
visual recordings be criminalised?  At the outset, it should be noted that this 
thesis is not concerned with sentencing issues,48 but rather with criminalisation.  
                                                 
48 For completeness, in the United States of America, a maximum sentence of one year’s 
imprisonment, a fine, or both apply to video voyeurism:  Video Voyeurism Act 18 USC 
§1801(a) (2004).  The maximum penalties in Queensland, New South Wales, the United 
Kingdom and Canada are higher than the United States of America.  In Queensland, the 
maximum sentence for observing or recording another person without consent in breach of 
privacy or distributing a prohibited visual recording is two years’ imprisonment:  Criminal 
Code (Qld) s 227A and B. Similarly, the maximum penalty in the New South Wales for filming 
another person for indecent purposes pursuant to Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) s 21G, is 
a fine of 100 penalty units ($110,000:  Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 17) in 
addition to or instead of two years imprisonment:   Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) s 21G.  
In the United Kingdom, the maximum penalty for voyeurism is two years’ imprisonment if the 
accused is convicted on indictment:  Sexual Offences Act 2003 (UK) s 67(5).  If the accused is 
liable on summary conviction, the maximum penalty is six months’ imprisonment, a fine not 
exceeding the statutory maximum, or both penalties:  Sexual Offences Act 2003 (UK) s 67(5).  
The maximum penalty is marginally higher in New Zealand, compared to Queensland, New 
South Wales and the United Kingdom.  The maximum penalty for making an intimate visual 
recording or publishing, importing, exporting or selling an intimate visual recording is three 
years imprisonment:  Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) ss 216H and J.  Canada offers the harshest 
maximum penalty for voyeurism, that is, five years’ imprisonment:  Criminal Code (Can) s 
162(5).  Maximum penalties are only given in worse-case scenarios, see for example the 
Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9(2)(b).  Whether there is consistency in sentencing in 
these jurisdictions will only become apparent as these offences are applied over time.  Note that 
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The literature suggests that there is not a unifying factor that underpins every 
decision to criminalise conduct.49  This thesis will explore the central question 
by adopting a principled approach to criminalisation, which is founded on the 
principles of harm, morality, social welfare, individual autonomy, punishment, 
culpability, consent and the distinctions between criminal law and civil law.50  
Such an approach has also been accepted by the literature.51        
 
Overall, this thesis does not set out to provide a concrete formula for 
determining whether to criminalise conduct.  It does not attempt to identify and 
weigh all of the reasons for and against the decision to create a new offence.  
Such a balancing approach is flawed because, as Schonsheck argues, assigning 
a weight to a reason is ‘intensely subjective and inherently controversial’.52  As 
an alternative, Schonsheck espouses a three step filtering process,53 which is a 
methodical approach.  The first filter is relevant to this thesis.  The first filter is 
called the ‘Principles Filter’, 54  which involves discussing principles including 
individual autonomy.  After deciding that there is a principled basis for 
criminalising the conduct, the second filter is used to determine whether the 
conduct could be reduced or eliminated by means other than criminal law, for 
example, an education campaign.55  The second filter is called the 
‘Presumptions Filter’.56  Once it is determined that criminalisation is the 
appropriate state action, the third filter comes into play.  The third filter is 
called the ‘Pragmatics Filter’.57  It considers the pragmatic outcome of the 
                                                                                                                                  
making a comparison between the maximum penalties for these offences and offences of a 
similar nature is outside the scope of this thesis. 
49 AP Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 3. 
50 Bernadette McSherry and Bronwyn Naylor, Australian Criminal Laws:  Critical Perspectives 
(2004) 17 and Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 23-28.  With 
regard to distinguishing criminal law from civil law refer generally to John C Coffee, 
'Paradigms Lost:  The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models - And What Can Be 
Done About It' (1992) 101 The Yale Law Journal 1875, James Lindgren, 'Why the Ancients 
may not have Needed a System of Criminal Law' (1996) 76 Boston University Law Review 29 
and Kenneth Mann, 'Punitive Civil Sanctions:  The Middleground between Criminal and Civil 
Law' (1992) 101 The Yale Law Journal 1795. 
51 Jonathan Schonsheck, On Criminalization:  An Essay in the Philosophy of the Criminal Law 
(1994) 16. Refer also to Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 22; 
Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 2005) 49; AP 
Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 8 and Mark Findlay, 
Stephen Odgers and Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (3rd ed, 2005) 5.   
52 Jonathan Schonsheck, On Criminalization:  An Essay in the Philosophy of the Criminal Law 
(1994) 33. 
53 Ibid 16. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid.  See also AP Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 21, 
which recommends an inquiry into whether the criminal law is the most appropriate mechanism 
for regulating the activity:  21.  This involves considering the advantages and disadvantages of 
using criminal law compared to its alternatives:  21. The criminal law should only be used as a 
last resort:  21.   




criminal law and requires a cost and benefit analysis of the consequences of the 
imposition of the criminal law.58  The scope of this thesis will embrace an 
inquiry consistent with the ‘Principles Filter’ as it will explore whether harm, 
morality, social welfare and individual autonomy justify the criminalisation of 
conduct.  This thesis cannot do justice to all three filters and thus it  
concentrates on the first filter and leaves the ‘Presumptions Filter’59 and the 
‘Pragmatics Filter’60 open to future research in the novel area of making and/or 
distributing visual recordings.  As discussed in chapter 2, the criminalisation 
literature supports the adoption of a principled approach to criminalisation and 
the principles used in this thesis. 
 
This analysis will serve as a useful tool for legislatures as it explains when it is 
appropriate to criminalise making and/or distributing visual recordings.  This is 
a timely tool as it will enable those jurisdictions that have recently provided a 
legislative response to this conduct an opportunity to review their criminal 
laws.  It will guide those jurisdictions that have postponed enacting criminal 
laws on the appropriate boundary of the criminal law to address this conduct.  
While the findings of this thesis will focus on making and/or distributing visual 
recordings, the framework developed in this thesis will equip legislatures with 
the resources necessary to deal with new problems that emerge in this 
challenging technological environment. 
 
As stated above, this thesis explores whether making and/or distributing visual 
recordings should be criminalised, and therefore the definition of 
criminalisation is central to this discussion.  Chapter 2 will illuminate the harm, 
immorality, social welfare and individual autonomy principles underpinning the 
decision to criminalise conduct.  Two key concepts discussed in chapter 2 are 
‘harm’ and ‘morality’ and they will be briefly introduced below.  Chapter 4 will 
examine the importance of culpability in criminalising conduct and chapter 5 
will review the relevance of consent in criminalising conduct and, in doing so, 
the concepts of ‘culpability’, ‘consent’, the ‘public and private dichotomy’ and 
‘privacy’ emerge and will be introduced below.  The examples investigated 
throughout this thesis regarding visual recording and distribution require a brief 
introduction of several central contextual concepts including ‘visual recording’, 
‘distribution’ and ‘voyeurism’. Briefly exploring definitions of these concepts 





                                                 
58 Ibid.   




1.2.1 Criminalisation  
 
Most of the literature discussing criminalisation does not define this term and 
assumes that the reader understands it,61 but it is useful to delve further into this 
concept.  Lacey, Wells and Quick suggest that the ‘substance of 
criminalisation’ is ‘how societies define deviance and determine which 
deviance calls for definition as criminal, and which behaviour actually meets 
with criminal enforcement’.62  For the purpose of this thesis, criminalisation is 
defined as how to decide whether conduct should be controlled by the criminal 
law, and will use the term ‘criminalisation debate’ to reflect whether conduct 
should be criminalised.  This thesis will enter the criminalisation debate in the 
context of making and/or distributing visual recordings and will explore 
whether this conduct should be criminalised using a principled basis.  The 
notions of ‘criminalisation’ and ‘criminalisation debate’ require an 
understanding of a related concept, that is, ‘crime’. 
 
As a useful starting point, Glanville Williams defines crime (or an offence) as 
‘a legal wrong that can be followed by criminal proceedings which may result 
in punishment’.63  It is a circular definition because conduct becomes a crime if 
it is followed by criminal proceedings, while the relevant proceedings are 
criminal if the conduct is a crime.  Two further criticisms of this definition of 
crime are that it merely states the consequences of a crime64 and that the 
definition does not explain the types of conduct that constitute a crime in the 
first instance.65  Despite the criticisms of Glanville William’s definition of 
crime, it broaches the procedural distinction between criminal and civil law, 
which will be discussed in chapter 3.   
 
Bronitt and McSherry offer a different definition of crime.  In particular, they 
suggest that a crime ‘is simply whatever the law-makers (legislatures or courts) 
at a particular time have decided is punishable as a crime.’66  Similarly, it has 
been said that ‘crime expresses social unity in that it signifies what constitutes 
acceptable and unacceptable behaviour’.67  Consequently, the definition of 
                                                 
61 See Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) and Jonathan Schonsheck, 
On Criminalization:  An Essay in the Philosophy of the Criminal Law (1994). 
62 Nicola Lacey, Celia Wells and Oliver Quick, Reconstructing Criminal Law Text and 
Materials, Law in Context (3rd ed, 2003) 12. 
63 Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 1983) 27.  Williams does not discuss 
the issue of criminalisation in Glanville Williams, Criminal Law The General Part (2nd ed, 
1961).  Note that several resources use this definition including Bernadette McSherry and 
Bronwyn Naylor, Australian Criminal Laws:  Critical Perspectives (2004) 5 and Andrew 
Ashworth, 'Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?' (2000) 116 The Law Quarterly Review 225, 226 
and David Brown et al, Brown, Farrier, Neal and Weisbrot's Criminal Laws - Materials and 
Commentary on Criminal Law and Process in New South Wales (4th ed, 2006) 44. 
64 Ibid 29. 
65 Ibid 28. 
66 Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 2005) 6. 
67 Canada, Law Commission of Canada, What is a Crime?  Defining Criminal Conduct in 
Contemporary Society (2004) xii. 
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crime by itself does not provide much guidance on the content of criminal law.  
Thus, it is necessary to go beyond the definition of crime to determine when 
and what conduct should be criminalised, and look towards to the principles 
underpinning criminalisation to establish the content of the criminal law.   
 
There are two sources of criminal law.  These are statutory law, which is made 
by the legislature, and common law, which is made by the judges.68  Making 
and/or distributing visual recordings are criminal offences created by the 
legislature and not the common law, although in many ways they are a response 
to public opinion on this particular issue.69    
 
Criminal law in statutory form warns the community in advance of the 
consequences of engaging in proscribed conduct.70  It has been said that its 
statutory form makes it readily accessible and easily understood by the public.71  
However, this is debatable considering that law students need instruction on 
how to locate the law and at times even judges agonise over the meaning of 
criminal provisions.  In any event, the criminal law forces people to engage in 
desirable as opposed to undesirable conduct.72  For this reason, criminal law 
has been described as ‘a system for moral education’73 that shapes preferences 
                                                 
68 Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers and Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (3rd ed, 2005) 
7. 
69 See Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) s 216G-N, which came into effect in December 2006;  Criminal 
Code (Qld) s 227A-C, which came into effect in December 2005;  Criminal Code (Can) s 162, 
which came into effect in November 2005;  Sexual Offences Act 2003 (UK) s 67, which came 
into effect in May 2004;  and Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) s 21G-H, which came into 
effect in March 2004. 
70 Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers and Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (3rd ed, 2005) 
8. 
71 Ibid 9.  There are further benefits of having criminal laws prescribed in statutory form.  For 
example, the concepts used in criminal law ‘will cohere with and not reinvent existing legal 
concepts, facilitating understanding by professionals within the criminal justice system and 
avoiding the need for costly retraining exercises’:   AP Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal 
Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 24.  However, with regard to the public easily understanding 
criminal laws in statutory form, Gardner puts forward a much more realistic view.  In particular, 
‘[m]ost people have better things to do than acquaint themselves with a mass of legal materials, 
however easy to read and understand.  Most people, most of the time, need to know roughly 
what the law says on non-specialist matters without knowing, or caring, how the law says it’: 
John Gardner, 'Rationality and the Rule of Law in Offences Against the Person' (1994) 53 
Cambridge Law Journal 502, 513.  On the same page, Gardner continues to claim that it is 
moral clarity that is required not textual clarity.  In Nils Jareborg, 'Criminalization as Last 
Resort (Ultima Ratio)' (2005) 2 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 521 it is suggested that the 
offence must be defined in such a way that its application is not very difficult and its elements 
are not difficult to prove:  529.  See also R A Duff, 'Law, Language and Community: Some 
Preconditions of Criminal Liability' (1998) 18 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 189. 
72 Paul H Robinson, 'A Theory of Justification:  Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal 
Liability' (1975) 23 UCLA Law Review 266, 266. 
73 John C Coffee, 'Paradigms Lost:  The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models - And 
What Can Be Done About It' (1992) 101 The Yale Law Journal 1875, 1877.  Similarly, 
Jareborg suggests that criminalisation makes it ‘unequivocally and publicly clear that some sort 
of conduct is unacceptable and reprehensible’:  Nils Jareborg, 'Criminalization as Last Resort 
(Ultima Ratio)' (2005) 2 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 521, 528.  Further, criminal law 
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and imposes costs.74  Clearly drafted criminal laws provide the community with 
confidence that offenders are correctly labelled.75  Garland agrees with the 
prescriptive and educational benefits of the criminal law.  In particular, he says: 
 
Penal signs and symbols are one part of an authoritative, institutional 
discourse which seeks to organise our moral and political understanding 
and to educate our sentiments and sensibilities.  They provide a 
continuous, repetitive set of instructions as to how we should think 
about good and evil, normal and pathological, legitimate and 
illegitimate, order and disorder.  Through their judgments, 
condemnations and classifications, they teach us (and persuade us) how 
to judge, what to condemn, and how to classify, and they supply a set of 
languages, idioms, and vocabularies with which to do so.  These 
signifying practices also tell us where to locate social authority, how to 
preserve order and community, where to look for social dangers, and 
how to feel about these matters.76 
 
While Garland’s comment signifies the important impact of criminal law, it 
does not provide any guidance on what types of conduct should be criminalised.  
This thesis will explore the principles underpinning the decision to criminalise 




This thesis will also explore the literature on the concept of ‘harm’ because it is 
used frequently to underpin the decision to criminalise conduct.  Harm is 
relevant from a variety of perspectives, including culpability, consent and the 
dividing line between criminal law and civil law.  As a starting point, the 
Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy states that harm includes ‘bodily injury and 
injury to one’s central and legitimate interests… [while the] disputed cases 
                                                                                                                                  
has been described as an ‘instrument of popular pedagogy, in order to sensitize the people’:  
Nils Jareborg, 'Criminalization as Last Resort (Ultima Ratio)' (2005) 2 Ohio State Journal of 
Criminal Law 521, 528. 
74 John C Coffee, 'Paradigms Lost:  The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models - And 
What Can Be Done About It' (1992) 101 The Yale Law Journal 1875, 1877. 
75 AP Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 23.  ‘Textual 
clarity requires the avoidance of arcane, ornamented language, the avoidance of great 
technicality and complexity of drafting, and a minimisation of the scope of conflicting 
interpretation’:    John Gardner, 'Rationality and the Rule of Law in Offences Against the 
Person' (1994) 53 Cambridge Law Journal 502, 519.  Note also that textual clarity may involve 
extra legal technicality, which may result in a conflict between certainty and textual clarity:  
John Gardner, 'Rationality and the Rule of Law in Offences Against the Person' (1994) 53 
Cambridge Law Journal 502, 519.  Note MacCormick’s example of battery (where a rule that 
appears to be clear-cut has its problems, that is, When does a tap on the shoulder amount to 
friendship, warning of a mishap, a threat or sexual harassment?:  Neil MacCormick, 
'Reconstruction after Deconstruction: A Response to CLS' (1990) 10 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 539, 544. 
76 David Garland, Punishment and Modern Society:  A Study in Social Theory (1990) 252. 
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include the causing of discomfort, insult, nuisance, and offence.’77  This 
definition is not exhaustive and highlights the difficulties in determining the 
boundaries of harm.  In a criminal law context, harm was articulated by 
Feinberg as a ‘thwarting, setting back, or defeating [of] an interest’.78  
Feinberg’s definition is frequently cited by leading commentators, but it leaves 
various questions about the scope of harm unanswered.  For example, it is 
debatable whether it includes psychological, economic or indirect harms.79  In 
the context of making and/or distributing visual recordings, psychological and 
indirect harms are pivotal types of harm.  For example, where the school boy 
rowers were visually recorded without their consent and the visual recordings 
were uploaded to a voyeuristic website, the boys felt violated, exploited, were 
angry and anxious about going in public places.80  The boys did not know that 
they had been visually recorded until some time later when the visual 
recordings were viewed on the Internet.  One of the key issues relating to harm 
is whether the harm involved in making and/or distributing visual recordings is 
serious enough to justify criminalisation.  Chapter 2 will explore the harm 




Similarly to the harm principle, morality is another justification for 
criminalising conduct.  Morality will arise in this thesis in various guises; for 
example, it is relevant to culpability, consent and the dividing line between 
criminal and civil law.  Moral wrongness is based on the norms of society, 
rather than the practices of a particular religion.81 Arguably, there is not a 
shared understanding of the concept of ‘morality’.82  Despite this, Simester and 
Sullivan attempted to provide a generalised definition of it as an ‘unpleasant 
                                                 
77 Simon Blackburn, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (2005) under the definition of harm.  
Note that the term of ‘offence’ used in this quote signifies moral wrongness and not a crime. 
78 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law:  Harm to Others (1984) 33.  Simester 
and Sullivan have developed this definition as follows:  ‘When we are harmed, one or more of 
our interests is left in a worse state than it was beforehand.  In turn, a person’s interests 
comprise the things that make his [or her] life go well;  thus we are harmed when our lives are 
changed for the worse.  In particular, harm involves the impairment of a person’s opportunities 
to engage in worthwhile activities and relationships, and to pursue valuable, self-chosen, goals.  
In this sense, harm is prospective rather than backward-looking:  it involves a diminution of 
one’s opportunities to enjoy or pursue a good life.  Characteristically, harm is brought about 
through the impairment of V’s personal or proprietary resources.  However, as Feinberg 
observes, what makes such impairment harmful is not the impairment per se but its implication 
for V’s well-being’:  AP Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 
10. 
79 Bernadette McSherry and Bronwyn Naylor, Australian Criminal Laws:  Critical Perspectives 
(2004) 19. 
80 Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, Unauthorised Photographs on the Internet and 
Ancillary Privacy Issues (2005) <http://www.ag.gov.au> at 1 October 2005, 12. 
81 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 41. 
82 Bernadette McSherry and Bronwyn Naylor, Australian Criminal Laws:  Critical Perspectives 
(2004) 20. 
 19
and disliked psychological experience’.83  This is a nebulous definition and 
epitomises one of the weaknesses of morality as a principle underpinning the 
decision to criminalise conduct.  The principle of morality will be discussed in 
detail in chapter 2.  Further, this thesis will consider the relevance of the 
principle of morality in deciding whether to criminalise making and/or 




Culpability is defined as ‘the moral value attributed to a defendant’s state of 
mind during the commission of a crime’.84  Findlay, Odgers and Yeo suggest 
that an offender’s mental state may be ascertained objectively or subjectively.85  
They categorise strict and absolute liability offences as objective standards of 
culpability.86  However, this thesis will unpack culpability into three standards; 
that is, subjective, objective and no-fault liability.  No-fault liability is further 
divided into strict and absolute liability offences.  Bronitt and McSherry 
endorse this tripartite approach to culpability.87 
 
An objective standard of culpability, for example, negligence, is more aligned 
with the social welfare principle and the harm principle, which will be 
discussed in chapter 2, because they afford greater weight to the ‘seriousness of 
the consequences and the deterrent effect of conviction and punishment’.88  
They place less emphasis on the offender’s actual mental state.  In contrast, the 
subjective mental states include intention, recklessness and knowledge.89  
These are more aligned to the autonomy of the individual principle, which will 
be discussed in chapter 2, because they hold individuals liable for their choice 
to engage in conduct.90  They focus on the offender’s mental state and place 
less emphasis on the consequences of the conduct.  The no-fault standards of 
culpability, that is, strict and absolute liability, concentrate on the conduct 
rather than the offender’s mental state or the consequences of the conduct.  
Consequently, the criminal law has at its disposal three standards of culpability. 
 
                                                 
83 AP Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 15.  Note that 
Simester and Sullivan use the concept of offence rather than moral wrongness. 
84 Stuart P Green, 'Why it's a Crime to Tear the Tag off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and 
Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses' (1997) 46 Emory Law Journal 1533, 1547. 
85 Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers and Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (3rd ed, 2005) 
15-21. 
86 Ibid 20. 
87 Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 2005) 187. 
88 Ibid 18.  See also, Bernadette McSherry and Bronwyn Naylor, Australian Criminal Laws:  
Critical Perspectives (2004) 65. 
89 Ibid 16-17. 
90 Ibid 69. 
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McSherry and Naylor suggest that any quest for a universal form of culpability, 
whether it be objective or subjective, is doomed to fail.91  Chapter 4 does not 
seek a universal standard of culpability, but will explore whether it is apt to use 
a subjective, objective and/or no-fault standard of culpability in criminalising 




Despite the fact that Simester and Sullivan suggest it is difficult to fashion a 
notion of ‘consent’ that is serviceable in all contexts,92  this thesis will draw on 
the definition of consent for the purposes of the non-fatal offences against a 
person and sexual offences as a guide for determining the boundaries of consent 
in visual recording and distribution offences.  In particular, non-fatal offences 
against a person construe consent to be express, implied or tacit.93  This 
construction of consent is consistent with McSherry and Naylor’s list of 
adjectives for consent; that is, ‘explicit, implicit, express, implied, presumed, 
informed, unwilling, reluctant, grudging, half-hearted, [and] unreserved’.94  
Implied consent is less obvious than express consent and is worthy of further 
discussion at this point. 
 
With regard to implied consent, Glanville Williams suggests that three 
conditions must be present.  Firstly, the victim must know the act is being done 
or proposed to be done in relation to their body by the offender who is 
present.95  This means that a person cannot consent to an act unless they know 
what is done.  Secondly, the victim must have the ability to refuse consent.96  
The first and second conditions for implied consent may be a problem in the 
context of making and/or distributing visual recordings because the person may 
not know that they are being visually recorded at the time it is done and 
therefore does not have the ability to refuse consent.  Thirdly, the victim must 
indicate his or her refusal to consent by, for example, words, gestures or 
resistance.97  Implied consent is of particular relevance to the examples used in 
this thesis: for example, does a person impliedly consent to being visually 
                                                 
91 Bernadette McSherry and Bronwyn Naylor, Australian Criminal Laws:  Critical Perspectives 
(2004) 65. 
92 AP Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 612. 
93 A key case in Queensland on the concept of consent is Kimmorley v Atherton; ex parte 
Atherton [1971] Qd R 117.  In that case, Hoare J stated that a ‘consent may be express or it may 
be implied or tacit’:  at 133.  Several other cases discuss the concept of consent in the context of 
non-fatal offences against the person, for example, Boughey v The Queen (1986) 60 ALJR 422, 
R v Watson [1987] 1 Qd R 440, R v Raabe [1984] 1 Qd R 115, McNamara v Duncan (1971) 26 
ALR 584, Kirkpatrick v Tully [1991] 2 Qd R 291, Lergesner v Carroll [1991] 1 Qd R 206, Re 
Lenfield (1993) 114 FLR 195 and Horan v Ferguson [1995] 2 Qd R 490. 
94 Bernadette McSherry and Bronwyn Naylor, Australian Criminal Laws:  Critical Perspectives 
(2004) 211. 
95 Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 1983) 550. 
96 Ibid 550. 
97 Ibid 550. 
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recorded in a public place merely because they appear in a public place?  
Chapter 5 will examine this issue more closely.  
 
Express or implied consent may generally be vitiated in three situations.  
Firstly, where a victim’s consent is vitiated by mistake or fear.98  Secondly, a 
victim’s consent is vitiated where a victim is incapable of consenting because 
he or she falls within a vulnerable group, for example, children.99  Thirdly, 
where public policy denies anyone from consenting to the act, for example, if 
the act is immoral or injures society.100  If the consent of the victim is vitiated 
in one or more of these three situations, the criminal law may step in to protect 
the victim. 
                                                
 
‘Consent’ emerges as a central concept in the context of making and/or 
distributing visual recordings, and notably, the statutory responses to this 
conduct hinge on the element of lack of consent,101 such that if the person 
visually recorded consents to the making and/or distribution of the visual 
recording, the criminal law does not apply.102  The element of lack of consent is 
not defined in any legislation for the purpose of visual recording and 
distribution offences,103 but consent implies knowledge104 and it ‘must be given 
before or at the time of the act’.105   In addition to discussing the conceptual 
boundaries of consent, chapter 5 explores the different approaches to the role of 
 
98 Ibid 550.  In the context of sexual offences, legislative reforms explain when consent is 
vitiated.  For example, in Queensland, consent is not voluntary if it is by force, threat or 
intimidation, fear of bodily harm, exercise of authority, false and fraudulent representations 
about the nature or purpose of the act or a mistaken belief induced by the accused that the 
accused was the victim’s sexual partner:  Criminal Code (Qld) s 348.  See also  Simon 
Blackburn, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (2005) definition of consent, which states that 
‘coercion, exploitation, fraud, [and] deception’ imply at a lack of consent.  ‘Conversely, just or 
permissible transactions imply either the actual or potential consent of affected parties’.  The 
definition of consent also raises the concept ‘potential consent’, which is based on motivations, 
knowledge, rationality and situation of the agent.  The dictionary also provides an example of 
tacit consent, that is, where a person does not actually consent to the laws of the country, but is 
bound by the laws. 
99 Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 1983) 551. 
100 Ibid 551.  McSherry and Naylor put forward female genital mutilation, indigenous 
customary law and sadomasochism as examples of acts where consent is vitiated on public 
policy grounds:  Bernadette McSherry and Bronwyn Naylor, Australian Criminal Laws:  
Critical Perspectives (2004) 198-202.  They suggest that these examples show how one culture 
can intrude on other cultures:  198. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Note that the following provisions explicitly refer to the element of consent:  Criminal Code 
(Qld) ss 227A and B, Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) ss 21G, Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) s 
216H and J, Sexual Offences Act 2003 (UK) s 67 and Video Voyeurism Act 18 USC §1801(a) 
(2004).  In New Zealand, the definition of intimate visual recording refers to visual recordings 
made without the ‘knowledge or consent’ of the person visually recorded.  The Canadian 
offence of voyeurism does not refer to consent:  Criminal Code (Can) s 162.   
103 Note that consent is defined in the Criminal Code (Qld) s 348, for the purpose of sexual 
assault and rape.  The concept is used in other non-fatal offences, for example, assault and 
assault occasioning bodily harm in Criminal Code (Qld) ss 335 and 339, respectively. 
104 Glanville Williams, Criminal Law The General Part (2nd ed, 1961) 867. 
105 Ibid 770. 
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consent in the criminalisation debate particularly as discerned from the 1995 
England and Wales’ Consultation Paper on consent,106 for example, 
quantitative, quantitative plus exceptions, individual autonomy, paternalism and 
morality.  Chapter 5 develops an additional approach to the role of consent, 
which is a contextual approach. 
 
Consent may be present as an element of an offence or a defence.  When 
viewed as an element of the offence in the context, for example, of an assault, 
the victim has the capacity to waive their physical integrity.107  The 
philosophical underpinning for consent viewed in this light is respecting the 
victim’s autonomy.108  This means that when a person agrees to the conduct, it 
will not amount to an offence because the element of lack of consent will not be 
satisfied.109  In contrast, when viewed as a defence, the elements of the offence 
may be satisfied, and the victim’s lack of consent operates to negative the 
offence.110  Examining the notion of ‘lack of consent’ is central to this thesis 
because it focuses on making  and/or distributing visual recordings, and in 
many cases this is done without the consent of the person visually recorded.  
Another issue relating to consent is the modern conceptualisation of consent as 
appropriate to contemporary contexts. 
 
1.2.6 Public and Private Dichotomy 
 
This thesis will consider whether the public and private dichotomy should 
impact on the decision to criminalise conduct broadly and then more 
specifically in the context of making and/or distributing visual recordings.  
There is no universally accepted distinction between private and public.111  
These concepts have changed over time and differ depending on the context.112  
As a starting point, Blackstone asserts that crimes ‘are a breach and violation of 
the public rights and duties, due to the whole community’,113 while civil 
                                                 
106 England and Wales, Law Commission for England and Wales, Consent in the Criminal Law, 
Consultation Paper No. 139 (1995) 245-276. 
107 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006), 318. 
108 Ibid. 
109 It should be noted that some non-fatal offences against the person do not contain the element 
of lack of consent, for example, grievous bodily harm, unlawful wounding and torture.  
Consequently, these offences will be committed even if the victim consented to the injuries. 
110 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 318. 
111 Ted Honderich (ed), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (New Edition ed, 2005), 770. 
112 Ibid, 770. 
113 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1979 (originally published in 
1765)) 5.  Note that Blackstone uses the terms of ‘rights’ and  ‘duties’ and not ‘interests’. 
Blackstone concludes that ‘in taking cognizance of all wrongs, or unlawful acts, the law has 
double view:  viz not only to redress the party injured, by either restoring to him his right, if 
possible;  or by giving him an equivalent;…but also to secure to the public the benefit of 
society, by preventing or punishing every breach and violation of those laws, which the 
sovereign power has thought proper to establish, for the government and tranquillity of the 
whole’: 7. 
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injuries are private wrongs and infringe individual civil rights.114  ‘[G]ross and 
atrocious injuries’,115 for example, murder and robbery, are criminalised 
because the offender cannot repair the injuries.116  In contrast, crimes of an 
inferior nature involve less severe public punishment and the possibility of a 
private remedy.117  In this regard, Blackstone provides an example of the 
overlap between criminal law and civil law and, he notes that in the case of 
beating another person, there is a crime for disturbing the peace and a private 
(civil) remedy for trespass to person.118  A further example of the overlap 
between criminal and civil law is nuisance,119 though there are many others.  
Chapter 3 will identify the distinctions between criminal law and civil law to 
help sharpen the focus of the criminal law.120  One example of a distinction is 
the public and private distinction.  In this sense, public and private do not relate 
to place, but rather to interests: the criminal law is considered to be ‘primarily 
public’121 because it protects social welfare interests rather than individual 
interests.122  
 
The public and private dichotomy will also emerge in chapter 5, which will 
explore the conceptual boundaries of consent and the different approaches to 
the role of consent in the criminal law.  In that chapter, public interest emerges 
as an exception to the quantitative plus exceptions approach to consent, which 
is discerned from the 1995 England and Wales’ Consultation Paper on 
consent.123   Further, chapter 5 discusses a contextual approach to consent and 
in doing so, it is necessary to consider whether there is a right to privacy in a 







                                                 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid 6. 
116 Ibid.  While Blackstone does not expressly use the notion of ‘morally wrong’ when 
discussing the example of murder and robbery, he does impliedly because he states, ‘When the 
word crime is used with reference to moral law, it implies every deviation from moral 





120 Paul H Robinson, 'The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert' (1996) 76 Boston 
University Law Review 201, 212. 
121 James Lindgren, 'Why the Ancients may not have Needed a System of Criminal Law' (1996) 
76 Boston University Law Review 29, 36. 
122Kenneth Mann, 'Punitive Civil Sanctions:  The Middleground between Criminal and Civil 
Law' (1992) 101 The Yale Law Journal 1795, 1806.  
123 England and Wales, Law Commission for England and Wales, Consent in the Criminal Law, 




There is a wealth of literature on privacy and canvassing all of its meanings is 
well beyond the scope of this thesis.124  ‘Privacy’ is an elusive concept and it 
has been said that the ability to find a single short definition of privacy is 
misguided.125  The spirit of privacy is self-respect, whereas the essence of a 
breach of privacy is shame and indignity.126  The origins of privacy as a legal 
concept go back to 1890, when Warren and Brandeis referred to privacy as the 
‘right to be let alone’.127  As will be discussed in chapter 5, this legal definition 
is flawed, but it provides a general gist of the notion.  The Australian Law 
Reform Commission, in its 2008 report on privacy, turns away from an 
overarching definition of ‘privacy’ and prefers Solove’s approach to privacy, 
which will be discussed in detail in chapter 5, by labelling it as a ‘useful 
template for law reform’ and a ‘pragmatic approach to privacy’.128 
 
The scope of privacy will have ramifications for the scope of harm, which is a 
principle that underpins criminalisation.  The harm principle is discussed in 
more detail in chapter 2.  Subsequent chapters in this thesis will consider 
whether invasion of privacy in the context of making and/or distributing visual 
recordings warrants the criminalisation of this conduct.   
 
In this thesis, the significance of privacy stems from the public place and 
private place dichotomy.  This issue is whether a person waives their right to 
privacy and thus consents to being visually recorded merely because they are in 
                                                 
124 Note that the author has read Australia, Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your 
Information:  Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report No. 108 (2008), but it was released 
too late to be fully incorporated in this thesis.  See especially Daniel Solove, 'A Taxonomy of 
Privacy' (2006) 154 University of Pennsylvania 477, Daniel Solove, 'Conceptualizing Privacy' 
(2002) 90 California Law Review 1087 ,  David Lindsay, 'An Exploration of the Conceptual 
Basis of Privacy and the Implications for the Future of Australian Privacy Law' (2005) 29 
Melbourne University Law Review 131,  James Whitman, 'The Two Western Cultures of 
Privacy:  Dignity Versus Liberty' (2003-2004) 113 The Yale Law Journal 1151, Edward J 
Bloustein, 'Privacy Is Dear at Any Price:  A Response to Professor Posner's Economic Theory' 
(1978) 12 Georgia Law Review 429, Robert Chalmers, 'Orwell or All Well? The Rise of 
Surveillance Culture' (2005) 30 Alternative Law Journal 258, Tim Dixon, 'Valuing Privacy:  An 
Overview and Introduction' (2001) 7 University of New South Wales 2,  Charles Fried, 'Privacy' 
(1968) 77 The Yale Law Journal 475,  Charles Fried, 'Privacy:  Economics and Ethics A 
Comment on Posner' (1978) 12 Georgia Law Review 423 and William L Prosser, 'Privacy' 
(1960) 48 California Law Review 383, which merely skims the surface of the literature on 
privacy. 
125 R Parker, 'A Definition of Privacy' (1974) 27 Rutgers Law Review 275, 277.  See also Daniel 
Solove, 'Conceptualizing Privacy' (2002) 90 California Law Review 1087, 1099. 
126 Simon Blackburn, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (2005) under the definition of privacy. 
127 S Warren and L Brandeis, 'The Right to Privacy' (1890) IV Harvard Law Review 193, 195.  
Further, they assert that the notion of ‘inviolate personality’ underpins privacy:  205. 
128 Australia, Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information:  Australian Privacy 
Law and Practice, Report No. 108 (2008)Australian Law Reform Commission, 'For Your 
Information:  Australian Privacy Law and Practice' (Report No. 108, 2008) [1.67]. 
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a public place.  Consequently, privacy is a central concept in this thesis and is 
discussed in chapter 5.   
 
While the concepts of ‘harm’, ‘morality’, ‘culpability’, ‘consent’, ‘public and 
private dichotomy’ and ‘privacy’ relate to the decision of criminalising conduct 
more generally, the specific instance of conduct being considered for potential 
criminalisation in this thesis requires consideration of a range of concepts 
relating to making and/or distributing visual recordings.  These concepts 
include ‘visual recording’, ‘distribution’ and ‘voyeurism’.  Each of these will be 
discussed in turn. 
 
1.2.8 Visual Recording 
 
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, digital cameras, mobile phone 
cameras, video cameras, the Internet, email, and the blogosphere have enhanced 
our ability to take photographs and make videos and distribute them to other 
people.  Websites such as flickr,129 Myspace,130 Facebook131 and Youtube132 
refer to concepts including ‘photographs’, ‘videos’ and ‘film’, presumably 
because they are more easily understood by the community, modern legislative 
approaches are tending to use the notion of ‘visual recording’ to capture 
photographs, videos and film.  ‘Visual recording’ is a central concept arising 
out of making and/or distributing visual recordings.   
 
Queensland and New Zealand have fostered the concept of ‘visual recording’ in 
their legislative responses.133  In particular, Queensland specifically refers to 
‘visually record’, which is defined to mean ‘record, or transmit, by any means, 
moving or still images of the person or part of the person’.134  The use of the 
word ‘transmit’ is significant because it will apply to people who, for example, 
transmit images in real-time to the Internet, but may not make a recording.135  
Even though one of the examples provided in the Queensland legislation136 
refers to a mobile phone camera, the visual recording offences are technology 
neutral because they apply to moving and still images.  Consequently, the 
offences apply to digital cameras and video cameras, but not sound recordings.  
New Zealand provides some specific examples of visual recordings, such as a 





133 Criminal Code (Qld) s 207A, which came into effect in December 2005; Crimes Act 1961 
(NZ) s 216G, which came into effect in December 2006. 
134 Criminal Code (Qld) s 207A. 
135 For this reason s 40 of the Summary Offences Amendment (Upskirting) Bill 2007 (Vic) uses 
the concept of visually capture rather than visual recording.  Visually capture, in relation to a 
person’s genital or anal region, means capture moving or still images of that region by a camera 
or any other means in such a way that a recording is made of those images or those images are 
otherwise capable of being distributed’. 
136 Criminal Code (Qld) s 227A(2). 
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photograph, videotape or digital image.137  These examples are consistent with 
the concepts used in the legislative responses of New South Wales, Canada and 
the United States, which occurred earlier than the responses in Queensland or 
New Zealand.138 
 
In New South Wales, the statute refers to one or more moving or still image.139  
In Canada, the legislation refers to ‘photographic, film or video recording made 
by any means,’140 while in the United States of America, the provision refers to 
‘videotaping, photographing, filming or recording’.141  The United Kingdom 
counterpart takes a different approach and leaves the concept of ‘recording’ 
open to judicial interpretation.142  Arguably this flexibility enables the law to 
keep pace with advances in technology.  The legislative responses have focused 
on visual recordings rather than sound recordings.  It should be emphasised that 
a discussion of recordings that merely capture sound are beyond the scope of 
this thesis.  Despite the use of different concepts across the world for visual 
recording, the relevant legislative responses apply to moving and still images, 
and thus are intended to have the same scope.   
 
Most of the relevant scholarly literature has been published in the United States, 
and pre-dates the legislative reaction in Queensland and New Zealand.  As a 
result, the literature does not use the concept of ‘visual recording’, but rather 
employs photographing, filming and videotaping.143  Similarly, relevant 
newspaper articles tend to use ‘photographing’, ‘filming’ and ‘videotaping’, 
presumably because these references are easily understood by the public.  
Visual recording is more appropriate because it is a broad concept that is 
technology neutral and more likely to keep up with advances in technology than 
the more specific alternatives identified above. 
 
The discussion in this thesis will enquire into (1) a person who makes a visual 
recording, (2) a person who distributes a visual recording and (3) a person who 
makes and distributes a visual recording.  Legislatures across the world have 
responded differently in criminalising these acts and the legislative responses 
                                                 
137 Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) s 216G(1). 
138 Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) s 21G(2)(a), which came into effect in March 2004; 
Criminal Code (Can) s 162(2), which came into effect in November 2005; and Video Voyeurism 
Act 18 USC §1801(b)(1), which came into effect in December 2004. 
139 Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) s 21G(2)(a). 
140 Criminal Code (Can) s 162(2). 
141 Video Voyeurism Act 18 USC §1801(b)(1) and (2) (2004). 
142 Sexual Offences Act 2003 (UK) s 67. 
143 See especially Clay Calvert and Justin Brown, 'Video Voyeurism, Privacy, and the Internet:  
Exposing Peeping Toms in Cyberspace' (2000) 18 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law 
Journal 469, Lance Rothenberg, 'Re-thinking Privacy:  Peeping Toms, Video Voyeurs, and the 
Failure of Criminal Law to Recognize a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Public Space' 
(1999-2000) 49 American University Law Review 1127, and Elizabeth Paton-Simpson, 'Privacy 
and the Reasonable Paranoid:  The Protection of Privacy in Public Places' (2000) 50 University 
of Toronto Law Journal 305. 
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have informed the delimitations in this thesis.144  Most jurisdictions do not 
specifically prohibit a person from setting up visual recording equipment,145 but 
arguably this type of conduct could be treated as an attempt to make a visual 
recording.  Most jurisdictions do not prohibit a person from merely possessing a 
visual recording.146  Consequently, emphasis is placed on making and/or 
distributing a visual recording rather than merely attempting to make or possess 
a visual recording.   
 
The thesis will canvass visual recordings made or distributed by individuals, as 
opposed to corporate, commercial or government entities.147  It will not explore 
visual recordings made by law enforcement officers acting reasonably in the 
course of their duties, visual recordings made in the name of public good or the 
interest of national security, or visual recordings where the person visually 
recorded is in lawful custody or under a supervision order.  This delimitation 
has again been informed by the legislative responses.148  The thesis will delve 
                                                 
144 See especially Criminal Code (Qld) s 227A-B, Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) s 216H and J, 
Criminal Code (Can) s 162(1) and (4) and Video Voyeurism Act 18 USC §1801(a) (2004).  
Contrast the position in New South Wales where it is an offence to film for indecent purpose 
pursuant to Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) s 21G, but there is no reference to distributing 
indecent films in the Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW).  Further, the legislative response in 
the United Kingdom does not specifically refer to distributing voyeuristic images, but it does 
catch a person who operates equipment with the intention of enabling another person to engage 
in voyeurism:  Sexual Offences Act 2003 (UK) s 67(2).  Consequently, this would capture a 
person who, for example, distributes the images via the Internet in real time.  Note that 
distribution of video voyeurism is not covered in the United States Code.   
145 See especially Criminal Code (Qld) s 227A-C, Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) s 216G-N, Criminal 
Code (Can) s 162 and Video Voyeurism Act 18 USC §1801 (2004).  Note that installing a device 
to facilitate filming for indecent purposes is an offence in New South Wales:  Summary 
Offences Act 1988 (NSW) s 21H.  Further, installing equipment with the intention to commit 
voyeurism is an offence in the United Kingdom:  Sexual Offences Act 2003 (UK) s 67. 
146 See especially Criminal Code (Qld) s 227A-B, Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) ss 21 G 
and H, Criminal Code (Can) s 162, Sexual Offences Act 2003 (UK) s 67-8 and Video Voyeurism 
Act 18 USC §1801 (2004).  The position in New Zealand may be distinguished from these 
jurisdictions because it prohibits a person from possessing an intimate visual recording where 
they know it is an intimate visual recording and where they intend to distribute it:  Crimes Act 
1961 (NZ) s 216I. 
147 See generally Helene Wells, Troy Allard and Paul Wilson, 'Crime and CCTV in Australia:  
Understanding the Relationship' (Centre for Applied Psychology and Criminology: Bond 
University, Australia, 2006) for a discussion on closed circuit television recordings made by 
government entities. 
148 See espeically Criminal Code (Qld) s 227C, Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) s 216K and N, Criminal 
Code (Can) s 162(3) and (6) and Video Voyeurism Act 18 USC §1801(c) (2004).  Queensland 
provides several exemptions relating to law enforcement purposes.  For example, the visual 
recording offences will not apply to a law enforcement officer reasonably performing their 
duties:  Criminal Code (Qld) s 227C(1).  A further exemption is granted to a person acting 
reasonably in the performance of their duties where the person visually recorded is in lawful 
custody (detained under the Mental Health 2000 (Qld) or subject to a supervision order):  
Criminal Code (Qld) ss 227C(2) and (3).  A supervision order includes a community based 
order under the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld), a community based order or supervised 
release order under the Juvenile Justice Act 1992 (Qld), a post-prison community based release 
order or a conditional release order under the Corrective Services Act 2000 (Qld), an intensive 
drug rehabilitation order under the Drug Rehabilitation (Court Diversion) Act 2000 (Qld), and a 
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into visual recordings made and/or distributed for a voyeuristic purpose, but 
will not be confined to them.  People may make and/or distribute visual 
recordings for a range of other purposes including to embarrass or humiliate a 
person visually recorded, to portray family and friends, or to capture a 





In addition to making visual recordings, this thesis also focuses on distributing 
visual recordings; thus, it is useful to define the concept of ‘distributing’ in this 
context.  In December 2005, Queensland introduced an offence of distributing a 
prohibited visual recording.149  Distributing has been defined to include ‘(a) 
communicate, exhibit, send, supply or transmit to someone, whether to a 
particular person or not;  and (b) make available for access by someone, 
whether by a particular person or not;  and (c) enter into an agreement or 
arrangement to do something in paragraph (a) or (b);  and (d) attempt to 
distribute’.  It is almost impossible to envisage a type of distribution that is not 
caught by this overarching definition.  Unlike the Queensland definition of 
‘distributing’, the Canadian approach simply lists ‘prints, copies, publishes, 
distributes, circulates, sells, advertises, or makes available the recording’,150 
and overlooks attempting to distribute. 
 
New Zealand uses slightly different terminology to Queensland and Canada, 
and punishes a person who publishes, imports, exports or sells an intimate 
visual recording.151  New Zealand defines publishing to include displaying, 
sending, distributing, conveying and storing electronically.152  In New Zealand, 
the concept of ‘sells’ is defined separately to publishes.  Thus, the Queensland 
notion of ‘distributes’ offers a more encompassing single concept.  In contrast, 
New South Wales, the United Kingdom and the United States of America do 
                                                                                                                                  
supervision order or an interim supervision order under the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual 
Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld):  Criminal Code (Qld) ss 227C(3).  New Zealand provides more 
exemptions than Queensland.  New Zealand grants an exemptions to police, Customs officers, 
officers and employees of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, employees of the 
Department of Corrections, lawyers and agents providing legal advice or making 
representations in proceedings:  Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) s 216N.  With regard to publishing a 
covert visual recording, exceptions are provided to postal operators, couriers, network operators 
and service providers:  Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) s 216K.  Canada provides an exemption for peace 
officer who is acting under a warrant:  Criminal Code (Can) s 162(3).  Canada also provides a 
defence for voyeurism if it is carried out in the public good:  Criminal Code (Can) s 162(6).  
Whether the act serves the public good is a question of law:  Criminal Code (Can) s 162(7)(a).  
The United States of America,does not prohibit video voyeurism if it is done for an intelligence, 
lawful law enforcement or correctional activity: Video Voyeurism Act 18 USC §1801(c) (2004).  
Note that there are no exemptions in New South Wales and the United Kingdom.   
149 Criminal Code (Qld) s 227B(1). 
150 Criminal Code (Qld) s 162(4). 
151 Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) s 216J(1). 
152 Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) s 216J(2). 
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not offer a definition of distribution.153  While different wording is used in 
Queensland, New Zealand and Canada, this thesis submits that all approaches 
to distribution capture the key form of distribution mentioned in the media 
reports, which is uploading a visual recording to the Internet.154  Two other 
prevalent forms of distribution in a technological environment are sending 




Various legislative responses across the world specifically refer to 
voyeurism,155 sexual purpose,156 sexual gratification157 or sexual arousal,158 
and this thesis will include examples of making and/or distributing visual 
recordings that are done for these purposes.  Consequently, at this point, it is 
useful to define the concept of ‘voyeur’.   
 
The concept of ‘voyeur’ stems back to legend of Lady Godiva (in 
approximately 1050).159  According to the legend, Tom looked at Lady Godiva 
as she rode naked through the town on a horse in protest of taxes.  As a result, 
Tom was named Peeping Tom.160  Depending on the version of the legend, 
Peeping Tom was either blinded or killed for his action.  The notion of ‘Peeping 
Tom’ is synonymous with a voyeur. 
 
The Australian, New Zealand and, England and Wales Discussion Papers on 
visual recording do not define voyeur.161  In contrast, the Canadian 
Consultation Paper draws on the Canadian Oxford Dictionary for a definition of 
                                                 
153 New South Wales and the United Kingdom refer to indecent filming and voyeurism, 
respectively,  for the benefit of a third person, and thus envisage distribution, but they do not 
provide a definition of distribution:  Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) s 21G and Sexual 
Offences Act 2003 (UK) s 67.  In contrast, the United States of America does not contemplate 
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voyeur.  The Canadian Oxford Dictionary defines a voyeur as ‘a person who 
derives sexual gratification from the unauthorised observation of others as they 
undress or engage in sexual activities’.  Similarly, the Australian Oxford 
Dictionary (2nd ed, 2004) defines a voyeur as ‘(1) a person who obtains sexual 
gratification from observing others’ sexual actions or organs, (2) a powerless or 
passive spectator and (3) a person who enjoys seeing the pain or distress of 
others’.  Unfortunately, the Canadian and Australian legislative definitions do 
not shed any light on why some legislatures used the concept of ‘sexual 
purpose’ or ‘sexual arousal’ instead of or in addition to ‘sexual gratification’, 
but it seems that the difference (if any) would be trivial and that they all pursue 
voyeurs.  The definitions of ‘voyeur’ discussed above fail to explain the 
concept of ‘observation’ in any depth and, do not provide any concrete 
examples of the types of devices voyeurs may use to observe another person for 
sexual gratification.  Some examples of devices include a digital camera, 
mobile phone camera or video camera.  This thesis will draw on voyeuristic 
examples of visual recording, but will not be confined to them.  Even though 
some of the examples of visual recording discussed in this thesis may overlap 
with the notion of ‘pornography’, or ‘paedophilia’, a discussion of these 
concepts and how they are regulated by the criminal law is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. 
 
1.3 Structure of Thesis 
 
This thesis is divided into six chapters.  Chapter 1 has outlined the key issues 
and key concepts in this thesis.  In this technological environment, with 
advances in the size and capabilities of mobile phone cameras, digital cameras, 
video cameras and the Internet, making and/or distributing visual recordings 
has become problematic.  The community is said to be concerned about people 
visually recording children playing in a public park where the recording is done 
without consent; up-skirt filming; and visually recording people in, for 
example, communal change rooms and bathrooms.  This first chapter has 
highlighted several examples of this problem.  The criminal law in the 21st 
century has been called upon to consider this issue and various jurisdictions 
have provided a legislative response.  However, unlike murder or rape, the 
characterisation of making and/or distributing visual recordings as criminal is 
far from clear-cut and emerging technologies are continually forcing a fresh 
consideration of the ambit of the criminal law and what is accepted as a normal 
consequence of using a public place today.162  This thesis will explore this 
issue, and discuss whether a principled approach to criminalisation supports the 
criminalisation of making and/or distributing visual recordings. 
 
There is not one single principle that consistently underpins every decision to 
criminalise conduct.  Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 will discuss a range of principles 
that underpin the decision to criminalise conduct.  More specifically, chapter 2 
                                                 
162 Determining the scope of murder and rape may be difficult. 
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will discuss the conceptual boundaries of harm, social welfare, individual 
autonomy, morality and punishment of the offender.  While the fluidity of these 
concepts enables the criminal law to keep abreast of advances in technology 
and shifts in contemporary conduct, the fluidity challenges the boundaries of 
the criminal law.  Chapter 2 will establish whether any or all of these principles 
support the criminalisation of making and/or distributing visual recordings.163 
 
Chapter 3 will distinguish criminal law from civil law in order to identify the 
features of the criminal law, as a further determinant in whether making and/or 
distributing visual recordings should be criminalised.  It will review the 
following distinctions:  punishment and compensation; prohibiting and pricing;  
public and private;  subjective and objective culpability;  risk of harm and 
actual harm;  moral and immoral conduct;  essentialist approach and the hybrid 
approach.  This chapter will recognise that the boundaries between criminal law 
and civil law are blurred, which exacerbates the problem investigated in this 
thesis, that is, determining whether conduct should be criminalised. 
 
Chapter 4 will explore the conceptual boundaries of culpability as well as the 
subjective, objective and no-fault standards of culpability.  The availability of 
three standards of culpability complicates the decision about which is the 
appropriate standard of culpability that should be used, if making and/or 
distributing visual recordings were to be criminalised. 
 
Chapter 5 will examine the conceptual boundaries of consent.  Implied consent 
is of particular relevance to this thesis because the people in digital images are 
often unaware that they have been visually recorded and do not expressly 
consent to being in them.  In many situations, the setting is a public place and 
one issue is whether a person who merely steps outside their home has 
impliedly consented to being photographed or filmed. There are many 
approaches to the role of consent in the criminal law, for example, quantitative, 
quantitative plus exceptions, individual autonomy, paternalism, morality and 
contextual, which will be discussed in detail in chapter 5.  Chapter 5 develops a 
contextual approach to consent based on privacy literature and considers how 
the myriad of approaches to consent apply in the context of making and/or 
distributing visual recordings.     
 
The final chapter will summarise the key findings of a principled approach to 
criminalisation, which is established in chapters 2-5.  In the context of making 
and/or distributing visual recordings, chapter 6 will compare the findings of a 
principled approach to criminalisation with the legislative responses in 
Queensland, New South Wales, Canada, New Zealand and, England and Wales.  
These jurisdictions have been chosen because they have recently provided a 
legislative response in this area.  Where there is a discrepancy between a 
                                                 
163 While chapter 2 recognises that the reaction of the public may provide guidance on whether 
conduct should be criminalised, it does not form part of a principled approach to 
criminalisation.   
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principled approach and the legislative responses, this thesis will recommend 




In addition to mapping out the structure of this thesis and introducing key 
concepts, this chapter raised the central issue, that is, when should making 
and/or distributing visual recordings be criminalised?  This conduct sits at the 
margins of the criminal law and is topical given the recent inconsistent 
legislative responses in several jurisdictions and the increasing use of visual 
recording technologies in the 21st century.  Some of the key examples of this 
conduct discussed in this chapter include making and/or distributing visual 
recordings of a child playing in a public park, a topless female bather at a 
public beach, a person engaging in a private act such as showering and, up-skirt 
filming.  The criminalisation of contemporary issues should be done in a 
principled rather than ad hoc manner.  Once it is determined that conduct 
should be criminalised, in framing criminal offences it is important to consider 
the appropriate standard of culpability and the role of consent.  The next chapter 
will discuss whether the principles of harm, social welfare, individual 
autonomy, morality and punishment of the offender support the criminalisation 




2 CHAPTER 2:  PRINCIPLES UNDERPINNING THE DECISION 
TO CRIMINALISE CONDUCT  
  
Chapter 1 introduced several central concepts including ‘criminalisation’ and, 
this chapter will explore the principles underpinning the decision to criminalise 
conduct.  Whether to criminalise making and/or distributing visual recordings is 
a perfect example of the difficulties in determining what conduct should be 
criminalised.  If a child is visually recorded fully clothed in a public place, 
whether or not for the purposes of sexual gratification, should this be a criminal 
offence?  If a woman is visually recorded sunbathing topless, or after she 
accidentally exposes herself, should this be a criminal offence?  Although these 
are thorny examples, these fact situations, and the controversy which has 
surrounded them in this context, illuminate the challenges that exist in drawing 
the criminalisation line. 
 
This offence of making and/or distributing visual recording exists only because 
of modern technology, and in a number of ways stretches the boundaries of 
conceptions of criminalisation.  In some cases, such as up-skirt filming, 
criminalisation of the conduct is not difficult to envisage.  In others, such as the 
filming of persons who are fully clothed, it is much more difficult, regardless of 
the motive.  This offence is at the margins of the criminal law, and is a 
contemporary example of the very challenging issue of when a criminal offence 
actually occurs.   
 
2.1 No Single Principle Underpinning Criminalisation 
 
Some commentators suggest that there is no unifying factor that underpins 
every decision on whether to criminalise conduct and, as this chapter will 
demonstrate, there is no single test which can be offered to assist with this 
decision.  As will be seen, writers in this area have suggested a number of 
different approaches, some more satisfactory than others, but none giving a 
definitive answer. 
 
For example, Simester and Sullivan note that ‘the sheer variety of conduct that 
has been designated a criminal wrong defies reduction to any ‘essential’ 
minimum’.164  In coming to this conclusion they argue that the criminal law is 
commonly used to control conduct that lacks a moral dimension and as a 
‘public means of suppression’.165  They provide some examples where the 
criminal law in England and Wales has been ‘overused-as a regulatory 
device’.166  While their examples of failing to notify a driving licence authority 
of a change of address and providing an incomplete consumer credit contract 
                                                 




are quite different from making and/or distributing visual recordings, they 
illustrate how the criminal law has managed to expand its boundaries well 
beyond its core.  The core in this sense canvasses types of offences that should 
obviously be characterised as criminal.167 
 
Similarly, McCutcheon contends that ‘the limits of the criminal law cannot be 
set by reference to a ‘simple principle’, be it harm, individual liberty or 
whatever.  Instead the boundaries of the law are shaped by a variety of forces 
that operate as broad guidelines rather than its clear-cut criteria’.168  He 
continues that searching for a single criterion underpinning criminalisation is 
futile.169  McCutcheon’s analysis indicates two principles that underpin the 
decision to criminalise conduct, that is, harm and individual autonomy.  
Further, McSherry and Naylor have placed emphasis on McCutcheon’s 
construction by inserting it at the end of their section on the aims of the 
criminal law in their book.170   
 
McCutcheon is not the only academic who suggests that the search for a single 
principle underpinning criminalisation is fruitless.  Duff suggests that  
 
we should not even hope to develop a single theory of criminal liability, 
but must instead recognize that in different contexts liability and 
culpability will take different forms and display quite different logical 
structures.171   
 
He notes that the criminal law mirrors a range of values, some of which are 
incompatible; and rather than finding a unifying principle that underpins 
criminalisation, it is more important to identify the types of wrongdoing that 
should be relevant to the criminal law.  Duff does not offer any insight into 
what types of wrongdoing should be controlled by the criminal law that may 
assist the legislature to determine whether new problems emerging in a 
technological environment should fall within or outside the boundaries of the 
criminal law. 
 
Duff’s reference to ‘logical structures’ in the quote above is reflected in 
Findlay, Odgers and Yeo’s comment that the boundaries of criminal law are 
                                                 
167 See also Douglas Husak, 'Crimes Outside the Core' (2003-2004) 39 Tulsa Law Review 755, 
756, where Husak provides alternative but arguably consistent definitions of core offences as 
‘those that consume the bulk of the workload in our systems of criminal justice…[and] those 
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168 Paul McCutcheon, 'Morality and the Criminal Law:  Reflections on Hart-Devlin' (2002) 47 
Criminal Law Quarterly 15, 37-8. 
169 Ibid 38. 
170 Bernadette McSherry and Bronwyn Naylor, Australian Criminal Laws:  Critical 
Perspectives (2004) 22. 
171 R A Duff, 'Theorizing Criminal Law: A 25th Anniversary Essay' (2005) 25 Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 353, 363. 
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based on rationality and justice and not merely chance or contingency.172  They 
argue that the development of criminal law has been unpredictable because of a 
‘fundamental ambiguity of its central organising principles’.173  There is not an 
easy answer ‘to why the criminal law has taken one direction and not another 
over a particular subject’.174  The justification for criminalisation stems from 
one or more policies or principles being priviledged during a value laden 
selection process.175 The question remains however as to how these values are 
determined.  Different societies, at different times in history, have determined 
that some activities should be categorised as criminal.  Notably however, in 
relation to some activities, whether they are criminalised has differed from time 
to time. 
 
Lacey, Wells and Quick describe how societies determine whether conduct is 
criminalised as the ‘substance of criminalisation’.176  Unfortunately, they do not 
provide guidance on how societies determine what should be criminalised, but 
state upfront that the ‘substance of criminalisation’ is a key assumption of their 
book and that it is ‘of central importance to understanding criminal law’.177  
Lacey, Wells and Quick concentrate on the impact the criminal law has on 
social relations and politics.178  Rather than focussing on the impact of the 
criminal law, this thesis will pay attention to the principles underpinning 
criminalisation.  Accurately, Lacey, Wells and Quick recognise that a crime ‘is 
a construct of particular legal and social systems, reflecting temporally and 
geographically specific interests’.179  However the question remains as to why 
they leave such an important question, on how societies determine whether 
conduct should be criminalised, unanswered.  
 
Ashworth rightly notes that the decision to criminalise conduct is multifaceted 
and justified by a range of ‘conflicting social, political and historical factors’.180  
Proof of this is the fact that a number of offences have moved in and out of 
criminalisation.  There is no doubt that offences such as rape and murder are 
appropriately criminalised, have always been, and fittingly attract, society’s 
condemnation.  However at the margins of criminal law are the more testing 
examples, one of which is making and/or distributing visual recordings.  This 
conduct is also an example of the way in which new technologies have created 
offences where none previously existed.  It is in these challenging areas that the 
issue of what constitutes a criminal offence becomes less clear cut. 
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Norrie suggests that one factor in the decision to criminalise can be more 
influential than the others.  For example, he places more emphasis on social 
relations as opposed to political or historical factors, but recognises that the 
boundaries of the criminal law change over time.  In particular, Norrie suggests 
that ‘modern criminal law was formed in a particular historical epoch and 
derived its characteristic ‘shape’ from fundamental features of the social 
relations of that epoch’.181  The influence of social, political and historical 
factors on criminalisation is difficult to measure and compare, but it is possible 
that one may be more influential than the others.  Rather than engage with 
social, political and historical factors, a principled approach to criminalisation 
will be adopted. 
 
In contrast to singling out one aspect of potentially greater influence, some 
commentators have provided a list of matters to be considered in making the 
decision on whether to criminalise conduct.  For example, Simester and 
Sullivan place emphasis on Lord Mostyn’s factors to be taken into 
consideration in determining whether criminal offences should be created.182  
These are that the conduct must be sufficiently serious to justify 
criminalisation, whether the conduct could be controlled by other means, the 
enforceability of the offence, the ability to clearly articulate the offence, and 
that the penalty corresponds with the offence’s seriousness.183  While this list of 
factors appears compelling at first instance, it is not exhaustive and it does not 
indicate how the factors should be prioritised or weighted.  Further, it does not 
indicate whether every factor needs to be considered before making the 
decision on whether to criminalise conduct, nor whether the application of the 
majority of factors is sufficient.  Most of the factors listed by Lord Mostyn 
relate to the ‘Presumptions’ and ‘Pragmatics’ filters, which were discussed in 
chapter 1.184  The ‘Presumptions Filter’, as discussed by Schonsheck, is used to 
determine whether the conduct could be reduced or eliminated by means other 
than the criminal law, for example, an education campaign.185  The ‘Pragmatics 
Filter’ considers the pragmatic outcome of the criminal law and requires a cost 
and benefit analysis of the consequences of the criminal law.186  As mentioned 
in chapter 1, these filters are beyond the scope of this thesis, which is using 
another filter, that is, the ‘Principles Filter’.187  Thus, while there are many 
questions around enforceability and ability to clearly articulate offences and 
penalties, these questions on form go beyond the boundaries of a principled 
approach to criminalisation, which centres on content.  However, the process of 
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determining whether conduct is sufficiently serious to be criminalised is 
important from the perspective of the harm principle and is explored below. 
  
Similar ambiguities are found in Jareborg’s six legitimate arguments for 
criminalisation, which are blameworthiness, need, moderation, inefficiency, 
control costs and victim’s interests.188  From Jareborg’s list, only 
‘blameworthiness’ and ‘victim’s interests’ are relevant to a principled approach 
to criminalisation because the other arguments listed by Jareborg are more 
relevant to the ‘Presumptions’ and ‘Pragmatics’ filters, rather than the 
‘Principles Filter’.189  Rather than use the terms ‘blameworthiness’ or ‘victim’s 
interests’, ‘culpability’ and ‘consent’, will be used respectively.  Culpability 
and consent are defined in chapter 1.   
 
In terms of culpability, Jareborg states that an ‘intentional act is more 
reprehensible than a negligent act’.190  He also suggests that the motives of the 
offender may make a difference because ‘not everyone has the same ability to 
act as a fully responsible agent’.191  He suggests that culpability depends on 
‘what values and interests have been infringed or threatened, and partly on 
whether the conduct involves actual infringement (harm), or creates a danger of 
such infringement, or is related to such infringement in some more distant 
way’.192  The offender’s culpability and the victim’s consent are important 
principles underpinning criminalisation.  The culpability and consent principles 
will be addressed separately in chapters 4 and 5, respectively.   
 
Rather than providing a list of factors to be considered in making the decision 
to criminalise conduct, Husak recommends that an exhaustive list of positive 
and negative reasons for enacting criminal offences be devised.193  His list falls 
within the ‘Pragmatics Filter’ rather than the ‘Principles Filter’ because the list 
relates more to the costs associated with implementing criminal law.194  
However, creating two lists, that is, for and against criminalisation, does not 
overcome the problems encountered by Lord Mostyn and Jareborg above.  The 
negative reasons for criminalising conduct are consistent with a minimalist 
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approach to criminalisation and using criminal law as a last resort.  Husak states 
that criminal law is used in an unprincipled way as the first resort for ‘Anglo-
American jurisdictions’ because they create criminal offences ‘casually and 
routinely’.195  The notion of ‘last resort’ requires that the criminal law not be 
employed if other means could effectively control the conduct.  Husak 
recommends that the term ‘last resort’ be used as a ‘tiebreaker’.196  ‘Last resort’ 
arises in chapter 3 where criminal law is distinguished from civil law in an 
effort to sharpen the focus of criminal law.  Instead of recommending that 
making and/or distributing visual recordings should be criminalsed as a first 
resort, this thesis seeks to approach this issue in a principled manner. 
 
2.2 Unpacking the Principles Underpinning Criminalisation 
 
With the exception of culpability and consent, this chapter provides an 
overview of the central principles underpinning the decision to criminalise 
conduct.  The principles discussed in this chapter have been derived from the 
inconsistent literature on criminalisation.  Findlay, Odgers and Yeo state that 
the key aim of the criminal law is to prevent certain kinds of conduct ‘that 
society regards as either harmful or potentially harmful’.197  Consequently, they 
view the harm principle as the overarching principle protected by the criminal 
law.  Further, they state that in achieving this key aim of the criminal law, it is 
necessary to identify the fundamental interests that deserve the protection of the 
criminal law.198  They provide three examples of fundamental interests, that is, 
individual autonomy, moral wrongness and community welfare.199  The scope 
of the term ‘community welfare’ is analogous to McSherry and Naylor’s social 
welfare.  McSherry and Naylor suggest that the aims of criminal law are shaped 
by punishment, prevention of harm, preservation of morality and social 
welfare.200   
 
Ashworth’s analysis on criminalisation is arguably the most comprehensive 
discussion.201  He discusses all of the politics of lawmaking, principle of 
individual autonomy, principle of welfare, harm and minimalism, assessing the 
seriousness of offences, morally wrong behaviour, criminalising omissions, 
minor harms, remote harms and victimless crimes, under the head of 
criminalisation.202  Many of these topics will be explored in this chapter, except 
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for criminalising omissions because it is acts rather than omissions that are 
relevant to making and/or distributing visual recordings.   
 
While this chapter acknowledges the important impact that the politics of 
lawmaking (for example, public opinion and the role of the media) have on the 
development of criminal law, it cannot be called a principle because it does not 
offer a theoretical foundation for criminalisation like the principles of harm, 
morality, social welfare, individual autonomy and punishment.203  This chapter 
will discuss public opinion because it is an important practical consideration in 
the decision on whether to criminalise conduct. 
 
Ashworth’s ‘principle of welfare’ is analogous to ‘social welfare’ and 
‘community welfare’, which are used by the other commentators above.  
Instead of the using the phrase ‘aims of the criminal law’ in his chapter on 
criminalisation, Ashworth utilises the phrases, ‘theoretical justifications for 
criminalization’204 and the ‘principles that may tell for or against making 
conduct criminal’.205   
 
Bronitt and McSherry use the terms ‘theories’206 and ‘normative ideas’207 to 
refer to the prevention of harm, morality, the public interest and the 
preservation of welfare.208  Bronitt and McSherry’s notion of ‘public interest’ is 
akin to Ashworth’s ‘politics of lawmaking’ because they concede that ‘[w]hile 
appearing to be neutral and objective, the public interest is a highly political 
concept.’209   
 
In summary, the literature on criminalisation uses the terms ‘aims’, ‘principles’, 
‘justifications’, ‘theories’ and ‘normative ideas’ indiscriminately, and principle 
will be used here.  This chapter will synthesise the conceptual boundaries of the 
principles examined by the various authors mentioned above, albeit that some 
principles are named differently.  In particular, it will provide an overview of: 
 
• reaction to public opinion, 
• protection from harm, 
• preservation of morality, 
• promotion of social welfare, 
• respect for individual autonomy, and  
• punishment of the offender. 
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In doing so, this chapter will explore the conceptual boundaries of the 
underpinning notions of ‘harm’, ‘morality’, ‘social welfare interests’ and 
‘individual interests’.  After unpacking each principle above, the lessons 
learned about each principle in the context of making and/or distributing visual 
recordings will be applied. 
 
2.2.1 Reaction to Public Opinion 
 
Public opinion, politicians and the media have had a profound influence on the 
boundaries of the criminal law.  Ashworth places great emphasis on the role of 
the ‘politics of lawmaking’ in criminalisation by discussing this ahead of 
concepts such as individual autonomy, social welfare and harm.210  An 
examination of criminalisation is incomplete without making reference to 
public opinion, and the role of the media and politicians in shaping 
contemporary criminal laws. 
 
Prima facie, public opinion may appear to be a ‘counter-intuitive place’211 to 
determine whether to criminalise conduct.  However, Lacey, Wells and Quick 
recognise that ordinary people shape the definition of crime212 and that public 
opinion and perceptions of public opinion are ‘enormously influential’.213  
Politicians who are accountable to the public are heavily influenced by their 
understanding of public opinion.214  The ‘criminal law should not be 
significantly out of touch with society’s expectations’215 and it ‘should be under 
continuous scrutiny to ensure that it maintains the respect of society’.216 
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There is a vast amount of literature discussing how society ranks the 
seriousness of different crimes.217  Crime seriousness surveys put various 
vignettes to respondents and ask them to indicate the seriousness of each 
vignette usually using a Likert Scale.218  The results of crime seriousness 
surveys are relevant to a wide-range of policy and legislative decisions, for 
example, perceptions of appropriate punishment, allocation of police and 
prosecution resources, measuring changes in crime trends and to evaluate 
models of law.219  Designing a valid and reliable crime seriousness survey is a 
complex process.220  Drawing a line on the Likert Scale at which point the 
conduct should be criminalised appears to be an arbitrary process and gives a 
false sense of precision.  Perhaps a means of enhancing this process is to attach 
descriptors to the Likert Scale, similarly to the harm gradation table explored 
below.  Despite these weaknesses in crime seriousness surveys, they indicate 
the public’s opinion and may influence the decision to criminalise conduct.   
 
Ashworth includes the criminal law’s response to public opinion in his notion 
of the ‘politics of lawmaking’.221  This notion includes other factors that result 
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examples that use public opinion to gauge crime seriousness, see Mark A Cohen, 'Some New 
Evidence on the Seriousness of Crime' (1988) 26 Criminology 343, which takes a monetary 
approach. 
218 David A Parton, Mark Hansel and John R Stratton, 'Measuring Crime Seriousness: Lessons 
from the National Survey of Crime Severity' (1991) 31 British Journal of Criminology 72, 73.   
219 Terance D Miethe, 'Public Consensus on Crime Seriousness: Normative Structure or 
Methodological Artifact?' (1982) 20 Criminology 515, 516. 
220 Geoff Payne and Judy Payne, Key Concepts in Social Research (2004) 195 and 233. 
221 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 25. 
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in the enactment of criminal laws, for example, law reform commission reports 
prepared after consultation, campaign of a pressure group, greater public 
exposure of harms and the views of law enforcers.222  Criminalising conduct 
may be seen as an ‘instantly satisfying political response to public worries’223 
about publicised inappropriate conduct.  It is also suggested as more proactive 
than merely consulting with the public or commissioning research.224  
Ashworth agrees that the boundaries of criminal law are largely due to exercises 
of political power at various points in time.225  He discounts the notion of 
morally wrong behaviour underpinning criminalisation.226  Instead, Ashworth 
concludes that ‘there are many offences for which criminal liability is merely 
imposed by Parliament as a practical means of controlling an activity, without 
implying the element of social condemnation which is characteristic of the 
major or traditional crimes’.227  This view is consistent with modern criminal 
law frequently being used to implement ‘regulatory’ offences, as will be 
discussed below under the head of the preservation of morality.  Consequently, 
the growth of modern criminal law ‘may reflect particular phases in 
contemporary social history, as written by the mass media and politicians’.228 
 
According to Beale, the media emphasises crime stories to grab the attention of 
viewers or readers, and that the stories are modified to meet the perceived 
demand.229  The media publicise and exemplify competing social realities in 
television soap operas and selected news stories.230  Lacey, Wells and Quick 
suggest that there is a long history of the media producing images of victims, 
perpetrators and crime responses that are ‘often far removed from empirical 
reality’,231 while other literature highlights the role of media in creating moral 
panics.232   
 
                                                 
222 Ibid. 
223 Ibid 23. 
224 Ibid. 
225 Ibid 1. 
226 Ibid 2. 
227 Ibid 1-2. 
228 Ibid 25. 
229 Sara Sun Beale, 'The News Media's Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How Market-
Driven News Promotes Punitiveness' (2006) 48 William and Mary Law Review 397, 398.  See 
also Geraldine Mackenzie, How Judges Sentence (2005) 168. 
230 Nicola Lacey, Celia Wells and Oliver Quick, Reconstructing Criminal Law Text and 
Materials, Law in Context (3rd ed, 2003) 75. 
231 Ibid.  Compare Ericson who portrays the role of the media in a more positive light.  In 
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own organizational realities’:  Richard V Ericson, 'Mass Media, Crime, Law, and Justice - An 
Institutional Approach' (1991) 31 The British Journal of Criminology 219, 242.   
232 See especially David Garland, The Culture of Control:  Crime and Social Order in 
Contemporary Society (2001), where an account of the media was provided, that is, ‘it has 
provided us with regular, everyday occasions in which to play out the emotions of fear, anger, 
resentment, and fascination that our experience of crime provokes’:  158.  With regard to moral 
panics, see also Chris Hale et al (eds), Criminology (2005) 150. 
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It has been suggested that this sensationalism has been driven by the wish to 
boost television ratings, sell magazines and newspapers, and generally increase 
profits.233  Sensationalism is also driven by ‘politicians and moral entrepreneurs 
[who] utilize the media to deploy evocative crime imagery as they work to 
consolidate political power or criminalize marginal groups.’234  Despite this 
criticism of the media, they can have a positive role in shaping the boundaries 
of the criminal law.235  The media are an ‘important means of conveying ideas 
and arguments about law reform, they also influence perceptions of how 
threatening crime is, what kind of crime is prevalent, and what should be done 
about it.’236  Media reports may reflect public opinion as well as relevant social 
welfare interests, individual interests and acceptable levels of morality.  Thus, 
the media are influential in determining what conduct is criminalised and what 
conduct is not criminalised. 
 
The boundaries of the criminal law are shaped by the media, politicians and 
public opinion, but they are not part of a principled approach to criminalisation 
because they are sensationalist rather than theoretical considerations.237  It 
would be remiss to avoid a discussion on public opinion, the role of the media 
and the politics associated with criminalisation because their impact is 
significant and it is important for the law to have the respect of society.   
 
Gauging public opinion via a reliable and valid crime seriousness survey is a 
complex process.  Not surprisingly, there is no literature that attempts to gauge 
the public’s opinion on the crime seriousness of making and/or distributing 
visual recordings.  Thus, there is an opportunity to undertake further research 
on making and/or distributing visual recordings by conducting a crime 
seriousness survey to gauge public opinion.  While public opinion may support 
criminalisation, as discussed above, public opinion is not a theoretical 
foundation and does not form a part of a principled approach to criminalisation. 
 
Using public opinion to shape the boundaries of the criminal law resonates with 
criminalising conduct on the basis of social welfare principle because they are 
both democratically determined.  However, unlike the social welfare principle, 
public opinion does not offer a theoretical basis for determining what should be 
criminalised and what should not be criminalised.  For completeness, this 
section will illustrate the public’s opinion on examples of making and/or 
distributing visual recordings as reported by the media and portrayed in the 
consultation papers.   
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According to the 2005 Australian Standing Committee of Attorneys-General 
Discussion Paper, the ‘media reported on the community outrage’ at the South 
Bank Parklands incident, discussed in chapter 1, where children playing in a 
public park were secretly visually recorded and their images were uploaded to 
the Internet.238  Several other incidents of making and/or distributing visual 
recordings that have prompted public concern have littered media reports as 
well as the discussion papers in Australia, Canada and New Zealand.  
Numerous examples of these incidents were highlighted in chapter 1 and will 
not be repeated here.  On one view, the community outrage and concern 
regarding, for example, a stranger secretly making visual recordings of children 
playing in a public park and uploading them to the Internet, provides support 
for criminalisation of this conduct.  However, the expansion of the criminal law 
should be principled and not merely based on allegations of public outrage as 
expressed in media reports.  The first principle discussed in this chapter is that 
of harm. 
 
2.2.2 Protection from Harm 
 
The purpose of this section is to provide an overview of the scope of the harm 
principle. The flexible core of the notion of ‘harm’ has made the harm test 
notoriously difficult to apply,239 and there is a positive correlation between the 
scope of harm and the breadth of criminal laws.  However, the reality is that not 
every type of harm warrants the protection of criminalisation.  This section will 
consider whether the harm principle relates to the harm to others or harm to 
oneself, whether the concept of ‘harm’ has nebulous edges and how to decide 
what interests it protects, whether the criminal law should interfere in minor 
harms and the ramifications of this, and how von Hirsch and Jareborg’s living-
standards analysis tool offers a framework for grading harm.240  It will then 
consider whether the criminalisation of making and/or distributing visual 
recordings is justified on the basis of the harm principle. 
 
2.2.2.1  Harm to Others 
 
Several commentators have identified the need for the harm principle to relate 
to harm to others rather than harm to the offender (the latter being legal 
paternalism).241  For example, Ashworth cites John Stuart Mill’s harm principle 
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underpinning criminalisation, that is, ‘the only purpose for which power can be 
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against, his [or 
her] will, is to prevent harm to others’.242  Mill argues that conduct should only 
be criminalised if it causes harm to others.  He impliedly rejects criminalisation 
if it merely protects the offender from harm.  Further, the use of the word only 
rejects criminalisation if it is based on any other ground.  With regard to harm 
to others, Mill’s view is consistent with the view expressed by Findlay, Odgers 
and Yeo; that is, that conduct should be criminalised if it injures the rights and 
interests of other people, that is, harms others.243   
 
Feinberg is more explicit and accepts harm to others as a justification for 
criminalisation, but rejects legal paternalism.  In particular, Feinberg states, ‘It 
is always a good reason in support of penal legislation that it would probably be 
effective in preventing (eliminating, reducing) harm to persons other than the 
actor and there is probably no other means that is equally effective at no greater 
cost to other values’.244  Feinberg’s principle of harm also suggests that harm to 
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the Code, and in the Common Law' (1988) 19 Rutgers Law Journal 725.   
244 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law:  Harm to Others (1984) 26.  Note that 
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of the Criminal Law:  Offense to Others (1985).  Simester and Sullivan refer to the first 
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others is only one consideration in the decision to criminalise conduct and 
opens the path for other considerations.   
 
Thus, the harm principle is appropriately concerned with the harm to others 
and, in the context of making and/or distributing visual recordings, this is 
important because the person making and/or distributing the visual recording 
potentially causes harm to the person visually recorded.245  In some instances, 
making and/or distributing a visual recording of another may not cause any 
harm because, for example, a topless female may sunbathe in a public place 
because she wants to be, or does not mind if she is, visually recorded by others.  
On the other hand, a topless female sunbather may be offended and may feel 
that her privacy has been invaded.246  Similarly, when school boys wearing 
rowing costumes were secretly visually recorded and the visual recordings were 
uploaded to the Internet, they were angry, felt violated and exploited, and were 
anxious about going into public places.247  Other boys in the same situation 
may not mind or may be quite happy to have their image uploaded to the 
Internet.  Thus, making and/or distributing visual recordings may cause harm to 
those who are visually recorded, it largely depends on the individual visually 
recorded. 
 
2.2.2.2  The Ambit of Harm  
 
Mill, a leading liberal philosopher, did not provide a definition of harm when 
espousing his harm principle, but Feinberg, another influential liberal 
philosopher, defined harm as a ‘thwarting, setting back, or defeating an 
interest’.248  When determining the importance of opposing interests, three 
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factors are taken into consideration, that is, ‘a.  how ‘vital’ they are in the 
interest networks of their possessors; b.  the degree to which they are reinforced 
by other interests, private and public; [and] c.  their inherent moral quality’.249  
The harm principle invokes a balancing of the degree of probability of the harm 
and gravity of the possible harm compared with the social value of the 
conduct.250   A further requirement of harm is that it be wrongful.251  ‘One 
person wrongs another when his [or her] indefensible (unjustifiable and 
inexcusable) conduct violates the other’s right, and in all but certain very 
special cases such conduct will also invade the other’s interest and thus be 
harmful in the sense [of a setback to interests]’.252  As will be discussed below, 
privacy interests and freedom of expression are certainly integral to the context 
of making and/or distributing visual recordings.  The harm principle only 
respects individual autonomy to the extent that individual autonomy does not 
interfere with other individuals.253  Individual autonomy is another principle 
underpinning criminalisation and is discussed later in this chapter. 
 
While Feinberg’s definition of harm was a significant contribution to the harm 
principle, it has been subjected to criticism.  One of the criticisms has been with 
respect to the ambiguity of the type of interest protected by the harm principle.  
In particular, Ashworth notes that Feinberg’s definition of harm, which focuses 
on an individual’s legitimate interests, does not address the political, cultural or 
moral nature of the interest setback.254  Further, McSherry and Naylor conclude 
that the definition does not canvass wider social, indirect or gendered harms.255  
They question whether harm encompasses indirect, potential, psychological or 
economic harm,256  without putting forward any arguments or a conclusion on 
these issues.    Ashworth adds to the debate by discussing another type of harm, 
                                                 
249 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law:  Harm to Others (1984) 217. 
250 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 31. 
251 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law:  Harm to Others (1984) 105. 
252 Ibid 34.  See also Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 31, which 
suggests that wrongfulness is an essential ingredient in the harm principle and ‘needs to be 
analysed not in terms of notions of moral wrong but in terms of the interests of others and 
conceptions of their personhood and autonomy’. 
253 Paul H Robinson, 'The Role of Harm and Evil in Criminal Law:  A Study in Legislative 
Deception?' (1994) 5 Contemporary Legal Issues 299.   See also Heather Douglas and Lee 
Godden, 'Intimate Partner Violence: Transforming Harm into a Crime' (2003) 10 Murdoch 
University Electronic Journal of Law  and Heather Douglas and Lee Godden, 'The 
Decriminalisation of Domestic Violence: Examining the Interaction Between the Criminal Law 
and Domestic Violence' (2003) 27 Criminal Law Journal 32 with regard to harm in the context 
of domestic violence. 
254 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 30. 
255 Bernadette McSherry and Bronwyn Naylor, Australian Criminal Laws:  Critical 
Perspectives (2004) 19. 
256 Ibid.  Cf John Gardner, 'Rationality and the Rule of Law in Offences Against the Person' 
(1994) 53 Cambridge Law Journal 502, 515, which focuses on the ways of bringing about harm 
rather than on the types or degrees of harm..   
 48
that is, remote harm.257  While direct and physical harms fall within the core of 
harm, it has nebulous edges.  These nebulous edges may be averted by 
identifying the interests protected by the harm principle.258  Making choices 
about the interests protected is morally loaded.259  However, this is necessary 
because if there was no conception of the relevant interests, the harm principle 
would be vacuous.260 
 
Adopting a principled approach to criminalisation on the ground of harm, in the 
context of making and/or distributing visual recordings, requires the 
consequences of the conduct to fall within the ambit of harm.  If a limited 
interpretation of harm is embraced, for example, that harm only includes 
physical harm and direct harm; the principle will not support the criminalisation 
of making and/or distributing visual recordings.  This is because making and/or 
distributing a visual recording does not cause physical harm, unlike assault 
offences and the offences endangering life or health.  Further, making a visual 
recording will not result in a direct or immediate harm where a person does not 
know that they have been visually recorded and only find out that they have 
been visually recorded when they see their image, for example, on the Internet, 
which may be some months later.  On the other hand, this may be a direct harm 
of distributing the visual recording.  Thus, if the notion of ‘harm’ only 
encapsulates physical and direct harm, making and/or distributing visual 
recordings should not be criminalised under the principle of harm. 
 
The types of harm will vary from individual to individual and case to case.261  
However, the types of harm (if any) caused by making and/or distributing 
visual recordings may be described as psychological, indirect and potential 
harms.  As an example, what types of harm did the school boys wearing rowing 
costumes suffer?  They were secretly visually recorded and their images were 
uploaded on a voyeuristic website.  The boys’ reactions included ‘feelings of 
anger, a sense of violation, anxiety about going out in public places, feelings of 
exploitation and invasion of privacy’.262  In another example, women who had 
been secretly filmed by an operatic society technician in a changing room 
described their feelings as ‘humiliated’, ‘really disgusted’ and ‘sick and 
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shocked’.263  In a further example, a female who had been secretly filmed by a 
friend in the bathroom and bedroom described her feelings ‘as though her skin 
had been ripped off’ and ‘felt that the voyeur’s actions should have been 
“treated like rape”’.264  While the response of the person visually recorded may 
vastly differ, it is ‘likely to fall within the parameters of development of 
psychological symptoms and disorders, distrust in relationships, fear of 
personal safety, and shame and humiliation’.265   
 
In assessing harm, the 2005 Australian Standing Committee of Attorneys-
General Discussion Paper suggests that the following factors should be taken 
into consideration:   
 
• a lack of consent to the making of the visual recording and the distribution 
of the visual recording (this point revolves around controlling one’s own 
image);   
• the nature of the visual recording, that is, whether the visual recording 
objectifies the person visually recorded;   
• whether the visual recordings are displayed in a sexually explicit context or 
involve objectification themes;   
• whether the purpose of the visual recordings is for sexual gratification;  and 
• the fact that visual recordings are permanent records that can be scrutinized 
at later points in time and can be distributed to a world wide audience.266   
 
These factors provide guidance on how to avert the nebulous edges of the 
concept of ‘harm’ in the context of making and/or distributing visual 
recordings.  Notably, the Australian Standing Committee of Attorneys-General 
did not expressly list privacy, but arguably it is included in the first factor about 
having the ability to control one’s image, which will be discussed in detail in 
chapter 5.   
 
The 2004 New Zealand Law Commission’s Study Paper provides a different 
range of factors including: 
 
• the relationship between the offender and the subject;  
• the location;  
• how the visual recording is distributed; 
• the nature of the activity visually recorded;  and  
• whether the subject is vulnerable due to pre-existing factors.267   
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The factors from the 2004 New Zealand Law Commission’s Study Paper omit 
privacy, but it could be implied from the location and the nature of the activity 
recorded. 
 
In contrast, the 2002 Canadian Department of Justice’s Consultation Paper 
places emphasis on privacy, and addresses harm from two perspectives.  The 
first perspective protects an individual’s privacy where it coincides with 
protecting an individual’s physical or sexual integrity.268   The second 
perspective takes into account the frequency of an offence.269   
 
Even though the factors and perspectives identified in the Australian, New 
Zealand and Canadian Consultation Papers may not be exhaustive and have not 
been weighted, they provide guidance on the scope of the term ‘harm’ in the 
context of making and/or distributing visual recordings and intimate that some 
instances of this conduct involve more harm than others.270  For example, 
where the person visually recorded is sexually objectified; where the person 
making and/or distributing the visual recording abuses their position of trust 
with the person visually recorded; whether the person visually recorded is in a 
private location such as a toilet, bathroom, shower or bedroom; and whether the 
visual recordings are sexually explicit and portray a person’s private body parts.  
The conception of ‘private body parts’ utilised in this thesis does not include 
female breasts, and the purpose of this is to permit a distinction, for example, 
between a woman who openly exposes her breasts at a public beach and a 
woman who reveals her breasts as she undresses in a bathroom.   
 
While the Discussion Papers above suggest that examples involving sexual 
objectification, abuse of a position of trust, private locations and private body 
parts are more serious than other examples of making and/or distributing visual 
recordings (for example, making a visual recording of a person walking down a 
public street, playing in a public park or sunbathing at a public beach), the 
question remains whether even these more serious examples are only minor and 




2.2.2.3  Minor Harm 
 
Harm can be divided into many categories, for example, minor, serious and 
grave.  Minor harms are particularly significant because, as will be discussed 
below, making and/or distributing visual recordings would appear to fall within 
                                                 
268 Canada, Department of Justice Canada, Voyeurism as a Criminal Offence:  A Consultation 
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the minor harm category rather than the serious or grave categories.  Some 
types of minor harm are not criminalised as they fall outside the scope of 
‘harm’ required for the purposes of criminalisation.  For example, Feinberg 
states that harm does not canvass ‘mere transitory disappointments, minor 
physical and mental ‘hurts,’ and a miscellany of disliked states of mind, 
including various forms of offendedness, anxiety, and boredom’.271  In contrast, 
some types of minor harms are criminalised, for example, dropping litter and 
illegal parking.272  Perhaps the only way of reconciling why some examples of 
a minor harm are criminalised and others are not is with reference to another 
principle underpinning criminalisation, such as morality, social welfare, and 
individual autonomy, rather than harm.  According to Feinberg, the 
criminalisation cut-off point for minor harm depends on whether criminalising 
the harm causes more harm than it prevents.273  This balancing act is probably 
easier said than done.   
 
Feinberg provides some factors to assist in making the decision to criminalise 
minor harms.  In particular, he uses the factors for conduct which he describes 
as not ‘perfectly harmless’ or ‘directly harmful’.274  Feinberg’s factors relate to 
the specific harm in question and are difficult to apply.  In particular, he does 
not comment on the weight of these factors, whether they are listed in order of 
priority or whether they all need to be considered in determining 
criminalisation.  In any event, the factors provide more guidance than finding 
the cut-off point by a pros and cons balancing act. 
 
Ashworth describes regulatory offences as minor offences, and these are 
reinforced by the criminal law because it is ‘relatively cheap, convenient, and 
                                                 
271 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law:  Harm to Others (1984) 215-216.   
272 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 1.  For this reason, Gardner 
diminishes the significance of the harm principle in determining whether conduct is 
criminalised:  John Gardner, 'Rationality and the Rule of Law in Offences Against the Person' 
(1994) 53 Cambridge Law Journal 502, 514. 
273 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law:  Harm to Others (1984) 216. 
274  Feinberg’s factors are: 
‘(a) the greater the gravity of a possible harm, the less probable its occurrence need be to 
justify prohibition of the conduct that threatens to produce it; 
(b) the greater the probability of harm, the less grave the harm need be to justify coercion; 
(c) the greater the magnitude of the risk of harm, itself compounded out of gravity and 
probability, the less reasonable it is to accept the risk; 
(d) the more valuable (useful) the dangerous conduct, both to the actor and to others, the 
more reasonable it is to take the risk of harmful consequences, and for extremely 
valuable conduct it is reasonable run risks up to the point of clear and present danger; 
(e) the more reasonable a risk of harm (the danger), the weaker is the case for prohibiting 
the conduct that creates it’:  Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law:  
Harm to Others (1984) 216.   
Further, Husak argues that the heavy hand of the criminal law should not prevent minor or 
insignificant risks, but only substantial risks.  Husak acknowledges that the term substantial 
requires a baseline for comparison and suggests that ‘only an act-type that creates reasonable 
risks can provide the appropriate baseline’: Douglas N Husak, 'Reasonable Risk Creation and 
Overinclusive Legislation' (1997-1998) 1 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 599, 606-7. 
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swift.’275  Jareborg makes an important point that the low costs associated with 
criminalisation have caused criminal law to be used as a ‘first resort’,276 rather 
than a last resort.277  He recommends criminalisation if ‘an intended result 
cannot be achieved by less intrusive or costly means’.278  In contrast to 
Ashworth and Jareborg, Simester and Sullivan suggest that ‘criminal law is a 
powerful, expensive, and invasive tool.  It should not be used lightly’.279  Thus 
economic considerations and expediency have been used to justify 
criminalisation, without the need for conduct to reach a specific level of 
wrongfulness or falling within the category of an unacceptable form of 
behaviour.280  This modern perspective of the criminal law is aligned with 
Farmer’s description of the criminal law as a ‘predominantly administrative 
system managing enormous numbers of relatively non-serious and ‘regulatory 
offences’’.281  While there is a proliferation of criminal offences involving 
minor harms and there are economic considerations associated with 
criminalisation, the harm principle does not support the criminalisation of 
minor harms, and they should not be criminalised unless they are justified by 
another principle underpinning criminalisation.   
 
This thesis therefore argues that the harm principle should not be used to justify 
the criminalisation of minor harms.  Criminalising minor harms goes against 
Ashworth’s normative claim that criminal law is ‘society’s strongest form of 
official censure and punishment, should be concerned only with major wrongs, 
affecting central values and causing significant harms’.282  Further, by 
criminalising minor harms, the harm principle fails to delineate the boundaries 
                                                 
275 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 48.  Note that regulatory 
offences have been described as ‘minor offences that use the threat of punishment to achieve 
the smooth running of day-to-day social intercourse and activities such as road traffic flow, 
business regulation, urban planning, licensing procedures and so forth’:  Mark Findlay, Stephen 
Odgers and Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (3rd ed, 2005) 6. 
276 Nils Jareborg, 'Criminalization as Last Resort (Ultima Ratio)' (2005) 2 Ohio State Journal of 
Criminal Law 521, 524.  Jareborg names the first resort principle as ‘criminal law inflation’:  
524. 
277 See also Douglas Husak, 'The Criminal Law as Last Resort' (2004) 24 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 207, 208. 
278 Nils Jareborg, 'Criminalization as Last Resort (Ultima Ratio)' (2005) 2 Ohio State Journal of 
Criminal Law 521, 527. 
279 AP Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 24.   
280 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 48.  Further see Bernard E 
Harcourt, 'The Collapse of the Harm Principle' (1999-2000) 90 The Journal of Criminal Law & 
Criminology 109.  In particular, Harcourt states: ‘Harm to others is no longer a limiting 
principle.  It no longer excludes categories of moral offences from the scope of the law.  It is no 
longer a necessary (but not sufficient) condition, because there are so many non-trivial harm 
arguments.  Instead of focusing on whether certain conduct causes harm, today the debates 
center on the types of harm, the amounts of harm, and our willingness, as a society, to bear the 
harms’: 182. 
281 L Farmer, 'The Obsession with Definition' (1996) 5 Social and Legal Studies 57, 64-66. 
282 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 17.  Note that Ashworth does 
not provide a list of significant harms or central values, nor does he provide any guidance on 
how they are determined or whether they change over time with advances in technology. 
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of criminal, quasi-criminal and civil laws.283  The criminal law would be 
labelled as ‘drastically over-used’ if it criminalised all conduct that caused or 
could potentially cause harm.284  Further, overuse of the criminal law would 
‘impair the criminal law’s nondeterrent functions.’285  Consequently, the 
legislature needs to carefully determine the dividing line between what types of 
harmful conduct fall within the ambit of criminal law and what falls outside.286  
On this basis, if the conduct falls within minor harm, it should not be 
criminalised under the harm principle.  This is not to say that minor harms 
should never be criminalised because the criminalisation of minor harms may 
be justified by another principle underpinning criminalisation.   
 
2.2.2.4  Determining the Seriousness of Harm 
 
Simester and Sullivan, and Ashworth suggest that conduct should be 
criminalised if it involves serious harm.287  However, determining the 
seriousness of harm is a complex process.  Ashworth declares that seriousness 
involves three dimensions, that is, harmfulness, culpability and remoteness.288  
The harm principle is discussed in this chapter, while culpability is discussed in 
detail in chapter 4.289  Von Hirsch and Jareborg gauge the seriousness of 
criminal harm by conducting a living-standard analysis.290  The living-standard 
                                                 
283 Bernadette McSherry and Bronwyn Naylor, Australian Criminal Laws:  Critical 
Perspectives (2004) 19.  See also Mirko Bagaric, 'The "Civil-isation" of the Criminal Law' 
(2001) 25 Criminal Law Journal 184,  191 where he suggests that the harm caused by ‘breaches 
of civil law is certainly no less than violations of many criminal laws’.  See further Andrew 
Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 31. 
284 Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers and Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (3rd ed, 2005) 
4. 
285 John C Coffee, 'Paradigms Lost:  The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models - And 
What Can Be Done About It' (1992) 101 The Yale Law Journal 1875, 1877.   Further, Ashworth 
suggests that unenforceable offences will bring the criminal law into disrepute:  Andrew 
Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 34. 
286 Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers and Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (3rd ed, 2005) 
4.  The harm principle is discussed in more detail below. 
287 AP Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 11 and Andrew 
Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 35-40. 
288 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 38. 
289 In the context of remoteness Ashworth was specifically referring to attempted offences, 
conspiracies, drunk driving and possession, where there was no actual harm.  Exploring the 
concept of remoteness is outside the ambit of this thesis. 
290 Andrew von Hirsch and Nils Jareborg, 'Gauging Criminal Harm:  A Living-Standard 
Analysis' (1991) 11 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1.  Note that my work in this section has 
been published in Kelley Burton, 'Criminalisation:  Applying a Living-standard Analysis to 
Non-consensual Photography and Distribution' (2007) 7 Queensland University of Technology 
Law and Justice Journal 464.  See also Mike Treip, 'Re-Thinking the Study of Criminal Law?' 
(1992) 55 The Modern Law Review 733.  The definition of living standard used in this work is 
much broader than that used by economists.  It refers to ‘the degree of economic affluence or 
want…[and] non-economic capabilities that affect personal well-being’:  Andrew von Hirsch 
and Nils Jareborg, 'Gauging Criminal Harm:  A Living-Standard Analysis' (1991) 11 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 1, 7.   
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analysis tool and the literature on the harm principle support the criminalisation 
of conduct where it falls within the notions of ‘serious’ and ‘grave’.  Rather 
than seeking an overarching concept of ‘harm’, it is useful to grade the harm 
involved in contemporary scenarios.  If the conduct does not fall within the 
notions of ‘serious’ or ‘grave’, it should not be criminalised on the basis of the 
harm principle.  In that instance, the harm involved would be described as non-
serious and the conduct should only be criminalised if another principle justifies 
the criminalisation.   
 
Non-serious harm includes the notion of ‘minor harm’ discussed above.  
However, non-serious harm goes further than just minor harms and includes 
other grades of harm such as upper-intermediate harm, lower-intermediate harm 
and lesser harm, which are discernable from von Hirsch and Jareborg’s harm 
gradation table,291 which is discussed below.  While von Hirsch and Jareborg 
do not specifically use the notion of ‘minor harm’ or ‘non-serious harm’, it is 
arguable that minor harm falls within their grade of lesser harm or lower-
intermediate harm because a minor harm done to a person may not affect their 
living standard, only marginally affect their living standard or affect their 
enhanced well-being.   
 
2.2.2.5  Living-standard Analysis 
 
Von Hirsch and Jareborg propose a living-standard analysis tool to ‘assess 
harm, to see how serious an offence is; and…to determine its seriousness for 
the purpose of determining the severity of the punishment’.292  They comment 
that the consideration of harm is important to determining whether conduct is 
criminalised, by stating 
 
There is, of course, another context for considering harm-namely, when 
deciding whether conduct should be declared criminal at all.  Whether 
conduct is harmful, and how harmful it is, should be an important factor 
in the legislative consideration about its proscription.293 
 
However, as von Hirsch and Jareborg were interested in sentencing, they used a 
living-standard analysis to grade the harm associated with conduct that has 
already been criminalised, for example, homicide, assault, battery, petty assault, 
armed robbery, forcible rape, date rape, burglary with ransacking, common 
residential burglary and auto theft.294  They did not use the living-standard 
analysis to determine whether conduct should be criminalised, and this section 
will apply the novel idea that the living-standard analysis tool provides a useful 
                                                 
291 Andrew von Hirsch and Nils Jareborg, 'Gauging Criminal Harm:  A Living-Standard 
Analysis' (1991) 11 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1, 29. 
292 Ibid 3. 
293 Ibid 3-4. 
294 Ibid. 
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framework for determining whether conduct should be criminalised on the basis 
of the seriousness of harm. 
 
Ashworth describes the living-standard analysis as ‘pathbreaking’ because it 
provides a process for determining the interests that should be protected by the 
criminal law.295  In particular, he states that the ‘value of the von Hirsch-
Jareborg approach is that it identifies the stages of thought through which it is 
desirable to pass when making judgements’.296  The living-standard analytical 
tool ‘urges one to dig deeper, and to look more closely at the interests 
affected’.297  Even though von Hirsch and Jareborg suggest that the living-
standard analysis could be employed to determine whether conduct should be 
criminalised,298 they did not use it for this purpose. Their approach is normative 
because it indicates how offences ‘should’ be rated,299  and has merit because it 
provides a framework for grading harm rather than determining this intuitively 
and impressionistically.  The living-standard analysis tool is important because 
legislatures could utilise this tool to grade the level of harm involved in the 
conduct and thus justify their decision on whether to criminalise the conduct on 
the basis of the harm principle.  Thus, it would assist the legislatures to adopt a 
more principled approach to criminalisation.   
 
Importantly, while the living-standard analysis offers a practical tool to grade 
harm it does not offend the ‘Pragmatics Filter’ or the ‘Presumptions Filter’.300  
The harm principle is relevant to the ‘Principles Filter’.  To reiterate, the 
‘Pragmatics Filter’ is concerned with whether the conduct can be reduced or 
eliminated by means other than the criminal law, for example, via an education 
campaign.  The ‘Presumptions Filter’ is concerned with the pragmatic outcome 
of the criminal law and requires a cost and benefit analysis of the consequences 
of the criminal law.  As mentioned in chapter 1, the ‘Principles Filter’ is the 
most relevant because it is consistent with a principled approach to 
criminalisation, and while the latter two filters are important practical 
considerations, they are separate inquiries.  Detailing the components of the 
living-standard analysis tool is imperative at this stage in the chapter because 
the tool will then be applied to examples of making and/or distributing visual 
recordings at the end of this section.    
 
The living-standard analysis commences by identifying the ‘generic-interest’ 
dimension affected by the crime.301  Under von Hirsch’s and Jareborg’s 
                                                 
295 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 37. 
296 Ibid 39. 
297 Ibid. 
298 Ibid 3. 
299 Ibid 6. 
300 Jonathan Schonsheck, On Criminalization:  An Essay in the Philosophy of the Criminal Law 
(1994) 16. 
301 Notably von Hirsch and Jareborg’s ‘generic-interests’ are more specific than Feinberg’s 
definition of harm, which essentially suggests that harm is setting back an interest without 
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schema, there are four generic-interest dimensions, namely, ‘physical integrity, 
material support and amenity, freedom from humiliation, and privacy and 
autonomy’.302  These generic-interest dimensions should not be viewed as 
opposing interests because they might all be relevant to a particular situation.  
Physical integrity ‘embraces health, safety, and avoidance of physical pain’.303  
Material support and amenity includes all types of material interests, for 
example, food, shelter and luxuries.304  Freedom from humiliation encompasses 
‘injuries to self-respect that derive from others’ mistreatment’.305  Privacy and 
autonomy ‘promotes self-respect’306 and helps a person to pursue various 
preferences.307  While the generic-interest dimensions appear compelling, a 
decision-maker should be aware of their weaknesses.   
 
One of the weaknesses with the von Hirsch and Jareborg living-standard 
approach is that their list of generic-interest dimensions appears to be random, 
incomplete and without theoretical justification.  As mentioned above, the 
living-standard analysis tool assists the ‘Principles Filter’.  The generic-interest 
dimensions are based on their impressions of ‘legally-protected interests’308 
usually involved in ‘criminal conduct which injures or threatens identifiable 
victims’.309  The inclusion of freedom from humiliation in the list above is 
appropriate because a person is ‘worse off when treated in a degrading 
fashion’.310  Similarly, the inclusion of privacy and autonomy is justified 
because ‘it promotes self-respect’311 and ‘helps one pursue preferences of 
various kinds’.312  The weight attributed to privacy and autonomy may vary 
from culture to culture.313  The living-standard analysis gives credence to a 
broad range of interests that may have been overlooked had the criminalisation 
decision been made intuitively.  However, the living-standard analysis could be 
strengthened by refining the scope of the freedom from humiliation, and 
privacy and autonomy generic-interest dimensions.  Further, the living-standard 
analysis could be strengthened if it was based on a list of generic-interest 
dimensions that was supported by theory.  In any event, the generic-interest 
dimensions as currently constructed, especially privacy and autonomy, and 
                                                                                                                                  
actually illustrating any interests: Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law:  Harm 
to Others (1984) 33.   
302 Andrew von Hirsch and Nils Jareborg, 'Gauging Criminal Harm:  A Living-Standard 
Analysis' (1991) 11 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1, 19.  These are interests that should be 
protected by the harm principle.  See the discussion above under The Ambit of Harm. 





308 Andrew von Hirsch and Nils Jareborg, 'Gauging Criminal Harm:  A Living-Standard 
Analysis' (1991) 11 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1, 19-20. 
309 Ibid 3 and 19-20.  Note that the notion of ‘legally-protected interests’ is unique to von 
Hirsch and Jareborg’s discussion and has not been used in the definitions of harm above. 
310 Ibid 20. 
311 Ibid. 
312 Ibid. 
313 Ibid 21. 
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freedom from humiliation are relevant to making and/or distributing visual 
recordings and this chapter will take an incremental step to apply the tool to a 
new context.  
 
The next step in the living-standard analysis is to estimate the degree to which 
the living standard of a typical victim would be affected in a typical case.  In 
this way, the tool’s proponents support a ‘standard harm’ rather than dealing 
with victims who are particularly vulnerable or resilient.314 The living standard 
does not focus on an ‘actual life quality or goal achievement, but on the means 
or capabilities for achieving a certain quality of life.  It is also standardized, 
referring to the means and capabilities that would ordinarily help one achieve a 
good life’.315  Consequently, the living standard can be employed without 
knowing a particular person’s life goals.316  The living standard approach 
differs from a consideration of social welfare interests because the former is not 
based on a choice criterion, but is rather based on the ‘means for achieving a 
certain quality of life’.317  For the same reason the generic-interest dimensions 
are different from individual interests.  The principles of individual autonomy 
and social welfare are discussed below.   
 
von Hirsch and Jareborg grade an intrusion into a person’s living-standard at 
one of four levels as set out in the table below.318  Four levels were chosen 
because the difference between them was reasonably easy to discern.319  A 
larger number of levels, for example, 100, would have given a deceptive sense 
of precision. 
 
Level Category General Description 
1 ْ Subsistence Survival, but with maintenance of no more than 
elementary human capacities to function.  No 
satisfactions presupposed at this level. 
2 ْ Minimal well-being Maintenance of a minimal level of comfort and 
dignity. 
3 ْ Adequate well-
being 
Maintenance of an ‘adequate’ level of comfort 
and dignity. 
4 ْ Enhanced well-
being 
Significant enhancement in quality-of-life above 
the mere ‘adequate’ level. 
 
The terms ‘subsistence’, ‘minimal well-being’, ‘adequate well-being’ and 
‘enhanced well-being’ presented in the table above are worthy of further 
exploration.  ‘Subsistence’ ‘means barely getting by.  Included would be 
preservation of one’s major physical and cognitive functions, and preservation 
                                                 
314 Ibid 4.  In these cases, principles of aggravation and mitigation would be relevant. 
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 ْ.  
 
Whether a level 1 ْ  to 4 ْ  is attributed to the conduct sought to be criminalised 
depends on the temporal perspective taken.  Von Hirsch and Jareborg adopt a 
one-year or slightly longer temporal perspective.324  This means that the 
relevant question in assessing the conduct is ‘How has your year been?’325 
rather than ‘How was your day?’326 or ‘How was your last decade?’.327  It is 
asserted that these latter two expressions overrate or underrate the conduct.  
 
To link the levels in the table above with the generic-interest dimensions 
identified earlier, von Hirsch and Jareborg suggest that physical integrity and 
material support and amenity may relate to all four levels in the table above.328  
In contrast, freedom from humiliation, and privacy and autonomy develop at 
levels 2 ْ to 4 ْ in the table above.329  The reason for this is that level 1 ْrelates to 
survival, and a person may survive without privacy or freedom from 
humiliation.330  After determining the relevant level in the table above, the next 
step is to map the level onto a harm gradation scale.331  The von Hirsch and 
Jareborg harm gradation table is set out below.332  The critical grades in terms 
of the criminalisation decision are serious and grave, which are satisfied if the 
conduct impacts on a person’s minimal well-being or subsistence. 
 
Harm Gradation Living-Standard Level Intruded Upon 
I – grave Subsistence (living-standard level 1)ْ 
II – serious Minimal well-being (level 2)ْ 
III – upper-intermediate Adequate well-being (level 3)ْ 
IV – lower-intermediate Enhanced well-being (level 4)ْ 
V – lesser  Living standard not affected or only 
marginally so 
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Von Hirsch and Jareborg acknowledge that their living-standard levels are not 
precise and ‘their application to criminal harms will leave much to 
judgment’.333  Despite suggesting that the living-standard analysis can be used 
to determine whether conduct is criminalised, von Hirsch and Jareborg did not 
indicate the cut-off point on the harm gradation table where conduct should be 
criminalised.  In fact, they retreat on the issue of criminalisation by advising 
that if a type of conduct constitutes grave harmfulness on the harm gradation 
table above, it ‘does not necessarily settle whether it should be proscribed’.334  
The living-standard analysis tool is therefore a useful process in justifying the 
decision whether to criminalise conduct on the basis of the harm principle.  The 
living-standard analysis provides ‘a systematic conceptual framework’335 for 
gauging criminal harm that is ‘superior to untutored intuition and 
guesswork’.336   
 
Elsewhere in a published analysis, I considered whether four examples of 
making visual recordings should be criminalised on the basis of the living-
standard analysis tool.337  The four examples, which were based on examples 
reported by the media, are (1) visually recording a child playing in a public 
park; (2) visually recording a topless female bather at a public beach; (3) up-
skirt filming at a shopping centre;  and (4) visually recording a housemate as 
they shower in the bathroom.  Intuitively (3) and (4) may be more serious than 
(1) and (2) because they involve a greater intrusion on privacy (which is one of 
the generic-interest dimensions) and thus greater harm.  However, applying the 
living-standard analysis tool, all four examples of making a visual recording 
were ranked at the same level, that is, level 4,ْ which meant that the conduct 
impacted on a person’s enhanced well-being and was graded at lower-
intermediate on the harm gradation table.  This fell a long way short of the 
serious or grave harms, which impact on a person’s minimal well-being or 
subsistence.  A typical victim of example (4) may not sufer serious 
psychological harm. In contrast, von Hirsch and Jareborg suggest that the 
humiliation associated with being raped by a stranger at gunpoint is serious.338 
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337 Kelley Burton, 'Criminalisation:  Applying a Living-standard Analysis to Non-consensual 
Photography and Distribution' (2007) 7 Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice 
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338 Andrew von Hirsch and Nils Jareborg, 'Gauging Criminal Harm:  A Living-Standard 
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As discussed above, the literature requires the level of harm to be serious before 
criminalising the conduct on the basis of the harm principle.339  Thus, if the 
legislature decided to criminalise making a visual recording, they should base 
their decision on another principle.  A principled approach to criminalisation 
does not support the legislature merely interpreting harm liberally or drawing 
the cut-off on the living-standard analysis tool at a lower point to criminalise 
new non-serious contemporary problems.   
 
According to this analysis, distributing a visual recording would result in more 
harm and thus would be more serious than simply making a visual recording 
because it involves a greater intrusion on privacy, which is one of the generic-
interest dimensions in the living-standard analysis tool.  Some more serious 
examples of distributing a visual recording include distributing a visual 
recording for sexual gratification; uploading the visual recording to the Internet 
to a world wide audience as opposed to distributing the visual recording to a 
small number of individuals;  distributing moving visual recordings as opposed 
to still visual recordings because the former are better at capturing a person’s 
personality;  and distributing visual recordings that damaged the personal or 
professional relationships of the individual visually recorded.  However, the 
question remains whether these examples of distribution are serious enough to 
fall within the serious or grave levels of harm on the living-standard analysis 
tool. 
 
Elsewhere, I have intimated that it was possible for the grade of harm attributed 
to distribution to range between level 2 ْ (serious harm) and level 4 ْ (lower-
intermediate harm) but suggested that a lower grade would be more appropriate 
because the harm is assessed from a one-year temporal perspective.340  Thus, 
my application of the living-standard analysis tool suggests that distributing a 
visual recording is also non-serious and should not be criminalised on the basis 
of the harm principle. 
 
2.2.2.6  Using Harm as a Framework in the Criminalisation Decision 
 
Lacey, Wells and Quick state that the harm principle has a ‘strong common-
sense appeal’341 and has a ‘significant place in the public debate about criminal 
law and its limits’.342  However, as discussed above, the scope of harm and 
gauging the level of harm are problematic.  McSherry and Naylor note that the 
harm principle explains why conduct should not be criminalised, but has 
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difficulty in explaining why conduct should be criminalised.343  This is 
confirmed by the results of the living-standard analysis above, which suggest 
that none of the four examples of making and/or distributing visual recordings 
should be criminalised because the harm involved was not serious or grave.  
Thus, in this instance, the harm principle explains why this contemporary 
conduct should not be criminalised.   
 
Additionally, Lacey, Wells and Quick ‘suggest that the harm principle is not 
only indeterminate at a normative level but also incomplete at an explanatory 
level’.344  Rather than offering an ideal or explanation, the harm principle offers 
‘an ideological framework in terms of which policy debate about criminal law 
is expressed.’345  Despite the ambiguities associated with the harm principle, it 
offers a framework in which to situate contemporary problems and thus is 
valuable to the criminalisation debate.   
 
To reiterate my key points above, the decision on whether to criminalise 
conduct may be based on the harm principle.  The concept of ‘harm’ is difficult 
to define and there is not one single overarching definition of the concept that is 
accepted in all contexts of criminal law.  Having a fluid definition of harm 
contributes to the blurred boundaries of the criminal law, but at the same time 
enables the criminal law to keep up with contemporary values, society and 
advances in technology.  Instead of seeking an overarching definition of harm, 
this chapter has isolated a specific tool that provides a means of grading the 
harm involved in conduct as serious or non-serious, and thus justifying the 
decision on whether conduct should be criminalised.   
  
As discussed above, Simester and Sullivan, and Ashworth state that conduct 
should only be criminalised if it involves serious harm.346  Using the living-
standard analysis tool, if the conduct falls within the serious or grave grades of 
harm, it should be criminalised on the basis of the harm principle.  However, if 
the conduct falls within the upper-intermediate, lower-intermediate and lesser 
harm grades, the conduct should not be criminalised under the harm principle, 
but may be criminalised on the basis of another principle.  To recap, making 
and/or distributing visual recordings do not fall within serious or grave harm as 
interpreted by the living-standard analysis tool and thus should not be 
criminalised on the basis of the harm principle.  The next principle 
underpinning criminalisation, morality, shares the same fluidity as harm.   
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2.2.3 Preservation of Morality 
 
Similarly to the protection of harm principle, the preservation of morality is 
another possible principle underpinning the decision to criminalise conduct.  
Lord Devlin is the key advocate of the preservation of morality principle, and 
claims that morality underpins the ‘social fabric of society’347 and immoral 
behaviour erodes ‘that fabric and consequently’348 destabilises society.  Lord 
Devlin asserts that society will disintegrate unless immoral acts are 
criminalised.349  The Oxford Companion to Philosophy suggests that legislative 
responses to protect public morals prohibit or restrict ‘acts and practices judged 
to be damaging to the character and moral well-being of persons who engage in 
them or who may be induced to engage in them by the bad example of 
others.’350   
 
The scope of morality is subject to debate.  Lord Devlin argues that criminal 
law should prohibit behaviour that is immoral according to the norms of a 
society.351  It is not confined to the teachings of a particular religion.  Ashworth 
notes that this is realistic in a British context because several religions with 
differing perspectives are practised in British society.352  Further, Ashworth 
contends that morality fluctuates with place and time,353 and Lacey, Wells and 
Quick agree with Ashworth on this point.354  Similarly, Simester and Sullivan 
assert that moral stagnation is unattractive,355 and suggest that ‘difference, even 
conflict, between the lives and values of citizens can be a dynamic force for the 
evolution of a vigorous, thriving, and valuable culture.’356  In any event, Duff 
states that the  
                                                 
347 Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers and Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (3rd ed, 2005) 
3. 
348 Ibid.  Cf Hamish Stewart, 'Legality and Morality in HLA Hart's Theory of Criminal Law' 
(1999) 52 SMU Law Review 201. 
349 Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (1965) 8-14. 
350 Ted Honderich (ed), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (New Edition ed, 2005), under 
enforcement of morals.  Protecting the persons who engage in the offences has been referred to 
as unjustifiable legal paternalism:  AP Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and 
Doctrine (2003) 18. 
351 Ibid 20.  See also Horder who recognises that a serious crime against a person describes 
what a person has actually done but also captures the ‘moral essence of the wrong involved’: 
Jeremy Horder, 'Rethinking Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person' (1994) 14 Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 335, 335.  Further, Horder refers to the concept of representative labelling, 
which means defining an offence in a way that provides an ‘accurate moral grasp of what’ the 
offender has done:  339. 
352 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 41.  Further, there is no 
simple equation between crime and sin:  David Brown et al, Brown, Farrier, Neal and 
Weisbrot's Criminal Laws - Materials and Commentary on Criminal Law and Process in New 
South Wales (4th ed, 2006) 91.  See also Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of 
Criminal Law (2nd ed, 2005) 58. 
353 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 44. 
354 Nicola Lacey, Celia Wells and Oliver Quick, Reconstructing Criminal Law Text and 
Materials, Law in Context (3rd ed, 2003) 5. 
355 AP Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 17. 
356 Ibid. 
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criminal law reflects a range of different values, which are not always 
either commensurable or consistent; that the criminal law’s offence 
definitions should pick out recognizable types of moral wrongdoing – 
and that we must recognize the different kinds and structures of 
wrongdoing that properly concern the criminal law.357  
 
Lord Devlin states that ‘morality could be determined by enquiring into what 
every right-minded person considered immoral’.358  However, this has been 
criticised because it is doubted whether a shared morality can be identified.359  
Further, if a shared morality was identified, it could be used to ‘discriminate 
against minority groups’.360  This is similar to a statement made by Findlay, 
Odgers and Yeo, who state that the definition of morality ‘may well stem from 
irrational prejudices rather than reasoned moral indignation’.361  They state that 
morality is imprecise and rests on ‘mere feelings of disgust’.362   
 
As noted in chapter 1, moral wrongness and offensiveness are often used 
interchangeably or synonymously in the literature.363  However, it has been 
suggested that they are different because offensive conduct is done in public.364  
According to Simester and Sullivan, the term ‘offence’ is akin to an ‘unpleasant 
and disliked psychological experience’.365  Offensive conduct is wrong when it 
‘treats persons with a gross lack of consideration or respect’.366  The concept of 
‘offence’ in a criminal context may also mean a crime, which can be 
categorised as an indictable offence or summary offence.367  This is not the 
sense in which the word is used here. 
 
                                                 
357 R A Duff, 'Theorizing Criminal Law: A 25th Anniversary Essay' (2005) 25 Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 353, 363. 
358 Bernadette McSherry and Bronwyn Naylor, Australian Criminal Laws:  Critical 
Perspectives (2004) 20.  The criminal law represents a set of minimum standards rather than 
maximum standards:  Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law 
(2nd ed, 2005) 55. 
359 Bernadette McSherry and Bronwyn Naylor, Australian Criminal Laws:  Critical 
Perspectives (2004) 20. 
360 Ibid 21.  An example of Nazi Germany is used to support this criticism. 
361 Ibid. 
362 Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers and Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (3rd ed, 2005) 
3.  Cf Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 40, which refers to feelings 
of disgust, indignation and intolerance amongst ordinary members of the society. 
363 See also Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law:  Offense to Others (1985), 
which uses ‘offence’. 
364 David Brown et al, Brown, Farrier, Neal and Weisbrot's Criminal Laws - Materials and 
Commentary on Criminal Law and Process in New South Wales (4th ed, 2006) 95. 
365 AP Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 15. 
366 Ibid 16. 
367 Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 1983) 18.  Note that some quotes 
used in this thesis may use the term offence to mean moral wrongness.  In such situations, 
common sense will prevail. 
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Criminalisation on the basis of morality should be used sparingly.  This protects 
freedom of expression,368 and is consistent with the notion of ‘minimalism’ and 
Feinberg’s suggestion that criminalisation is only supported when it prevents 
serious immorality.369 
 
Criminalising serious immorality is similar to the view that criminal law should 
be limited to ‘breaches of important moral principles’.370  However, this view 
would be more meaningful if it specified where to draw the line between 
important and unimportant morals or provided a comprehensive list of 
examples of important and unimportant morals.371  In contrast, Simester and 
Sullivan recommend a ‘thick skin’372 approach to criminalising immoral 
conduct and recommend that people tolerate incivility on the ground of 
‘personal and cultural diversity’.373  This ‘thick skin’ approach is consistent 
with minimalism. 
 
2.2.3.1  Moral Dimension 
 
Bronitt and McSherry recognise that many serious offences have a moral 
dimension.374  Lacey, Wells and Quick refer to an offence with a moral 
dimension as a ‘real’ crime, which is to be contrasted to a regulatory offence, 
which generally lack a moral dimension.375  However, they note that some 
regulatory offences are not trivial and result in penalties that impinge on a 
person’s livelihood.376  Further, they acknowledge that many offences can be 
viewed from both a moral and regulatory perspective, ‘with our attitudes to the 
boundary between ‘regulatory’ and ‘real’ crime shifting over time’.377  Lacey, 
Wells and Quick provide driving under the influence of alcohol as an example 
of an offence that was viewed as a regulatory offence 20 years ago, ‘while 
today it has become heavily moralised’.378  They recognise that the criminal 
law is a ‘system of quasi-moral judgment which reflects a society’s basic 
379values’.    
                                                 
368 Ibid. 
369 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law:  Offense to Others (1985) 1. 
370 Mirko Bagaric, 'The "Civil-isation" of the Criminal Law' (2001) 25 Criminal Law Journal 
184,193. 
371 Note that Bagaric provides two examples, that is, littering and illegal car parking, but does 
not give any further guidance on dividing important and unimportant moral principles:  Mirko 
Bagaric, 'The "Civil-isation" of the Criminal Law' (2001) 25 Criminal Law Journal 184, 193. 
372 AP Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 16. 
373 Ibid. 
374 Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 2005) 58. 
375 Nicola Lacey, Celia Wells and Oliver Quick, Reconstructing Criminal Law Text and 




379 Ibid 4.  Crimes with quasi-morality should only be invoked where there is a serious threat to 
interests shared by the community.  Further, Lacey doubts whether quasi criminal laws have 
been  so successful that other forms of ‘less draconian, costly and socially divisive means of 
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It has been suggested that morality does not need to support every crime to be a 
valid principle underpinning the decision to criminalise conduct. In particular, 
‘for moral principles to explain and justify the settled rules of law only a 
significant portion of the rules need to be consistent with the background moral 
theory’.380  This conclusion could have been strengthened by supporting it with 
evidence, for example, comparing the proportion of criminal offences that are 
consistent with the principle of morality with the proportion of criminal 
offences that are not consistent with the principle of morality.  Further, this 
conclusion leaves open for interpretation the point at which the term 
‘significant portion’ is satisfied.  Presumably, the point lies between 50 per cent 
and 100 per cent.  On the basis of Lacey, Wells and Quick’s construction of 
‘real’ crimes, morality underpins ‘real’ crimes, but it may not underpin 
regulatory offences, some of which lack a specific moral dimension.381  Lacey, 
Wells and Quick do not provide any examples of regulatory offences that lack a 
specific moral dimension to support their argument, but an example of such an 
offence is where a pedestrian crosses a road against the pedestrian lights.382  
The literature confirms that some of the more recent incursions into the 
criminal law are becoming more ‘civilised’ and more paternalistic rather than 
having a moral dimension.383 
 
There are other examples of criminal offences that are purely regulatory in 
nature and lack a moral dimension.384  These include leaving a vehicle in a no 
standing zone, not wearing a seat belt, leaving a vehicle for a longer than fixed 
period and travelling without a ticket.385  They do not protect any recognisable 
right,386 are aimed at controlling conduct,387 and have little moral foundation.  
Further, Bronitt and McSherry maintain that ‘the modern criminal law does not 
universally promote or enforce any particular conception of morals’.388  As 
discussed earlier in this chapter, while they do not explicitly attribute a 
timeframe to the notion of ‘modern criminal law’, Bronitt and McSherry make 
                                                                                                                                  
social governance’ cannot be used:  Nicola Lacey, 'Abstraction in Context' (1994) 14 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 255, 266. 
380 Mirko Bagaric, 'The "Civil-isation" of the Criminal Law' (2001) 25 Criminal Law Journal 
184, 187. 
381 Nicola Lacey, Celia Wells and Oliver Quick, Reconstructing Criminal Law Text and 
Materials, Law in Context (3rd ed, 2003) 5.   
382 Commonly known as jay walking.  This  is an example of a regulatory offence in 
Queensland.  See Transport Operations (Road Use Management – Road Rules) Regulation 
1999 (Qld) s 231. 
383 See generally Mirko Bagaric, 'The "Civil-isation" of the Criminal Law' (2001) 25 Criminal 
Law Journal 184.  For example, it is an offence not to wear a seat-belt. 
384 Ibid 189-190.  
385 Ibid. 
386 Recognisable rights are established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (entered 
into by Australia on 10 February 1948), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (entered into by Australia on 10 March 1976) and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (entered into by Australia on 13 November 1980). 
387 Mirko Bagaric, 'The "Civil-isation" of the Criminal Law' (2001) 25 Criminal Law Journal 
184, 189. 
388 Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 2005) 58. 
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reference to ‘modern society’ and later ‘21st century’.389  Thus, the modern 
criminal law is tantamount to the contemporary criminal law and to the criminal 
law created in the 21st century.   
 
Lacey, Quick and Wells note that some ‘wrong’ conduct is not criminalised.390  
In this sense, they use the word ‘wrong’ to mean ‘immoral’.391  They do not 
provide any examples of such conduct to support their argument, but adultery 
and lying may be examples.  However, other literature notes that some people 
‘may scoff at or belittle others for breaching rules of etiquette, fashion trends or 
the rules of a sporting contest, we do not condemn people for doing so’.392  On 
the other hand, some conduct, which is not ‘wrong’, is criminalised, for 
example, not wearing a bicycle helmet when riding a bicycle.393  
Consequently, there appears to be a regulatory aspect to modern criminal 
law.
 
 advances in society.   
                                                
394  Many offences would be decriminalised if criminal laws only dealt 
with breaches of important moral principles.395  The changing nature of 
morality in time and place may lead to a shift in the boundaries of criminal law, 
but the fluidity of the concept of ‘morality’ ameliorates the criminal law’s 
ability to keep up with
 
Unlike the harm principle, the principle of morality did not receive any explicit 
attention in the 2005 Australian Standing Committee of Attorneys-General 
Discussion Paper,396 the 2004 New Zealand Law Commission’s Study Paper397 
or the 2002 Canadian Department of Justice’s Consultation Paper.398  This lack 
of attention is consistent with the argument above that morality does not always 
underpin modern criminal offences, which often lack a moral dimension and 
many of which are merely regulatory offences.  Thus, the morality principle 
could be described as superfluous in the criminalisation debate.  As discussed 
 
389 Ibid 56. 
390 Nicola Lacey, Celia Wells and Oliver Quick, Reconstructing Criminal Law Text and 
Materials, Law in Context (3rd ed, 2003) 4. 
391 Ibid. 
392 Mirko Bagaric, 'The "Civil-isation" of the Criminal Law' (2001) 25 Criminal Law Journal 
184, 187.  In such circumstances, people must comply with the ‘demands of a ‘higher’ 
unwritten code of conduct’:  Paul H Robinson, 'A Theory of Justification:  Societal Harm as a 
Prerequisite for Criminal Liability' (1975) 23 UCLA Law Review 266, 272. 
393 Nicola Lacey, Celia Wells and Oliver Quick, Reconstructing Criminal Law Text and 
Materials, Law in Context (3rd ed, 2003) 4. 
394 Ibid 4-5.  Lacey, Wells and Quick also suggest that there is a utilitarian aspect to modern 
criminal law.  The notion of utilitarianism would fall under the social welfare head in this 
chapter of the thesis. 
395 Mirko Bagaric, 'The "Civil-isation" of the Criminal Law' (2001) 25 Criminal Law Journal 
184, 193. 
396 See generally Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, Unauthorised Photographs on the 
Internet and Ancillary Privacy Issues (2005) <http://www.ag.gov.au> at 1 October 2005. 
397 See generally New Zealand, New Zealand Law Commission, Intimate Covert Filming Study 
Paper, Study Paper No. 15 (2004). 
398 See generally Canada, Department of Justice Canada, Voyeurism as a Criminal Offence:  A 
Consultation Paper (2002). 
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above, the notion of ‘morality’ changes with time and place and has been 
empirically associated with disgust.   
 
While the relevant discussion papers do not explicitly refer to morality, they 
refer to notions that conjure up immorality in the context of making and/or 
distributing visual recordings.  Examples of these notions include ‘children as 
objects of adult sexual gratification’,399 ‘sexual exploitation’400  and ‘non-
consensual disrobing’.401  These notions involve a sexual violation and 
examples of making and/or distributing visual recordings that encompass such 
notions are indecent.  Visually recording a child as a sexual object and 
distributing the visual recording for the sexual gratification of adults is arguably 
one of the worst case scenarios of visual recording from a morality perspective.  
While up-skirt filming may be considered as equally immoral as photographing 
another person using a toilet, whether visually recording a topless female bather 
at a public beach is immoral is much more contentious and depends on the 
conception of morality.  There is no universal definition of morality and some 
offences in the 21st century have no moral dimension or a limited one.  As a 
result, this thesis will not use the principle of morality to justify the decision 
whether making and/or distributing visual recordings should be criminalised.  
 
2.2.4 Promotion of Social Welfare 
 
Ashworth states that criminalisation ‘may be justified as a mechanism for the 
preservation of social order’.402  Promoting social welfare reduces or avoids 
‘unnecessary hardship and financial cost to the community.’403  Thus, it is a 
social defence.404  Criminalising conduct under the label of promoting social 
welfare implies that ‘there is a public interest in ensuring that such conduct 
does not happen and that, when it does, there is the possibility of State 
punishment’.405  The social welfare principle recognises ‘the social context in 
which the law must operate and gives weight to collective interests’.406  It also 
reinforces a point made in chapter 3, that is, that the criminal law is preferable 
                                                 
399 Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, Unauthorised Photographs on the Internet and 
Ancillary Privacy Issues (2005) <http://www.ag.gov.au> at 1 October 2005, 11 
400 Canada, Department of Justice Canada, Voyeurism as a Criminal Offence:  A Consultation 
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402 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 22.  See also Michael Kirby, 
'Editorial' (2001) 25 Criminal Law Journal 181, 181. 
403 Andreas Schloenhardt, Queensland Criminal Law: Critical Perspectives (2006) 19. 
404 Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers and Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (3rd ed, 2005) 
11. 
405 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 2. 
406 Ibid 28. 
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to the civil law to prohibit conduct that harms the public rather than a specific 
individual.407  
 
The social welfare principle concentrates on the ‘[s]tate’s obligation to create 
the social conditions necessary for the exercise of full autonomy by individual 
citizens’.408  Social welfare interests include ‘the fulfilment of certain basic 
interests such as maintaining one’s personal safety, health and capacity to 
pursue one’s chosen life plan’.409  These all encompassing social welfare 
interests coincide with individual goals such as ‘life, liberty, property and 
health’.410  While the social welfare principle and the individual autonomy 
principle (discussed below) may protect similar high-level interests, the 
interests are derived in a different manner.  Under the social welfare approach 
to criminalisation, the interests are determined objectively (based on democratic 
decision making), and are not determined according to the preferences of each 
individual.411  Arguably, it is the democratic decision making process that 
forces the literature to foster terms such as ‘social welfare interests’, 
‘community welfare interests’, ‘basic interests’ and ‘collective goals’.  The 
terms ‘social welfare principle’, which is the name of the overarching principle, 
and social welfare interests, which are the collective goals protected by the 
social welfare principle,412 will be used.  
 
As social welfare interests are determined democratically, they are not fixed 
and shift over time as society evolves.  The changing nature of social welfare 
interests impacts on the boundaries of the criminal law.  This means that the 
legislature has the ability to adopt a broad notion of ‘social welfare interests’ to 
support their decision to criminalise conduct under the principle of social 
welfare.  While the fluidity of the concept of ‘social welfare interests’ 
contributes to the serious problem of not being able to distinctly draw the 
boundaries of the criminal law, the fluidity enables the principle of social 
welfare and thus the criminal law, to keep up with advances and changes in 
society.   
 
This section does not undertake the gruelling task of listing a current set of 
social welfare interests because such a list would be incomplete.  Further, this 
section does not explain how a list of social welfare interests has had to evolve 
in light of advances in mobile phone cameras, video cameras and the Internet, 
                                                 
407 Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers and Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (3rd ed, 2005) 
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408 Ibid 28. 
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the individual autonomy principle.  However, as discussed below the two principles may 
conflict with each other. 
410 S E Marshall and R A Duff, 'Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs' (1998) 11 Canadian 
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and changing community conceptions of privacy given the ubiquity of these 
new technologies.413  Given the changeable construction of social welfare 
interests, this chapter will consider two interests that are of concern to the 
community according to the pertinent consultation papers, that is, freedom of 
expression and privacy.   
 
The 2005 Australian Standing Committee of Attorneys-General Discussion 
Paper states that for  
 
any society to function in a relatively free and open manner there could 
not realistically be a requirement for all photographs to be taken with 
consent.  If there were such restrictions, candid shots could never be 
taken, and the media would be severely constrained in the images they 
show us.  Freedom of expression and artistic expression would 
undoubtedly be adversely affected.414   
 
Thus, the social welfare interest of freedom of expression should surpass the 
social welfare interest of privacy in some instances to support the role of the 
media and to enable people to make candid visual recordings.  Requiring the 
media to obtain the consent of all people in their visual recordings would be 
very onerous and would impede journalists and news reporters when time is of 
the essence.  Further, making spontaneous visual recordings, particularly of 
family and friends, and physical landmarks, is clearly a right that should be 
protected.  While the 2005 Australian Standing Committee of Attorneys-
General Discussion Paper recognises the need to balance freedom of expression 
with privacy,415  it does not provide any guidance on how to achieve this 
balancing act, except to say that the role of the media and the taking of candid 
shots should be supported. 
 
Similarly, the 2004 New Zealand Law Commission’s Study Paper emphasises 
privacy.  In particular, it states that  
 
[s]ociety depends on a certain degree of privacy for individuals, but it 
also depends on social interaction and the ability to function freely in 
public…Privacy contributes significantly to people’s right and ability to 
be fully functioning human beings and thereby assists in the functioning 
of civil society.416 
 
While the 2004 New Zealand Law Commission’s Study Paper stresses the need 
to protect privacy, it also recognises the need to protect freedom of expression.  
In a later section of the Study Paper, it recommends that freedom of expression 
                                                 
413 Note that chapter 5 explores the conceptions of ‘privacy’ and ‘consent’ in detail. 
414 Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, Unauthorised Photographs on the Internet and 
Ancillary Privacy Issues (2005) <http://www.ag.gov.au> at 1 October 2005, 9. 
415 Ibid 10. 
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Paper No. 15 (2004) 5. 
 70
should outweigh privacy, for example, where a person visually records a topless 
female sunbather at a public beach.417 
 
The 2002 Canadian Department of Justice’s Consultation Paper on voyeurism 
acknowledges the changing nature of social welfare interests and the fact that 
they are determined democratically.  For example, it contends that advances in 
technology have enabled voyeurs to intrude on a person’s privacy in a greater 
manner than was perceived at the time the Canadian Code was drafted.418  As 
discussed in chapter 1, this topic goes beyond voyeurism and canvasses making 
and/or distributing visual recordings, but the 2002 Canadian Department of 
Justice’s Consultation Paper bolsters privacy as a relevant and superior social 
welfare interest. 
 
Thus, there are two competing social welfare interests relevant to making 
and/or distributing visual recordings.  With no rigid means of determining how 
to prioritise these two competing social welfare interests, the legislature is at 
liberty to prioritise them in a manner that suits their goals.419  As will be 
discussed in chapter 5, the criminalisation decision is not simply a matter of 
protecting privacy in private places and protecting freedom of expression in 
public places because privacy does and should exist to some extent in a public 
place.  Further, the social welfare interest does not need to reach a pre-ordained 
level, for example, serious, before it should justify criminalisation.  Thus, the 
living-standard analysis tool, which was used above to grade the seriousness of 
harm, is unhelpful in determining which interest the social welfare principle 
should promote. 
 
It is argued here that the social welfare interest of privacy should be promoted 
where a person makes and/or distributes a visual recording of another who is 
undressing, showering, using a toilet and engaging in a sexual activity; and 
where the visual recording focuses on a person’s private body parts.  In these 
examples there is a significant intrusion on privacy and there is no acceptable 
reason to promote freedom of expression.  While the criminalisation of these 
examples was not justified under the head of prevention of harm and, the 
preservation of morality was discarded as being superfluous in the 
criminalisation debate, these examples should be criminalised under the head of 
promotion of social welfare.   
 
As discussed above, the heads of prevention of harm and preservation of 
morality should not be used to support the criminalisation of making and/or 
distributing a visual recording of a child playing in a public park or a topless 
female bather at a public beach.  Similarly, the social welfare principle should 
                                                 
417 Ibid 39. 
418 Canada, Department of Justice Canada, Voyeurism as a Criminal Offence:  A Consultation 
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promote freedom of expression rather than privacy by permitting people to 
make visual recordings of, for example, a child playing in a public park and a 
topless female bather at a public beach, because the ability to make visual 
recordings is an important part of our lives in the 21st century and it is a 
freedom worth protecting.  Many members of the community would make 
visual recordings for a socially desirable purpose, such as recording family and 
friends.  It is unrealistic to suggest that the criminal law should prohibit people 
from making visual recordings of other people in public places, and if the 
criminal law did so, it would stand to lose the respect of the community.  
Further, the criminal law would be largely unenforceable because law enforcers 
may never find the visual recordings unless they see the person making the 
visual recordings.  While it is recognised that some members of the community 
may make visual recordings of other people for a socially undesirable purpose, 
for example, sexual objectification, voyeurism, humiliation and embarrassment; 
it may only become a social problem if it is distributed, and thus it is suggested 
that, on balance, the criminal law should protect freedom of expression and 
permit people to make visual recordings.420       
 
The position is different for distributing visual recordings, for example, to the 
Internet, which is becoming a common practice in the 21st century.  A person 
invades another person’s privacy to a higher extent when they not only make a 
visual recording, but then distribute it to a wider audience or in an inappropriate 
context.  For example, a person may visually record a child wearing a tight, wet 
swimming costume and upload it to a website that is designed for the sexual 
gratification of adults.  This is very concerning because the distribution has 
been done for a socially undesirable purpose and it is an example of where the 
criminal law should step in to protect the social welfare interest of privacy 
rather than freedom of expression.  Other socially undesirable purposes for 
distribution may include humiliation, embarrassment, voyeurism and sexual 
objectification.  In these situations, the criminal law should protect the privacy 
of the person visually recorded, rather than the freedom of expression of the 
person distributing the visual recording.  Privacy is discussed in detail in 
chapter 5, which shows a relationship between privacy and implied consent.   
 
The social welfare interests identified above (freedom of expression and 
privacy) intersect with the relevant individual interests, and thus it is timely to 






                                                 
420 Note that the notion of ‘sexual’ does not govern all of the nouns listed, for example, 
humiliation and embarrassment. 
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2.2.5 Respect for Individual Autonomy 
 
Findlay, Odgers and Yeo argue that the criminal law should respect individual 
autonomy.421  This means that conduct should only be criminalised to the 
minimum extent necessary to provide other individuals with the same 
autonomy.422  As stated above in relation to harm, the harm principle only 
respects individual autonomy to the extent that individual autonomy does not 
interfere with other individuals.  Further, Ashworth states that the individual 
autonomy principle means that individuals should only be criminally 
responsible for acts if they have capacity and a fair opportunity to act 
differently.423  Advocates of the minimalist approach to criminal law are 
concerned about the overuse of criminal law because of its coercive and liberty-
depriving consequences.424 Minimalism accepts the need to criminalise direct 
wrongs against victims and to safeguard interests, but is concerned that the 
State, groups or other individuals will abuse their power.425  Consequently, 
respecting individual autonomy is a principle that may underpin the 
criminalisation decision.    
 
Ashworth acknowledges that it is unsustainable for individuals to have 
complete freedom without qualifications.426  He notes that individuals are 
‘entitled to equal concern and respect’.427  Jareborg maintains that the criminal 
law could not protect all individual interests and that some individual interests 
are not worthy of protection.428  The criminal law’s protection of individual 
interests and values has been described as ‘selective…[and] fragmentary’429 in 
character.  Additionally, Ashworth asks the question of whose individual 
autonomy is protected by the criminal law and draws attention to gender bias 
that is evident in the law.430  Not every individual’s autonomy preferences can 
be reflected in the criminal law.  Instead of identifying specific individual 
interests, Marshall and Duff identify some broad significant individual interests, 
                                                 
421 Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers and Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (3rd ed, 2005) 
3. 
422 Ibid.  Note that respect for individual autonomy does not always underpin the decision to 
criminalise conduct as there are victimless crimes:  Mirko Bagaric, 'The "Civil-isation" of the 
Criminal Law' (2001) 25 Criminal Law Journal 184, 188. 
423 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 27.  This statement also links 
to the concept of culpability, which is discussed later in this thesis.  See also Nils Jareborg, 
'Criminalization as Last Resort (Ultima Ratio)' (2005) 2 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 
521, 522 which suggests that culpability is a basic pillar of modern criminal law. 
424 Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers and Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (3rd ed, 2005) 
4. 
425 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 31. 
426 Ibid 27. 
427 Ibid 29. 
428 Nils Jareborg, 'Criminalization as Last Resort (Ultima Ratio)' (2005) 2 Ohio State Journal of 
Criminal Law 521, 526. 
429 Ibid 525.  
430 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 27. 
 73
that is, life, liberty, property and health.431  These individual interests are so 
broad that there is considerable overlap between them and the social welfare 
interests identified above.  Consequently, the scope of individual interests is 
open to interpretation and may be shaped by the legislature to meet its goals.  In 
the context of making and/or distributing visual recordings, privacy and 
freedom of expression fall readily within the individual interest of liberty. 
 
Marshall and Duff explain why there may be alignment between individual and 
social welfare interests.  In particular, they state that 
 
[a] group …[shares] the wrongs done to its individual members, insofar 
as it defines and identifies itself as a community united by mutual 
concern, by genuinely shared (as distinct from contingently coincident) 
values and interests, and by the shared recognition that its members’ 
goods (and their identity) are bound up with their membership of the 
community.  Wrongs done to individual members of the community are 
then wrongs against the whole community – injuries to a common or 
shared, not merely to an individual, good.432 
 
While their account about the intersection of individual and social welfare 
interests is rational, it is possible that the converse is true, that is, that social 
welfare interests and individual interests will conflict.   
 
Marshall and Duff have put forward a strategy for the social welfare principle 
to cope with such a conflict.433   Their strategy begins with the view that the 
criminal law should protect ‘common or collective goals’,434 which are social 
welfare interests.  The second step is to identify the ‘individual goals’435 (if 
any) the criminal law should protect.436  In the case of a conflict, social welfare 
interests may override individual interests, unless the individual interests are 
specifically recognised and protected in treaties and human rights legislation.437   
 
The ambit of individual interests is potentially far reaching and the principle of 
respecting individual autonomy provides the legislature with the prospect of 
enlarging the criminal law.  Drawing on the consultation papers about making 
and/or distributing visual recordings, there are two key competing individual 
interests, that is, the privacy interest of the person being visually recorded and 
                                                 
431 S E Marshall and R A Duff, 'Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs' (1998) 11 Canadian 
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437 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 29.  Findlay, Odgers and Yeo 
contend that the community welfare approach ‘places a premium on community interests and 
would be prepared to override individual autonomy for the greater good of the community’:  
Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers and Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (3rd ed, 2005) 4.   
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the freedom of expression interest of the person making and/or distributing the 
visual recording.  Privacy and freedom of expression were also identified as 
social welfare interests in the previous section.  The literature indicated that the 
social welfare interests should take priority over the individual interests in the 
event of a conflict but, as will be demonstrated soon, the trade-off is more 
complicated in practice.  The individual interests of privacy and freedom of 
expression are evolving and change with advances in technologies that facilitate 
making and distributing visual recordings.  Social welfare interests and 
individual interests are fluid concepts, which enable the criminal law to keep up 
with advances in technology, but pave the way for the legislature to expand the 
ambit of the criminal law.  The criminal law should give priority to social 
welfare interests, but should not ignore individual interests. 
 
The individual autonomy principle is consistent with the notion of 
‘minimalism’ and may equally justify the decision to criminalise or not 
criminalise conduct.  In the context of making and distributing visual 
recordings, the individual interest that could justify the decision to criminalise 
the conduct is privacy.  This individual interest protects the autonomy of the 
person being visually recorded.  In particular, the 2004 New Zealand Law 
Commission’s Study Paper states that intimate covert visual recording  
 
robs individuals of the freedom to choose how they present themselves 
to others.  Because they do not know they are being filmed they cannot 
adjust their behaviour to minimise the intrusion and control how they 
are viewed.438   
 
In contrast, the individual interest that could justify the decision not to 
criminalise the making and/or distribution of visual recordings is freedom of 
expression.  This individual interest protects the autonomy of the person 
making and/or distributing the visual recording.  The 2005 Australian Standing 
Committee of Attorneys-General Discussion Paper recognises freedom of 
expression in this context.439  It states that ‘[m]ost Australians have access to 
some form of photography equipment.  Photographs can be taken for wide 
variety of purposes in public and private circumstances’.440  It also mentions 
the ability to purchase small cameras and mobile phone cameras, as well as the 
ability to print visual recordings at home, to send visual recordings to other 
mobile phone users, and to upload the visual recordings to the Internet.441  
Thus, the principle of respecting individual autonomy may or may not justify 
the criminalisation of making and/or distribution of visual recordings.  It 
depends on whether the individual interest of privacy or freedom of expression 
                                                 
438 New Zealand, New Zealand Law Commission, Intimate Covert Filming Study Paper, Study 
Paper No. 15 (2004) 5. 
439 Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, Unauthorised Photographs on the Internet and 
Ancillary Privacy Issues (2005) <http://www.ag.gov.au> at 1 October 2005, 7. 
440 Ibid 8. 
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is favoured; that is, the autonomy of the person being visually recorded or the 
person making and/or distributing the visual recording.   
 
Thus, even though the literature above suggested that social welfare interests 
should be prioritised over individual interests, this is not an easy task in the 
context of making and/or distributing visual recordings because both of the 
individual interests, that is, freedom of expression and privacy, are both also 
social welfare interests.  Thus, the legislature has the ability to exploit the 
prioritisation of individual interests and social welfare interests in this situation. 
 
An instinctive approach to prioritising individual and social welfare interests 
would be to criminalise the conduct where the individual makes a visual 
recording of another person undressing, showering, using a toilet or engaging in 
a sexual activity, or where the visual recording focuses on a person’s private 
body parts, because the social welfare interest of privacy is worthy of protection 
in these instances.  Further, there is no acceptable reason for respecting the 
autonomy of the person making the visual recording in these instances.  Thus, 
making and/or distributing these examples of visual recordings should be 
criminalised under the head of the social welfare principle as the individual 
autonomy principle does not offer a worthy reason not to criminalise these 
instances. 
In all other examples of making visual recordings, for example, visually 
recording a person walking down the street, visually recording a topless female 
bather at a public beach, visually recording a child playing in a public park; the 
social welfare interest and individual interest of freedom of expression should 
be promoted over privacy.  Thus, if these examples of making visual recordings 
were criminalised, they should be based on another principle because the harm, 
morality, social welfare and individual autonomy principles have not supported 
the criminalisation of this conduct.  If, on the other hand, a person not only 
makes a visual recording of a child playing in a public park or a topless female 
bather at a public beach, but distributes them to a wider audience or in an 
inappropriate context, the purpose of the distribution should be considered, 
before determining whether the distribution should be criminalised.  If the 
distribution was done for the purpose of sexual objectification, voyeurism, 
humiliation or embarrassment; perhaps the criminal law should protect the 
individual interest and social welfare interest of privacy rather than the 
individual interest and social welfare interest of freedom of expression, and step 
in to prohibit this conduct.  The final section in this chapter is punishment of 
the offender.  It is a weak basis for criminalising conduct because it is circular, 
that is, conduct should be criminalised if it deserves to be punished and if the 
conduct should be punished it is a crime.  The principles of culpability and 





2.2.6 Punishment of the Offender 
 
Simester and Sullivan describe punishment as ‘an important facet of the 
criminal process…[and] an indispensable feature of criminal prohibitions’.442  
Similarly, Ashworth contends that a ‘primary justification for criminal law and 
sentencing is that offenders deserve punishment for their offences’.443  
McSherry and Naylor claim that ‘a positivist approach to criminal law often 
focuses on the main aim of the criminal law as being to punish offenders’.444  
Further, the definition of crime used in chapter 1 highlights the circular 
relationship between crime and punishment.   
 
As correctly noted in the literature, the criminal law should be used for serious 
wrongs and as a last resort because of the stigma and punishment associated 
with it.445  In particular, Ashworth states that the criminal law is ‘society’s 
strongest form of official censure and punishment, should be concerned only 
with major wrongs, affecting central values and causing significant harms’.446  
Ashworth’s comment is consistent with the view of Findlay, Odgers and Yeo, 
who contend that criminal law is commonly reserved for serious wrongs.447  
Similarly, Simester and Sullivan advocate that criminal law should be used as a 
last resort because it stigmatises through prohibition, conviction and 
punishment.448  Further, if the expansion of criminal law remains unchecked, it 
will have two ramifications, that is, the stigma attached to a conviction will no 
                                                 
442 Ibid 3. 
443 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 16. 
444 Bernadette McSherry and Bronwyn Naylor, Australian Criminal Laws:  Critical 
Perspectives (2004) 17. 
445 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 17, AP Simester and GR 
Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 22 and Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers and 
Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (3rd ed, 2005) 5. 
446 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 17. 
447 Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers and Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (3rd ed, 2005) 
5.  See also John C Coffee, 'Paradigms Lost:  The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law 
Models - And What Can Be Done About It' (1992) 101 The Yale Law Journal 1875, 1875.  
Public opinion has been sought on crime-seriousness.  This was discussed in more detail above. 
448 AP Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 22.  Jareborg in 
Nils Jareborg, 'Criminalization as Last Resort (Ultima Ratio)' (2005) 2 Ohio State Journal of 
Criminal Law 521 agrees with this and states that criminalisation ‘should be used as a last 
resort, as uttermost means in uttermost cases’:  523.  However, compare Marshall and Duff who 
assert that the difference between criminal law and tort law does not lie in the seriousness of the 
wrong, but in the character of its wrong:  S E Marshall and R A Duff, 'Criminalization and 
Sharing Wrongs' (1998) 11 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 7, 8.  ‘Crime…is not 
just conduct which is inconsistent with values held by other members of the community – we 
may disapprove of many kinds of conduct, without thinking that we have the right, or the 
standing, to declare that others ought not to engage in them’:  13.  Crime is to believe that the 
conduct ‘should be declared wrong by the community’:  13.  Criminal law should prohibit non-
negotiable wrongs:  18.  The term ‘non-negotiable wrongs’ is not specifically defined, but 
presumably it means serious wrongs. 
 77
longer be warranted and the legitimacy of criminal punishment will be 
threatened because it would lack a normative underpinning.449   
 
Punishing the offender does not expressly indicate what types of conduct 
should be criminalised or what types of conduct should not be criminalised.  
However, it implies that criminal law should be used for serious wrongs and as 
a last resort.  The conduct should not be criminalised under this head if the civil 
law provides an effective means of regulation.  Chapter 3 elucidates the 
dividing line between criminal law and civil law. 
 
The literature does not present a tangible definition for the concept of ‘serious 
wrong’ and this enables the criminal law to progress into unchartered terrain.  
However, the fluidity of the notion of ‘serious wrong’ enables the criminal law 
to keep up with contemporary problems in society.  Above, the notion of 
‘serious’ for the purposes of the harm principle was grounded in the living-
standard analysis tool, and there is a corollary here in the context of serious 
wrong.  Thus, if the conduct affects the victim’s survival or their maintenance 
of minimal dignity and comfort, it is a serious wrong and should be 
criminalised under the auspices of the punishment principle.  As the 
punishment principle is hinged on the notion of ‘serious’, it bolsters the impact 
of the harm principle.   
 
As discussed above under the princple of harm, making and/or distributing 
visual recordings are not serious according to the living-standard analysis tool, 
and a legislature should only criminalise making and/or distributing visual 
recordings if another principle supports the criminalisation of this conduct.   
 
Further, according to this principle, if making and/or distributing visual 
recordings could be effectively regulated by other means, for example, civil law 
or an education campaign, then the criminal law should not be utilised.  It 
should be noted that the 2002 Canadian Department of Justice’s Consultation 
Paper entitled, Voyeurism as a Criminal Offence, only considers the 
criminalisation of voyeurism (as opposed to civil remedies) because at the time 
it had expressed interest for six years in criminalising the conduct.450  In 
contrast, the 2005 Australian Standing Committee of Attorneys-General 
Discussion Paper raises alternative means of regulating the use of unauthorised 
visual recordings, for example, the possibility of an ‘education campaign 
focusing on the appropriate use of mobile phone cameras’451 and a process 
whereby individuals could request that their images be removed from a 
website.452  The 2005 Australian Standing Committee of Attorneys-General 
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Discussion Paper broaches the issue of whether there should be an enforceable 
civil right regarding the use of a person’s own image.453  Similarly, the 2004 
New Zealand Law Commission’s Study Paper recommends criminal and civil 
responses.454   
 
As mentioned in chapter 1, whether an education campaign or civil remedy 
should reduce or eliminate making and/or distributing visual recordings is 
irrelevant because this examination falls within the ‘Presumptions Filter’ rather 
than the ‘Principles Filter’.455  However, chapter 3 will illuminate the dividing 
line between criminal law and civil law in an effort to sharpen the focus of 
criminal law and determine what conduct should be criminalised.  Chapter 3 
will build on the discussion in this chapter on the principle of punishment 
because one of the distinctions between criminal law and civil law is the 
punishment and compensation distinction.  However, the key point made in this 
chapter with regard to punishment is that making and/or distributing visual 
recordings is not a serious wrong and should not be criminalised on that basis.  
Thus, the punishment principle is not that helpful because the harm principle 
already suggested above that making and/or distributing visual recordings may 




There is no unifying principle that persistently underpins the decision to 
criminalise conduct.  This chapter provides an overview of some of the 
principles underpinning criminalisation.  In particular, it explores protection 
from harm, preservation of morality, promotion of social welfare, respect for 
individual autonomy, reaction to public opinion and punishment of the 
offender.  A principled approach to criminalisation requires that one or more 
principles underpin the decision to criminalise conduct. 
 
Making and/or distributing visual recordings are modern offences, which were 
introduced in New South Wales in March 2004,456 in the United Kingdom in 
May 2004,457 in the United States in December 2004,458 in Canada in 
November 2005,459 in Queensland in December 2005460 and in New Zealand in 
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December 2006.461 The novelty and short tenure of these offences certainly 
make them cutting edge, raising as they do so many issues of what is 
appropriate behaviour in public places, including questions of harm, morality, 
social welfare interests and individual autonomy. 
 
This chapter discarded the principle of morality as a means for determining 
whether making and/or distributing visual recordings should be criminalised 
because, apart from the fact that there is no universal conception of morality, 
some offences in the 21st century have no or a limited moral dimension.  Thus, 
the principle of morality is not compelling justification for criminalisation and 
should be used sparingly. 
 
Making and/or distributing visual recordings should not be criminalised under 
the harm or punishment principles because the conduct does not satisfy the 
notion of ‘serious’ used above.  Most specifically, this chapter utilised a 
conceptualisation of serious from the living-standard analysis tool, which 
requires the conduct to impact on the victim’s survival or their maintenance of 
minimal dignity and comfort.   
 
In the context of making and/or distributing visual recordings, privacy and 
freedom of expression are both social welfare interests and individual interests.  
Unlike the harm principle, social welfare and individual interests are not 
anchored around the notion of ‘serious’.  Where an individual makes and/or 
distributes a visual recording of another person undressing, showering, using a 
toilet or engaging in a sexual activity, or one that focuses on a person’s private 
body parts,  the social welfare interest of privacy is worthy of protection over 
the individual’s interest of freedom of expression.  In all other examples of 
making visual recordings, such as visually recording a child playing in a public 
park, an adult walking along a street or a topless female bather at a public 
beach, the social welfare interest of freedom of expression should take priority 
over privacy.  However, if one of these latter visual recordings was distributed, 
for example, uploaded to the Internet, it needs to be considered whether the 
distribution was for a socially desirable purpose.  If it is distributed for the 
purpose of sexual objectification, voyeurism, humiliation or embarrassment, the 
social welfare interest of privacy should take priority over freedom of 
expression.   
 
According to media reports, the community has expressed outrage and concern 
about people making and/or distributing visual recordings of children playing in 
a public park and topless female bathers at a public beach.  However, public 
opinion should not form part of a principled approach to criminalisation.  The 
next chapter will take a minimalist approach to criminalisation and sharpen the 
focus of what is criminalised by distinguishing criminal law from civil law. 
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3 CHAPTER 3:  DISTINGUISHING CRIMINAL LAW FROM 
CIVIL LAW 
 
Making and/or distributing unauthorised visual recordings is a particularly 
contemporary example of conduct that does not fit squarely within the core of 
the criminal law.  While it sits at the periphery of the criminal law, the relevant 
question is when it should be criminalised.  This chapter will explore the thesis 
question by distinguishing criminal law from civil law.  The content of this 
chapter is significant because ‘to define the proper sphere of the criminal law, 
one must explain how its purposes and methods differ from those of tort 
law’.462  Coffee suggests that the ‘blurring border between tort and crime 
predictably will result in injustice, and ultimately will weaken the efficacy of 
the criminal law as an instrument of social control’.463  Thus, illuminating the 
distinctions in this chapter will sharpen the focus of criminal law and make it 
more effective.464   
 
In the context of making and/or distributing visual recordings, quasi-criminal 
orders including police directions to move on, public nuisance offence, and 
restraining orders are ineffective.  Police have the power to move people on in 
public places if their conduct causes anxiety, or is offensive, threatening, 
disrupting, disorderly or indecent.465  While this may have application to visual 
recordings made in public places such as up-skirt filming and visually recording 
a child playing in a public park, there are a couple of practical problems with 
move-on orders.  Firstly, before a police officer could give a move-on direction, 
they would need to see the person actually making the visual recording, and 
secondly, the person visually recorded may not have the opportunity to feel 
anxious or threatened because they may be unaware that they are in fact being 
visually recorded.  Further, the police move-on powers are inapplicable to 
visual recordings made in the home and will not prevent people from, for 
example, uploading visual recordings on the Internet.  For identical reasons, the 
public nuisance offence may not apply to making and/or distributing visual 
recordings.466  Unlike a public nuisance offence, a restraining order proceeding 
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is not a criminal offence and must be decided on the balance of probabilities.467  
The court may make a restraining order against a person in relation to any 
person or property, but this is confined as the person making the visual 
recording may simply make visually recordings of other people in places 
outside the limits.  Thus, quasi-criminal orders may not be feasible in these 
circumstances. 
 
This chapter does not fall within the realm of the ‘Presumptions Filter’, which 
was discussed in chapter 1 and espoused by Schonsheck, because this chapter 
does not determine whether making and/or distributing visual recordings could 
be reduced or eliminated by civil or tort law.468  While chapters 1 and 5 
acknowledge that tort law has intervened in the past to control making and/or 
distributing visual recordings, this thesis is focussing on a principled approach 
to criminalisation, rather than an evaluation of whether tort law or civil law are 
an appropriate means for controlling this conduct.  This chapter explores the 
distinctions between criminal law and civil law in order to gain a greater 
understanding of what conduct appropriately falls within the boundaries of the 
criminal law.  The distinctions will provide guidance on whether there is a 
principled basis for criminalising the making and/or distribution of visual 
recordings.   
 
There is a need to ‘prevent the criminal law from sprawling over the landscape 
of the civil law’.469  For example, Coffee hopes to resist criminal law 
encroachment.470  He states that the ‘criminal law’s scope must be limited 
because society’s capacity to focus censure and blame is among its scarcest 
resources’.471  Similarly, Mann recommends a shrinking of the criminal law,472 
and Epstein recommends the shrinking of both criminal law and civil law.473  
These comments necessitate attention to the boundaries of criminal law.  
 
There is at times an overlap between criminal law and civil law, but there is not 
a single unifying principle that consistently underpins the division between the 
two.  For instance, Lindgren states ‘the overlap [between criminal law and tort 
law] is so substantial that no one concept can effectively do the splitting.  Even 
then, the two concepts of crime and tort are too unruly to stay in the 
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pigeonholes where we try to stuff them’.474  Further, Seipp contends that the 
difference between criminal law and civil law is not based on ‘two kinds of 
wrongful acts.475  He conceives that the same wrong could be prosecuted either 
as a crime or as a tort’476 in all instances.  Equally, Hall asserts that ‘the 
difference between civil injuries and crimes, can hardly be found in any 
difference between the ends or purposes of the corresponding sanctions’.477  
‘[T]he decision whether to make a certain form of conduct a criminal or civil 
wrong is no more principled than the toss of a coin’.478   
 
The commentators in this area provided different lists of attributes to separate 
criminal law from civil law.  For example, Coffee asserts that the criminal law 
is different because of  
 
(1) the greater role of intent in the criminal law, with its emphasis on 
subjective awareness rather than objective reasonableness;  (2) the 
criminal law’s focus on risk creation, rather than actual harm;  (3) its 
insistence on greater evidentiary certainty and its lesser tolerance for 
procedural informality;  (4) its reliance on public enforcement, tempered 
by prosecutorial discretion;  and (5) its deliberate intent to inflict 
punishment in a manner that maximizes stigma and censure.479   
 
Further, Coffee distinguishes criminal law from civil law by arguing that 
criminal law prohibits conduct whereas civil law ‘prices’480 conduct.481  
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Notably, Coffee does not add this distinction to his list above or indicate the 
basis on which he prioritises the distinctions. 
 
Similarly to Coffee, Mann canvasses the same distinctions but expresses them 
differently.  He suggests that the difference between criminal law and civil law 
can be explained by ‘subjective vs objective liability and wrongful vs harmful 
acts’,482 ‘punishment vs compensation’,483 ‘stigma and incarceration vs 
restitution and monetary payments’,484 ‘high vs low certainty’485 and ‘state vs 
private initiative’.486  Further, Mann contends that criminal law is different to 
civil law because of ‘its punitive purposes, its high procedural barriers to 
conviction, its concern with the blameworthiness of the defendant, and its 
particularly harsh sanctions’.487 
 
In contrast, Lindgren offers three approaches for distinguishing criminal law 
from civil law.  He refers to these approaches as the ‘essentialist [a]pproach’, 
‘[w]rongdoing/[c]ompensation [a]pproach’ and the ‘[p]ublic/[p]rivate 
[a]pproach’.488  This chapter will explore the distinctions between criminal law 
and civil law raised in the literature and will conclude by suggesting how the 
distinctions shed light on whether making and/or distributing visual recordings 
should be criminalised.  The distinctions can be synthesised as: 
 
• Punishment and compensation, 
• Prohibiting and pricing, 
• Public and private, 
• Subjective and objective culpability, 
• Risk of harm and actual harm, 
• Immoral and moral conduct,  
• Essentialist approach,489 
• Hybrid approach,490 and 
• Not making the distinction between criminal law and civil law.491 
                                                 
482 Kenneth Mann, 'Punitive Civil Sanctions:  The Middleground between Criminal and Civil 
Law' (1992) 101 The Yale Law Journal 1795, 1805. 
483 Ibid 1807. 
484 Ibid 1809. 
485 Ibid 1810. 
486 Ibid. 
487 Ibid 1799. 
488 James Lindgren, 'Why the Ancients may not have Needed a System of Criminal Law' (1996) 
76 Boston University Law Review 29, 36. 
489 John C Coffee, 'Paradigms Lost:  The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models - And 
What Can Be Done About It' (1992) 101 The Yale Law Journal 1875, Kenneth Mann, 'Punitive 
Civil Sanctions:  The Middleground between Criminal and Civil Law' (1992) 101 The Yale Law 
Journal 1795, James Lindgren, 'Why the Ancients may not have Needed a System of Criminal 
Law' (1996) 76 Boston University Law Review 29. 
490 James Lindgren, 'Why the Ancients may not have Needed a System of Criminal Law' (1996) 
76 Boston University Law Review 29, 56. 
491 Mirko Bagaric, 'The "Civil-isation" of the Criminal Law' (2001) 25 Criminal Law Journal 
184, 193. 
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Each distinction will now be explored in turn. 
 
3.1 Punishment and Compensation Distinction 
 
This distinction suggests that the ‘criminal law is meant to punish, while the 
civil law is meant to compensate’.492  Seipp acknowledges this difference and 
refers to this as a ‘choice of vengeance or compensation’.493  Seipp contends 
that criminal law and tort law (an example of civil law) offer the victim a 
choice to pursue justice for a wrongful act in two different ways.494  He states 
that this choice is the ‘remarkable’ difference between criminal law and civil 
law, and discounts conduct, culpability and the private and public distinction.495  
Seipp advances an interpretation of the choice between criminal law and tort 
law as ‘one law for the rich and another for the poor’.496  However, his 
interpretation fails to recognise that a victim may prefer to have a wealthy 
offender charged with a criminal offence rather than seek compensation.497   
 
Mann states that the criminal law should be restricted ‘to areas of clearly 
egregarious behavior in which severely punitive civil monetary sanctions are 
ineffective’.498  This implies that the criminal law should be used as a last resort 
for controlling conduct.  Mann does not tender examples of egregarious 
conduct, but arguably murder and rape would fall within this conception.   
Similarly, other commentators suggest that criminal law is only invoked when 
tortious remedies are insufficient.499  Epstein suggests that a tort remedy will 
not be appropriate where ‘there are no victims to whom a tort remedy could be 
sensibly assigned’.500  Further, Coffee suggests that compensation is inadequate 
(and thus a tort remedy is inadequate) where the crime ‘create[s] a generalized 
sense of fear affecting persons other than actual victims’.501  Thus, where there 
is no identifiable victim or where the crime generates fear amongst the 
community, it is more appropriate to use criminal law rather than civil (tort) 
law. 
                                                 
492 Kenneth Mann, 'Punitive Civil Sanctions:  The Middleground between Criminal and Civil 
Law' (1992) 101 The Yale Law Journal 1795, 1796.  On this point, see also AP Simester and 
GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 4. 
493 David J Seipp, 'The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the Early Common Law' (1996) 
76 Boston University Law Review 59, 84. 
494 Ibid. 
495 Ibid 83. 
496 Ibid. 
497 Ibid. 
498 Kenneth Mann, 'Punitive Civil Sanctions:  The Middleground between Criminal and Civil 
Law' (1992) 101 The Yale Law Journal 1795, 1802. 
499 Richard A Epstein, 'The Tort/Crime Distinction:  A Generation Later' (1996) 76 Boston 
University Law Review 1, 8.  See also AP Simester, 'Moral Certainty and the Boundaries of 
Intention' (1996) 16 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 445.  
500 Richard A Epstein, 'The Tort/Crime Distinction:  A Generation Later' (1996) 76 Boston 
University Law Review 1, 8. 
501 John C Coffee, 'Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing 
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law' (1991) 71 Boston University Law Review 193, 234. 
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In the context of making visual recordings, the civil law would be ineffective 
where the individual in the visual recording is unidentifiable, and is thus not 
able to bring an action as a plaintiff.  For example, where the visual recording is 
up-skirt filming or where the visual recording focuses on private body parts.502  
Another instance where the civil law would be ineffective is when making 
and/or distributing a visual recording does not result in any calculable damages. 
For example, what is the damage suffered and how can the damage suffered be 
quantified when a person makes a visual recording of a child playing in a public 
park?  Does the damage increase if the person subsequently distributes the 
visual recordings on the Internet or to others via email?  These thorny questions 
highlight the ineffectiveness of civil remedies in some situations as well as the 
difficulties in using civil law to control this conduct.   
 
Mann suggests that ‘imprisonment and the special stigma associated with 
convictions are the core remedies used to achieve the purposes of the criminal 
sanction’.503  While imprisonment has historically been the distinctive outcome 
of criminal law, many modern offences result in ‘fines and probation’.504  Such 
remedies imposed by the criminal law are more akin to compensation, which 
has traditionally been awarded by civil law.  Thus, this shift in criminal law 
remedies blurs the boundaries between criminal law and civil law.  The stigma 
attached to conviction and imprisonment requires that criminalisation be used 
as a last resort in controlling the conduct. 
 
Different evidentiary requirements stem from the punishment and 
compensation distinction between criminal and civil law.  For example, the 
criminal law has higher evidentiary requirements than civil law,505 such as the 
onus and standard of proof.  Mann states that criminal law ‘puts a higher value 
on certainty before imposing sanctions’.506  More onerous rules of evidence, 
higher penalties (including imprisonment) and stigma associated with the 
criminal law denote that the criminal law should be used for serious wrongs and 
as a last resort.  This argument depends on a normative distinction between 
serious and non-serious.  Chapter 2 establishes the concepts of ‘serious’ and 
                                                 
502 In these situations, the individual would be unidentifiable unless they had a distinguishing 
tattoo or birthmark.  Where the individual has a distinguishing tattoo or birthmark, they would 
be identifiable and would be able to bring an action as a plaintiff, provided that they knew the 
visual recording was made and/or distributed.  See especially Clay Calvert and Justin Brown, 
'Video Voyeurism, Privacy, and the Internet:  Exposing Peeping Toms in Cyberspace' (2000) 18 
Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 469, 498. 
503 Kenneth Mann, 'Punitive Civil Sanctions:  The Middleground between Criminal and Civil 
Law' (1992) 101 The Yale Law Journal 1795, 1809. 
504 Ibid. 
505 Ibid 1799.  See also Nicola Lacey, Celia Wells and Oliver Quick, Reconstructing Criminal 
Law Text and Materials, Law in Context (3rd ed, 2003) 5; Carol S Steiker, 'Punishment and 
Procedure:  Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide' (1997) 85 The 
Georgetown Law Journal 775 and Franklin E Zimring, 'The Multiple Middlegrounds Between 
Civil and Criminal Law' (1992) 101 The Yale Law Journal 1901. 
506 Kenneth Mann, 'Punitive Civil Sanctions:  The Middleground between Criminal and Civil 
Law' (1992) 101 The Yale Law Journal 1795, 1811. 
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‘non-serious’ based on the living-standard analysis tool and applies them to 
examples of making and/or distributing visual recordings.   
 
If the individual in a visual recording is identifiable, it is necessary to consider 
whether making and/or distributing the visual recording falls within the notion 
of ‘serious wrong’.  Chapter 2 suggests that some examples of making a visual 
recording were more serious than other examples, such as where the individual 
is sexually objectified; where the individual is undressing, showering, using the 
toilet or engaging in a sexual activity; where the visual recording focuses on an 
individual’s private body parts; and where the individual making the visual 
recording is in a position of trust to the individual visually recorded.   
 
Chapter 2 establishes that distributing a visual recording generated more harm 
than merely making a visual recording and thus is potentially more serious.  It 
suggests that distributing a visual recording for sexual gratification;  posting the 
visual recording on the Internet to a world wide audience as opposed to 
distributing the visual recording to a small number of individuals; distributing 
moving visual recordings as opposed to still visual recordings;  and distributing 
visual recordings that damaged the personal or professional relationships of the 
individual visually recorded were more serious than other examples of 
distributing a visual recording.   
 
However, compared to other types of crimes, chapter 2 suggests that even these 
more serious examples of making and/or distributing visual recordings should 
fall within the non-serious category rather than the serious category.  It follows 
that making and/or distributing visual recordings should not be criminalised 
under the punishment and compensation distinction, and even where the civil 
law is ineffective in controlling the conduct and the criminal law is the last 
resort, another principle should justify the criminalisation of the conduct.  The 
notion of ‘last resort’ merely reinforces the decision not to criminalise the 
conduct. 
 
3.2 Prohibiting and Pricing Distinction 
 
Similarly to the punishment and compensation distinction, the prohibiting and 
pricing distinction focuses on the different remedies provided by criminal and 
civil law.  It has been said that the criminal law prohibits conduct while the 
civil law prices conduct.507  Coffee argues that criminal law should be used to 
prohibit conduct that  
 
                                                 
507 John C Coffee, 'Paradigms Lost:  The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models - And 
What Can Be Done About It' (1992) 101 The Yale Law Journal 1875, 1876 and Robert Cooter, 
'Prices and Sanctions' (1984) 84 Columbia Law Review 1523, 1523.  Coffee borrows the 
concept of ‘prices’, which was coined by Cooter. 
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society believes lacks any social utility, while civil penalties should be 
used to deter (or “price”) many forms of misbehaviour (for example, 
negligence) where the regulated activity has positive social utility but is 
imposing externalities on others.508   
 
He asserts that the civil law prices modest departures from norms and does not 
prohibit behaviour.509  The criminal law operates differently, in that it does not 
permit modest departures, unless there is an excuse or defence available.510  
Coffee suggests that society needs to determine whether it wants to prohibit or 
reduce the behaviour.511     
 
Coffee recommends the use of criminal law when ‘society can precisely 
articulate the desired standard of conduct’512 and tort law when the standard of 
conduct is ‘soft-edged’513 and has a ‘fuzzy quality’.514  This necessary 
procedural certainty in the ambit of criminal law harks back to the list of factors 
mentioned in chapter 2 that is to be considered when creating an offence.  More 
specifically, Simester and Sullivan refer to Lord Mostyn, who suggests that a 
                                                 
508 John C Coffee, 'Paradigms Lost:  The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models - And 
What Can Be Done About It' (1992) 101 The Yale Law Journal 1875, 1876.  See also Macaulay 
as cited in Paul H Robinson, 'A Theory of Justification:  Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for 
Criminal Liability' (1975) 23 UCLA Law Review 266, 268, who explains:  ‘When an act is of 
such a description that it would be better that it should not be done, it is quite proper to look at 
the motives and intentions of the doer, for the purpose of deciding whether he [or she] shall be 
punished or not.  But when an act which is really useful to society, an act of a sort which it is 
desirable to encourage, has been done, it is absurd to inquire into the motives of the doer, for 
the purpose of punishing him if it shall appear that that his [or her] motives were bad’.  
Robinson suggests that views of what is societally useful and harmful will change over time 
and from society to society:  Paul H Robinson, 'A Theory of Justification:  Societal Harm as a 
Prerequisite for Criminal Liability' (1975) 23 UCLA Law Review 266.  See also Robert Cooter, 
'Prices and Sanctions' (1984) 84 Columbia Law Review 1523, John C Coffee, 'Does "Unlawful" 
Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law' 
(1991) 71 Boston University Law Review 193, Mark G Kelman, 'Trashing' (1984) 36 Stanford 
Law Review 293 and Mark Kelman, 'Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law' 
(1980-1981) 33 Stanford Law Review 591. 
509 John C Coffee, 'Paradigms Lost:  The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models - And 
What Can Be Done About It' (1992) 101 The Yale Law Journal 1875, 1876. 
510 Ibid.  
511,Ibid 1886. 
512 Ibid. 
513 Ibid 1887. 
514 Ibid 1878.  However, it should be noted that in some jurisdictions, the criminal law is not set 
out in a Criminal Code and is judge-made law, similar to tort law.  In such jurisdictions, the 
benefit of judge-made criminal law is that the judiciary may ‘create new offences and the 
vagueness of existing criminal law are needed to deal with new variations of social mischief 
without having to await the lumbering response of legislature’: Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers 
and Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (3rd ed, 2005) 8.  This position is similar to tort 
law, which is judge-made law.  Further, compare the view of Findlay, Odgers and Yeo who 
suggest that some of the terms used in criminal law in statutory form are vague, for example, 
reasonableness.  ‘These concepts are vague to provide the flexibility needed for judges to 
respond properly to a whole variety of situations’:  12.  
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proposed offence should be ‘enforceable in practice…tightly drawn and legally 
sound’.515  In contrast, the  
 
imprecision [of tort law] is consistent with the natural desire of judges 
to leave themselves discretion and flexibility in future cases…Because 
such a standard can never be fully realized nor even defined with 
specificity in advance, it seems self-evident that is should not be 
criminalized.516   
 
Coffee’s view about precise articulation in the criminal law is consistent with 
the principle of minimalism, which demands stronger justifications for 
criminalising behaviour as distinct from regulating behaviour with tort law.517  
Further, the criminal law would be brought into disrepute if it was fuzzy and 
unenforceable,518 and it would not be as useful as a means of socialisation. 
 
The prohibiting and pricing distinction between criminal and civil law gels with 
the promotion of social welfare principle discussed in chapter 2 because they 
both require the democratic determination of collective interests.  It is 
appropriate to use criminal law where society determines to prohibit the 
behaviour rather than merely reduce it.  Obviously, it is not appropriate to use 
criminal law unless the conduct can be clearly articulated and unless the 
conduct is enforceable, but these points relate more to the ‘Presumptions Filter’ 
or the ‘Pragmatics Filter’, rather than the ‘Principles Filter’, and are thus are not 
key factors here.519 
 
Not all forms of making and/or distributing visual recordings should be 
prohibited.  Chapter 2 noted that the criminal law would be made a mockery if 
it prohibited people from making visual recordings of other people in public 
places because this conduct is an inevitable part of life in the 21st century and 
such an offence would be difficult to enforce.  The criminal law should prohibit 
a person from making a visual recording that focuses on another person’s 
private body parts or another person engaging in a private act, as these are made 
for a socially undesirable purpose520 where they are made without the consent 
of the person visually recorded.   The criminal law should also prohibit a person 
from distributing a visual recording where that is done for a socially 
undesirable purpose, for example, sexual objectification, voyeurism, 
humiliation and embarrassment.   
                                                 
515 AP Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 8. 
516 John C Coffee, 'Paradigms Lost:  The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models - And 
What Can Be Done About It' (1992) 101 The Yale Law Journal 1875, 1878-8.  
517 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 31. 
518 AP Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 8. 
519Jonathan Schonsheck, On Criminalization:  An Essay in the Philosophy of the Criminal Law 
(1994) 16. 
520 Note that valueless has not been used because the sexual objectification of children may 
have value to the person making the visual recording, but yet does not have value to society.  
Socially undesirable purpose is consistent with the terminology used in chapter 2. 
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3.3 Public and Private Distinction 
 
Similarly to the prohibiting and pricing distinction, the public and private 
distinction asserts that criminal law focuses on collective interests.  The 
emphasis on collective interests reinforces that the public and private 
distinction (as well as the prohibiting and pricing distinction) falls under the 
promotion of social welfare principle, which was discussed in chapter 2.  In 
particular, in this context, the public and private distinction suggests that 
criminal law is ‘primarily public’521 and tort law is ‘primarily private’.522  
Lindgren suggests that this is the ‘heart’523 of the criminal and civil law 
distinction.   
 
Even though the criminal law is described as primarily public,524 it does not 
mean it is restricted to conduct that occurs in public.  It may apply to conduct 
that occurs in private.  Marshall and Duff provide ‘spouse-beating’525 as an 
example of such conduct that may take place in private, but is a relevant issue 
for the criminal law.526  The reference to primarily public527 is in relation to 
interests528 rather than the place where the conduct occurs.  Mann explains that 
the criminal law sanctions certain wrongdoings because they ‘are public 
wrongs, violating a collective rather than an individual interest.  The criminal 
                                                 
521 James Lindgren, 'Why the Ancients may not have Needed a System of Criminal Law' (1996) 
76 Boston University Law Review 29, 36.  The authors in the following two articles agree with 
this view:  Marshall and Duff in S E Marshall and R A Duff, 'Criminalization and Sharing 
Wrongs' (1998) 11 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 7, 7 and George P Fletcher, 
'The Fall and Rise of Criminal Theory' (1997-1998) 1 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 275, 289.  
See also Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 1983) 33, where Williams 
states that ‘the criminal law has to be used to protect the public interest because there is no one 
who can be relied upon to take civil proceedings on behalf of the public’. 
522 James Lindgren, 'Why the Ancients may not have Needed a System of Criminal Law' (1996) 
76 Boston University Law Review 29, 36.  Similarly, see David Brown et al, Brown, Farrier, 
Neal and Weisbrot's Criminal Laws - Materials and Commentary on Criminal Law and Process 
in New South Wales (4th ed, 2006) 85.  However, Marshall and Duff in S E Marshall and R A 
Duff, 'Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs' (1998) 11 Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence 7 suggest that the difficulty remains in distinguishing public from private:  7.  
Contrast Simester and Sullivan who contend that ‘most harms are both public and private’:  AP 
Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 8. 
523 James Lindgren, 'Why the Ancients may not have Needed a System of Criminal Law' (1996) 
76 Boston University Law Review 29, 30 
524 Ibid 36. 
525 S E Marshall and R A Duff, 'Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs' (1998) 11 Canadian 
Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 7, 14. 
526 Ibid. 
527 James Lindgren, 'Why the Ancients may not have Needed a System of Criminal Law' (1996) 
76 Boston University Law Review 29, 36. 
528 Note that most of the literature uses interests rather than rights.  For example, refer to 
Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 1983) 33, S E Marshall and R A Duff, 
'Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs' (1998) 11 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
7, 14 and David Brown et al, Brown, Farrier, Neal and Weisbrot's Criminal Laws - Materials 
and Commentary on Criminal Law and Process in New South Wales (4th ed, 2006) 85.  
However, contrast William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1979 
(originally published in 1765)) 5-7, which uses ‘public rights and duties’. 
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sanction will apply even if no individual interest has suffered direct injury.’529  
In this sense, criminal laws require a social harm.530  This interpretation is 
consistent with the contextual approach to consent, which will be discussed in 
chapter 5; that is, it is important to focus on the context in which the intrusion 
on privacy occurs rather than the place where the intrusion occurs.  In the 
example of making and/or distributing visual recordings, it is not simply a 
matter of looking at the place where the person was located when they were 
visually recorded because privacy may exist in both a public or private place.   
 
Mann’s account is consistent with Blackstone’s explanation that crimes are a 
breach of public interests that are due to the whole community, while civil 
injuries are private wrongs and infringe individual civil rights.531  Further, Hall 
recognises that ‘crimes affect the whole community, considered as a 
community, in its social aggregate capacity…they strike at the very being of 
society, which cannot possibly subsist where actions of this sort are suffered to 
escape with impunity’.532  In this way, a purpose of the criminal law is to 
control anti-social behaviour.533   
 
Similarly, Marshall and Duff ask the following questions in determining what 
types of conduct should be criminalised, that is,  
 
what kinds of wrongs should be seen as wrongs against ‘us’;  and this is 
to ask which values are (which should be) so central to a community’s 
identity and self-understanding, to its conception of its members’ good, 
that actions which attack or flout those values are not merely individual 
                                                 
529 Kenneth Mann, 'Punitive Civil Sanctions:  The Middleground between Criminal and Civil 
Law' (1992) 101 The Yale Law Journal 1795, 1806. 
530 Ibid. 
531 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1979 (originally published in 
1765)) 5-7.  Blackstone notes that the public swallows up private where there are ‘gross and 
atrocious’ injuries (for example murder and robbery), because often it is impossible for the 
aggressor to repair the private wrong afterwards:  6.  Further, where the crime is of an inferior 
nature, the public punishment is not severe and there is scope for private compensation:  6.  
Blackstone notes that in the case of beating another person, there is a crime for disturbing the 
peace and a private (civil) remedy for trespass to person:  6.  Blackstone continues to provide a 
nuisance example where there may be a public remedy in criminal law as well as a civil law 
remedy.  Blackstone concludes that ‘in taking cognizance of all wrongs, or unlawful acts, the 
law has double view:  viz not only to redress the party injured, by either restoring to him his 
right, if possible;  or by giving him an equivalent;…but also to secure to the public the benefit 
of society, by preventing or punishing every breach and violation of those laws, which the 
sovereign power has thought proper to establish, for the government and tranquillity of the 
whole’: 7. 
532 Jerome Hall, 'Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts:  I' (1943) XLIII Columbia Law 
Review 753, 757.  
533 Kenneth Mann, 'Punitive Civil Sanctions:  The Middleground between Criminal and Civil 
Law' (1992) 101 The Yale Law Journal 1795, 1807. 
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matters which the individual victim should pursue for herself [or 
himself], but attacks on the community.534   
 
In the above quote, Marshall and Duff take two attempts to frame the question 
and did not attempt the arduous task of answering it.   
 
Tenuous arguments have been put forward to undermine the public and private 
distinction, that is, ‘that the personal is political or that the distinction is 
incoherent’.535 Simester and Sullivan argue that the distinction between 
criminal law and civil law cannot be determined by reference to the public or 
private interest violated because most types of harms are public as well as 
private.536  Perhaps they are correct and that the distinction between criminal 
law and civil law lies in expression and labelling.  Despite this, the public and 
private distinction is compelling and explains why there are procedural 
differences between criminal and civil law.  For example, the state brings and 
enforces a criminal sanction where public interests are at stake and where there 
is no plaintiff to bring the action.  In civil law, a plaintiff brings the action.537  
Further, criminal law is better placed to regulate wrongs than tort law because 
the state ‘pays the costs of investigating, prosecuting, and punishing criminal 
conduct’,538 instead of private individuals.      
 
It is appropriate to utilise criminal law where public interests are breached and 
where the conduct affects the whole community, not merely the individual 
victim.  This is consistent with the first distinction discussed in this chapter, that 
is, the punishment and compensation distinction, which suggests that conduct, 
should be criminalised where the society is generally fearful of it.  It is 
appropriate to use the criminal law irrespective of whether the conduct actually 
occurred in a private or public place.  This argument depends on notions of 
‘public’ and ‘private’ interests. 
                                                 
534 S E Marshall and R A Duff, 'Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs' (1998) 11 Canadian 
Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 7, 21-22.  They use rape as an example of a ‘wrong against 
us’:  18.   
535 James Lindgren, 'Why the Ancients may not have Needed a System of Criminal Law' (1996) 
76 Boston University Law Review 29, 37.   The overlap of public and private interests depends 
on how they are expressed, for example, an ‘individual’s private interest in not being killed can 
also be expressed as a public interest in the value of human life’:  David Brown et al, Brown, 
Farrier, Neal and Weisbrot's Criminal Laws - Materials and Commentary on Criminal Law 
and Process in New South Wales (4th ed, 2006) 86.  Consequently, the private and public 
distinction ‘does not go far enough in helping us to understand the phenomenon of crime’:  86.  
As opposed to public and private interests, the public and private dichotomy is also used in the 
context of place of crime.  It is noted that this dichotomy operates in a ‘class, race or gender-
biased way.  Simply put, access to the institutions of privacy – private homes, grounds, clubs, 
transport and so on – is highly unequal, being heavily structured in terms of class, race, sex and 
age.  The homeless spend a large proportion of their time in public space as do certain 
Indigenous and youth cultures’:  86. 
536 AP Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 2. 
537 Jerome Hall, 'Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts:  I' (1943) XLIII Columbia Law 
Review 753, 760.  
538 AP Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 22. 
 92
If making and/or distributing a visual recording impinges on a public interest, 
that is, affects the community as a whole and not just the individual victim, the 
conduct should be criminalised rather than being regulated by the civil law.  As 
will be mentioned in chapter 5, an example of a public interest that is affected 
by visual recording is privacy.  A greater invasion on privacy occurs where a 
person visual recorded is engaging in a private act and where a visual recording 
focuses on private body parts.  In these situations, the community should 
protect the public interest of privacy more vigorously than the public interest of 
freedom of expression.  On the other hand, if a person is visually recorded as 
they walk down a public street or play in a public park, the public interest of 
freedom of expression should be prioritised over privacy because this is an 
ordinary incident in the common intercourse of life, as discussed in chapter 5.  
In the case of distributing a visual recording of another person, the public 
interest of privacy should take priority, especially where the distribution is not 
done in the public interest, for example, sexual objectification, voyeurism, 
humiliation and embarrassment.  This is consistent with the discussion in 
chapter 2 relating to the principles of social welfare and individual autonomy.   
 
3.4 Subjective and Objective Culpability Distinction 
 
The subjective and objective culpability distinction suggests that criminal law 
places emphasis on subjective culpability while civil law places emphasis on 
objective culpability.  Various subjective, objective and no-fault standards of 
culpability are discussed below in chapter 4, and the criminal law regularly 
employs a subjective standard of culpability, which punishes the offender for 
what they meant to do.539  The rationale for the criminal law using a subjective 
standard of culpability is that the criminal law centres on ‘wrongful’540 conduct 
and generally has higher penalties, evidentiary requirements and stigma, 
compared to the civil law.   
 
Heriot highlights the importance of culpability in criminal law by using 
attempted offences as an example.  She states that culpability is important to the 
determination of criminal liability and this is demonstrated in the criminal law’s 
concern for harms caused by wrongful conduct and inchoate crimes.541  Thus, if 
prohibited conduct is done with intent, then if fits ‘more easily in the criminal 
camp’.542  Similarly, Hall states that generally ‘criminal law is chiefly 
                                                 
539 L Waller and C R Williams, Criminal Law: Text and Cases (10th ed, 2005) 13. 
94) 
egal Issues 145, 146. 
view 1, 8. 
540 Kenneth Mann, 'Punitive Civil Sanctions:  The Middleground between Criminal and Civil 
Law' (1992) 101 The Yale Law Journal 1795, 1805. 
541 Gail L Heriot, 'The Practical Role of Harm in the Criminal Law and the Law of Tort' (19
5 Journal of Contemporary L
542 Richard A Epstein, 'The Tort/Crime Distinction:  A Generation Later' (1996) 76 Boston 
University Law Re
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concerned with intentional harms whereas negligence bulks large in tort 
law’.543   
In contrast to criminal law, civil law ‘depends principally on the notion of 
objective liability, either disregarding the mental element in conduct or 
requiring only negligence’.544  However, the distinction between civil law and 
criminal law is blurred on this account by the notion of ‘criminal negligence’.  
Further, the modern trend in criminal law to use strict liability and absolute 
liability standards of culpability signifies a shift in the criminal law from a 
subjective to a no-fault standard of culpability in regulatory offences.545  When 
criminal law and civil law both use subjective and objective standards of 
culpability, the boundary between criminal law and civil law is distorted.  To 
dd to the confusion, Lindgren suggests that ‘[m]ost crimes and most torts are 
, the person making and/or 
istributing a visual recording must have the requisite subjective culpability 
a
based on wrongdoing and blameworthiness’.546   
 
Even though making and/or distributing a visual recording is, depending on the 
circumstances, non-serious,547 chapter 4 suggests that a subjective standard of 
culpability is appropriate in that context because it sheds light on the purpose 
(for example, sexual objectification, voyeurism, humiliation, embarrassment, or 
a socially useful purpose) of the person making the visual recording.  It follows 
that a lack of consent should be an element of offences pertaining to making 
and/or distributing visual recordings.  Chapter 4 also argues that both an 
objective and no-fault standard of culpability are inappropriate in the context of 
making and/or distributing visual recordings.  Thus
d
before it could be said the conduct is criminalised.   
 
 If an individual intentionally sets up a video camera in the shower vent of their 
home to capture their housemates showering on film, the conduct should be 
criminalised.  In contrast, if an individual accidentally captures another person 
undressing on their mobile phone camera, the conduct should not be 
criminalised, unless they proceed to intentionally distribute it to others, for 
example, uploading the image on the Internet, in which case the distribution 
should be criminalised.  In a different example, if a tourist makes a visual 
                                                 
543 Jerome Hall, 'Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts:  I' (1943) XLIII Columbia Law 
Review 753, 779. 
544 Kenneth Mann, 'Punitive Civil Sanctions:  The Middleground between Criminal and Civil 
Law' (1992) 101 The Yale Law Journal 1795, 1805-6.  See also John C Coffee, 'Paradigms 
Lost:  The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models - And What Can Be Done About It' 
(1992) 101 The Yale Law Journal 1875, 1878. 
545 John C Coffee, 'Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing 
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law' (1991) 71 Boston University Law Review 193, 198. 
546 James Lindgren, 'Why the Ancients may not have Needed a System of Criminal Law' (1996) 
76 Boston University Law Review 29, 37.  See also AP Simester, 'Moral Certainty and the 
Boundaries of Intention' (1996) 16 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 445, 4.  However, Simester 
and Sullivan recognised that the punishment under criminal law is imposed with censure:  AP 
Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 5.  See chapter 4 with 
regard to blameworthiness (culpability). 
547 See the discussion in chapter 2. 
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recording of a beach, but accidentally captures a topless female bather in the 
background, the person making the visual recording is not subjectively culpable 
d should not be criminally responsible.  However, if, for example, the tourist 
intentionally uploads the image on the Internet for the purpose of humiliation, 
t also when there is a risk of harm.  As an example of where the 
riminal law captures a risk of actual harm, Heriot refers to an attempted 
isk 
f harm or actual harm, it may be controlled by criminal law.  In such a case, 
                                                
an
they should be criminally responsible. 
  
3.5 Risk of Harm and Actual Harm Distinction 
 
The previous distinction referred to causing harm and thus it is timely to 
consider the risk of harm and actual harm distinction.  According to this 
distinction, the criminal law controls conduct where there is not only actual 
harm, bu
c
offence.  In contrast to the criminal law, the civil law concentrates on actual 
harm.548 
 
The risk of harm and actual harm distinction sheds more light on what conduct 
should not be controlled by civil law than what conduct should be controlled by 
criminal law.  More specifically, if the conduct merely involves a risk of harm, 
it should not be controlled by civil law.  However, if the conduct involves a r
o
other distinctions between criminal law and civil law would need to support the 
criminalisation of the conduct, before the conduct should be criminalised. 
 
If making and/or distributing visual recordings only produces a risk of harm, 
the civil law is inadequate because it only covers actual harm.  A risk of harm 
may occur when a person sets up equipment to make a visual recording, but 
fails to make the visual recording.  Similarly, there may be a risk of harm where 
a person possesses a visual recording, but does not distribute it.  However, in 
many of the examples discussed in chapter 1, the person who made the visual 
recording also distributed the visual recording and caused actual harm, in the 
form of, for example, psychological harm.  As discussed in chapter 2, the 
concept of ‘harm’ is notoriously difficult to define.  Based on the literature on 
 
548 Gail L Heriot, 'The Practical Role of Harm in the Criminal Law and the Law of Tort' (1994) 
5 Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 145, 145.  See also Fletcher who contends that people 
who intend to commit a crime and take steps to commit the crime should feel as guilty as those 
people who actually commit the crime:  George P Fletcher, 'The Fall and Rise of Criminal 
Theory' (1997-1998) 1 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 275, 288.  Compare victimless crimes, 
where moral wrongdoing rather than harm is at the core of criminalisation:  Claire Finkelstein, 
'Is Risk a Harm?' (2002-2003) 151 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 963, 965.  
Finkelstein makes a distinction between outcome harm and risk harm: 966.  Contrast Marshall 
and Duff, who contend that harmful consequences and wrongfulness are not in general a way of 
distinguishing crimes and torts.  In particular, ‘a breach of contract could be far more serious in 
both its wrongfulness and its harmful consequences than a minor act of vandalism:  but the 
former remains a matter of civil law, whilst the latter is a case of criminal damage’:  S E 
Marshall and R A Duff, 'Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs' (1998) 11 Canadian Journal of 
Law and Jurisprudence 7, 8. 
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criminalisation and the living-standard analysis tool, chapter 2 indicated that if 
the conduct fell within the realms of serious or grave harm, it should be 
criminalised.  Chapter 2 established that making and/or distributing visual 
recordings is non-serious and does not fall within the serious and grave grades 
f harm pursuant to the living-standard analysis tool.  Thus, even though this 
conduct involves an actual harm, rather than a risk of harm, it should not be 
ina e the grade of harm is not sufficient. 
rongs.   As discussed in chapter 2, immorality is usually associated with 
w] is its 
peration as a system of moral education and socialization’.   ‘Far more than 
immoral and moral conduct, or between seriously wrongful and other 
o
crim lised on the basis of harm becaus
 
3.6 Immoral and Moral Conduct 
 
Similarly to the actual risk of harm and actual harm distinction above, the 
immoral and moral conduct distinction hinges on the nebulous boundaries of 
morality.  As mentioned in chapter 2, it is difficult to find a shared 
understanding of morality.  The notion changes over time and place.  The 
immoral and moral conduct distinction between criminal law and civil law is 
normatively indeterminate unless a definition is attributed to immoral and 
moral.  If immorality and morality are constructed as the difference between 
right and wrong, this distinction between criminal law and civil law would not 
be helpful because both criminal law and civil law should be used to control 
549w
conduct with a sexual connotation.  When used in this context, the immoral and 
moral distinction has a limited ability to segregate criminal law from civil law. 
 
The immoral and moral conduct distinction suggests that immoral conduct 
should be criminalised whereas moral conduct should be controlled by the civil 
law.  For example, Simester and Sullivan assert that ‘criminal acts are those 
acts which are intrinsically morally wrong’.550  Further, Coffee stresses that 
‘the factor that most distinguishes the criminal law [from tort la
551o
tort law, the criminal law is a system for public communication of values’.552  
As a result of being a ‘system of socialization…it must be used 
parsimoniously’.553 
 
The immoral and moral conduct distinction has been criticised as a means of 
separating criminal law from civil law.  For example, Ashworth is dubious 
about whether morality separates criminal law from civil law.  More 
specifically, Ashworth states that there is ‘no general dividing line between 
criminal and non-criminal conduct which corresponds to a distinction between 
                                                 
549 David J Seipp, 'The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the Early Common Law' (1996) 
istinction in American Law' (1991) 71 Boston University Law Review 193, 193. 
76 Boston University Law Review 59, 59. 
550 AP Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 3. 
551 John C Coffee, 'Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing 
Tort/Crime D
552 Ibid 194. 
553 Ibid 201. 
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conduct’.554 The creation of regulatory offences that lack a moral dimension 
has blurred the boundary between criminal law and civil law and undermines 
this normative distinction between criminal law and civil law at an explanatory 
vel. Simester and Sullivan have directed further criticism at the morality 
rgued in this chapter that the other distinctions between 
riminal law and civil law do the real distinguishing work.  Another approach 
to distinguishing criminal law from civil law is the essentialist approach, which 
 if conduct is penalised, then it is 
riminal.   Similarly to the punishment and compensation distinction made 
gulated by tort law.   In contrast to the other distinctions, the 
ssentialist approach does not ever clearly separate criminal law from civil law, 
le
principle and contend that ‘mere immorality’ is inadequate by itself for 
justifying criminalisation.555   
 
The immoral and moral distinction has never been a compelling means of 
separating criminal law from civil law as several crimes lack a moral 
underpinning in the sense used in chapter 2.  As suggested in chapter 2, 
immorality is a superfluous consideration in the criminalisation debate.  
Similarly, it is a
c
is explored next. 
 
3.7 Essentialist Approach 
 
The essentialist approach is synonymous with the saying ‘a crime is a crime is a 
crime…’.556  This approach suggests that
557c
above, the essentialist distinction focuses on the results of the criminal law, that 
is, punishment rather than compensation.   
 
The essentialist approach is inward looking and does not explain why many 
types of conduct can be explained both as essentially crimes and essentially 
torts.  For example, the crime of assault corresponds to the torts of assault and 
battery.  Lindgren contends that the essentialist approach is flawed because it is 
not based on evidence, research or argument.558  The essentialist distinction 
overlooks Coffee’s remark that both criminal law and civil law seek to deter 
behaviour through punishment559 and that some of the remedies available in 
criminal law are also available in civil law.  Further, the essentialist distinction 
does not explain why some types of conduct are regulated by criminal law and 
others are re 560
e
                                                 
554 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 2. 
555 AP Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 18. 
556 James Lindgren, 'Why the Ancients may not have Needed a System of Criminal Law' (1996) 
76 Boston University Law Review 29, 36. 
557 Ibid. 
558 Ibid 36-37. 
559 John C Coffee, 'Paradigms Lost:  The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models - And 
What Can Be Done About It' (1992) 101 The Yale Law Journal 1875, 1875. 
560 James Lindgren, 'Why the Ancients may not have Needed a System of Criminal Law' (1996) 
76 Boston University Law Review 29, 37. 
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and it does not provide a framework within which to situate contemporary 
problems.   
 
In summary, the essentialist distinction is problematic because it does not 
provide any guidance on whether a future type of conduct should be 
essentialist approach should be discarded as a 
eans of determining whether making and/or distributing visual recordings 
phasis is placed on the 
ublic and private distinction because that does the ‘real distinguishing 
ns in 
e context of making and/or distributing visual recordings will not be repeated 
here.  The hybrid approach places greater emphasis on the public and private 
hat 
istinguishes criminal law from civil law.  The hybrid approach overlooks the 
s of the law 
ut yet maintaining different procedures for what was previously called 
criminal and civil law), merely avoids the task of drawing a line between 
                                                
criminalised.  As a result, the 
m
should be criminalised.   
 
3.8 Hybrid Approach 
 
Lindgren recommends a hybrid approach for distinguishing criminal law from 
civil law.  In particular, Lindgren’s hybrid approach combines two distinctions 
together, that is, the public and private distinction and the punishment and 
compensation distinction.  In this hybrid approach, em
p
work’.561  Lindgren concludes that criminal law controls public 
blameworthiness.562  By describing the hybrid approach in this manner, 
Lindgren incorporates culpability, without actually referring to the subjective 
and objective culpability distinction discussed above.  
 
The hybrid approach merely reiterates the normative outcomes of the 
punishment and compensation distinction and the public and private distinction, 
and does not provide any new insights into what conduct should be on the 
criminal law side of the dividing line.  The application of the two distinctio
th
distinction, but does not go as far to say that it is the single unifying factor t
d
contributions made by the other distinctions to the criminalisation debate. 
 
3.9 Not Making a Distinction Between Criminal Law and Civil Law 
 
In contrast to the distinctions between criminal law and civil law discussed 
above, one commentator suggests that there be no distinction between criminal 
and civil wrongdoing, which would expand the power of the state to pursue any 
civil or criminal legal action.563  Merely removing the criminal and civil law 




562 Ibid 56. 
563 Mirko Bagaric, 'The "Civil-isation" of the Criminal Law' (2001) 25 Criminal Law Journal 
184, 193. 
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criminal and civil law.  In fact, such a radical recommendation only considers a 
broader concern, that is, where to draw the dividing line between conduct that is 
regulated by the law and conduct that is not regulated by the law.   
 
Not making the distinction between criminal and civil law avoids addressing 
the issue that the criminal law has encroached on the civil law and, fails to 
recognise the overlap between criminal law and civil law.  Unlike the 
distinctions above, not making the distinction does not provide any guidance on 
boundaries and contravenes the view of the Australian Law Reform 
ommission, which favoured maintaining the distinction between criminal law 
and civil law.564  In particular, the Australian Law Reform Commission 
inal law should only encroach in regulatory areas where 
e necessary censure and stigma were present.565 
riminal law and 
ivil law.  This chapter builds on the pre-existing literature by collating various 
should be 
sed as a last resort.  In fact, these examples of this conduct should only be 
criminalised if another principle supports their criminalisation.  The notion of 
                                                
C





Distinguishing criminal law from civil law sharpens the focus of criminal law 
and provides guidance on whether making and/or distributing visual recordings 
should be criminalised.  Further, as mentioned above, the Australian Law 
Reform Commission supports the continued separation of c
c
distinctions between criminal law and civil law in a single source.  This chapter 
pioneers the application of the distinctions between criminal law and civil law 
in the context of making and/or distributing visual recordings. 
 
The punishment and compensation distinction suggests that the more stringent 
penalties, onerous evidentiary requirements and the stigma associated with the 
criminal law mean that the criminal law should be used as a last resort and for 
serious harms.  As noted in chapter 2 in the application of the living-standard 
analysis, all of the examples of making and/or distributing visual recordings fell 
within the descriptor of non-serious harm, rather than serious or grave harm.  
Thus, making and/or distributing visual recordings should not be criminalised 
under the punishment and compensation distinction.  The criminal law may be a 
last resort when the civil law is ineffective.  This may be case where the person 
visually recorded is unidentifiable and is unable to bring an action in civil law, 
for example, in up-skirt filming, or where damages cannot be calculated, for 
example, where a person is visually recorded playing in a park.  However, it 
does not automatically follow that these types of making and/or distributing 
visual recordings should be criminalised because the criminal law 
u
 
564 Australia, Australian Law Reform Commission, Principled Regulation:  Civil and 




‘last resort’ is not a justification for criminalisation in its own right, but merely 
a reinforcement that supports the decision to criminalise the conduct. 
 
It has been said that the criminal law should prohibit conduct, whereas the civil 
law should price conduct.  In the context of making and/or distributing visual 
recordings, this distinction requires an investigation into the purpose of the 
conduct.  Many, but not all, visual recordings are made for a socially desirable 
purpose, for example, capturing family and friends, and landmarks.  Consistent 
with the discussion in chapter 2 under the heads of social welfare and individual 
autonomy, the criminal law should prohibit people from making and/or 
distributing visual recordings: of another person who is undressing, showering, 
using a toilet or engaging in a sexual activity; or that focus on an individual’s 
private body parts, where any of this conduct is done without the express 
consent of the person visually recorded.  Further, and also consistently with the 
principles of social welfare and individual autonomy, which are discussed in 
chapter 2, the criminal law should prohibit a person from distributing a visual 
recording of a child playing in a public park or a topless female bather at a 
public beach, where it is done without the express, implied or tacit consent of 
e person visually recorded and where it is done for a socially undesirable 
ssment.  The public and private distinction confirms the results of 
e application of the social welfare principle and the individual autonomy 
th
purpose such as sexual objectification, voyeurism, humiliation and 
embarrassment.  
 
The public and private distinction suggests that the criminal should protect 
public interests, irrespective of whether these occur in a public or private place.  
In the context of making and/or distributing visual recordings, ‘public interests’ 
include privacy and freedom of expression.  A greater invasion on privacy 
occurs where a person visual recorded is engaging in a private act or where a 
visual recording focuses on private body parts.  In these situations, the 
community should protect the public interest of privacy more vigorously than 
the public interest of freedom of expression.  On the other hand, if a person is 
visually recorded as they walk down a public street or play in a public park, the 
public interest of freedom of expression should be prioritised over privacy.  In 
the case of distributing a visual recording of another person, the public interest 
of privacy should take priority, especially where the distribution is not done in 
the public interest, for example, sexual objectification, voyeurism, humiliation 
and embarra
th
principle in chapter 2 and the discussion on the public and private dichotomy in 
chapter 5.   
 
The culpability distinction asserts that a subjective standard of culpability 
should be associated with the criminal law while an objective and no-fault 
standard of culpability should be associated with the civil law.  This assertion is 
consistent with chapter 4, which establishes that a subjective standard of 
culpability is more appropriate than an objective or no-fault standard of 
culpability in the context of making and/or distributing visual recordings.  As 
will be discussed in chapter 4, a subjective standard of culpability includes 
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intention, knowledge, wilful blindness and recklessness.  Even though a 
subjective standard of culpability is appropriate in the context of making and/or 
distributing visual recordings, it does not necessarily follow that all examples of 
this conduct should be criminalised if the person making and/or distributing the 
visual recording is subjectively culpable.  Chapter 4 notes that subjective 
ulpability is not a principle that dictates whether making and/or distributing 
ng up visual recording equipment but failing to make a visual 
cording, that is, an attempt at making a visual recording, should not be 
l offences created in the 21  
entury have a limited or no moral dimension, and it is doubtful whether there 
w.  The essentialist approach does not offer a framework within 
hich to situate making and/or distributing visual recordings and it is not 
c
visual recordings should be criminalised, but rather is an important 
consideration in framing offences pertaining to this conduct.   
 
The risk of harm and actual harm distinction indicates that the civil law should 
control conduct that causes actual harm and the criminal law should control 
conduct that causes harm or a risk of harm.  However, as discovered in chapter 
2, just because conduct involves any harm does not automatically mean it 
should be criminalised.  Drawing on the results from chapter 2, none of the 
examples of making and/or distributing visual recordings involved serious or 
grave harm and thus should not be criminalised on the basis of the harm 
principle.  It also follows that any conduct that risks non-serious harm, for 
example, setti
re
criminalised on the basis of the harm principle, but should not be controlled by 
the civil law. 
 
The immoral and moral conduct distinction asserts that only immoral conduct 
should be criminalised, but this is only a starting point because not all immoral 
conduct should be criminalised.  Further, severa st
c
is a shared understanding of morality.  Thus, morality should be discarded as a 
means of separating criminal law from civil law. 
 
The essentialist approach suggests that what conduct should amount to a crime 
is inherently obvious and that the types of conduct criminalised are criminal.  It 
does not appreciate that the criminal law evolves over time to control 
contemporary problems and that some examples of conduct sit at the fringes of 
the criminal la
w
helpful in determining whether this conduct should or should not be 
criminalised. 
 
In the context of making and/or distributing visual recordings, the prohibiting 
and pricing distinction, and the public and private distinction are the most 
useful in determining when this conduct should be criminalised.  In particular, 
these distinctions suggest that the criminal law should prohibit people from 
making and/or distributing visual recordings of another person engaging in a 
private act or that focuses on private body parts, where it is made or distributed 
without the express consent of the person in the image.  Further, these 
distinctions suggest that the criminal law should prohibit a person from 
distributing a visual recording of a person in a public place, where it is done 
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without the express, implied or tacit consent of the person visually recorded and 
where it is done for a socially undesirable purpose such as sexual 
objectification, voyeurism, humiliation and embarrassment.  Generally, the 
ther distinctions discussed in this chapter have either been discarded because 
 of culpability attached to conduct impacts on whether 
e offender is criminally liable for their conduct and thus whether the conduct 
 criminalised.  As a result, culpability is a significant principle in the 





they have an inherent defect or they suggest that making and/or distributing 
visual recordings should not be criminalised. 
 
The next chapter will explore the notion of ‘culpability’ and determine when it 
is appropriate to use subjective, objective and/or no-fault standards of 
culpability in an offence pertaining to making and/or distributing visual 





CHAPTER 4: APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF CULPABILITY 
 
The previous chapter established that harm, morality, social welfare, individual 
autonomy and punishment are principles that may underpin the decision to 
criminalise conduct.  Culpability stems from the principle of individual 
autonomy and is a key consideration in creating new offences for making 
and/or distributing visual recordings.566  As was discussed in chapter 3, the 
criminal law is generally associated with subjective culpability and civil law is 
generally associated with objective culpability.567  This generalisation 
overlooks a third category of culpability, that is, a no-fault standard of 
culpability, which has also been used in contemporary criminal law.  Further, 
when the criminal law utilises an objective standard of culpability or no-fault 
liability, the boundary between criminal law and civil law is blurred.  The 
imprecise boundaries of criminal law and civil law raise issues in a 
technological environment where members of society engage in novel acts and 
there is a need to determine whether any of these new types of conduct should 
be criminalised on a principled basis.  
 
The availability of three categories of culpability, that is, subjective, objective 
and no-fault, complicates the decision on the appropriate standard of criminal 
culpability and, in turn, impacts on the decision to impose criminal liability.568  
The difficult decision on an appropriate standard of culpability in the criminal 
law is exacerbated when each of the three categories is scrutinised.  For 
example, subjective culpability may be in the form of intention, knowledge or 
recklessness.569  Negligence is an example of objective culpability,570 while 
absolute liability and strict liability are examples of no-fault liability.571  The 
differences in these concepts will be explored below.  Determining when the 
criminal law should use a subjective, an objective or no-fault liability is 
difficult.  In the technological environment where members of society engage 
in conduct at the margins of the criminal law, the criminal law is forced to 
confront this culpability problem. 
 
Current legislative responses to making visual recordings use both subjective as 
well as objective standards of culpability.  In terms of a subjective standard of 
culpability, the New Zealand offence for making an intimate visual recording 
uses two standards, which are intention and recklessness.572  Arguably, the New 
Zealand offence has the lowest standard of subjective culpability because the 
other jurisdictions do not criminalise mere recklessness in this particular 
                                                 
566 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 38. 
567 Kenneth Mann, 'Punitive Civil Sanctions:  The Middleground between Criminal and Civil 
Law' (1992) 101 The Yale Law Journal 1795, 1805-6. 
568 See generally Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 38. 
569 Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 2005) 172. 
570 Ibid. 
571 Ibid 187. 
572 Crimes Act 1966 (NZ) s 216H. 
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context.  The United Kingdom’s offence on voyeurism and the United States’ 
offence on video voyeurism both use intention and knowledge.573  In contrast, 
the Queensland provision on making a visual recording in breach of privacy has 
a higher standard of subjective culpability as it refers to ‘purpose’ which, as 
discussed below, falls in the realm of intention.574  However, the Canadian and 
New South Wales provisions have the highest standard of subjective culpability 
and only prohibit a person from making a visual recording for a ‘sexual 
purpose’575 or ‘sexual arousal or sexual gratification’,576 respectively.  In 
addition to a subjective standard of culpability, all of these offences are hinged 
on the visual recording being made in circumstances where there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, which is an objective measure.577 Thus, the legislatures 
have relied upon subjective and objective standards of culpability for making 
visual recordings, but not a no-fault standard of culpability.  Utilising both a 
subjective and objective standard of culpability in an offence may appear to be 
reasonable and highlights the complexity in determining an appropriate 
standard of culpability.  However, as discussed below, there are several 
drawbacks in using an objective standard of culpability.   
 
In contrast to the offence of making a visual recording, a subjective standard of 
culpability is used for distributing visual recordings.  For example, the New 
Zealand offence canvasses knowledge and recklessness, while the Canadian and 
Queensland offences require knowledge.578  The United States, the United 
Kingdom and New South Wales do not have specific offences dealing with 
distributing visual recordings.579 
 
This chapter will focus on the conceptual boundaries of culpability and various 
forms of subjective culpability, objective culpability and no-fault liability.  
More specifically it will examine intention, knowledge, recklessness, 
negligence, carelessness, absolute liability and strict liability.  It will determine 
whether it is appropriate for the contemporary criminal law to use a subjective, 
an objective or no-fault standard of culpability in framing offences pertaining to 
making and/distributing visual recordings because this is an example of conduct 
that has arisen in the 21st century at the edges of the criminal law in a 
technological environment. 
 
                                                 
573 Sexual Offences Act 2003 (UK) s 67 and Video Voyeurism Act 18 USC §1801(a) (2004). 
574 Criminal Code (Qld) s 227A. 
575 Criminal Code (Can) s 162(1)(c). 
576 Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) s 21G(1). 
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4.1 Conceptual Boundaries of Culpability 
 
Culpability is defined as ‘the moral value attributed to a defendant’s state of 
mind during the commission of a crime.’580  It ‘reflects the degree to which an 
individual offender is blameworthy or responsible or can be held 
accountable’581 and is a means of characterising the offender.  Commentators 
use a range of terms that mean culpability.  For example, Colvin, Simester and 
Sullivan, and Lacey, Wells and Quick use ‘mens rea’.582  McSherry and Naylor, 
and Bronitt and McSherry employ ‘fault elements’,583 while Ashworth refers to 
‘positive fault requirements’.584  Moore states that the term culpability is 
synonymous with ‘moral responsibility…[and] moral blameworthiness’585 and 
later refers to ‘mental states’.586  For simplicity, this chapter will use one 
concept to denote the offender’s mental state, that is, ‘culpability’. 
 
Culpability is important in framing new criminal offences.587  Alexander 
contends that the ‘centrality of the culpable act in criminal law is stronger than 
the case for taking the causation of harm into consideration’.588  He reaches this 
conclusion on the basis that a person who culpably risks harm flouts ‘the 
principle of respecting the rights of others whether or not harm ensues’.589  
Breaching this principle is ‘what retributive justice reflects’.590  Lacey, Wells 
and Quick state that culpability ‘is the linchpin of the asserted legitimacy of 
coercive state intervention towards individuals in response to “criminal” 
acts’.591  Similarly, Green argues that the offences ‘lacking mens rea do not 
                                                 
580 Stuart P Green, 'Why it's a Crime to Tear the Tag off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and 
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involve culpability or blameworthiness,… [and] are not truly criminal’.592  
Also, Weinberg states that ‘most modern theorists agree that the criminal law 
has no legitimate role to play in proscribing conduct that is not, in some way, 
morally blameworthy’.593  Thus, assessing the appropriate standard of 
culpability is a significant decision in creating new criminal laws. 
 
The importance of culpability in criminal law has changed over time.  In 
particular, Weinberg notes that, before the thirteenth century, actus reus was 
enough to justify conviction and that, from the thirteenth century onwards, the 
accused person’s state of mind was taken into account.594  In contrast to this 
sketchy historical account of culpability in criminal law, Robinson provides a 
more detailed account.  In particular, Robinson asserts that the criminal law 
recognised the distinction between wilful acts and accidents from the sixth 
century, the distinction between careless accidents and faultless accidents from 
the tenth century, the distinction between recklessness and negligence from the 
eighteenth century and the distinction between purpose and knowledge from the 
nineteenth century.595  Waller and Williams declare that objective mental 
elements were preferred until the beginning of the twentieth century because an 
accused could not provide evidence on oath or be cross examined.596  When 
this restraint was lifted and the accused was permitted to give sworn evidence 
and be tested on it, objective mental elements continued to be preferred because 
there was a fear that if a subjective mental element was used, the accused would 
be provided with an ability to control the trial outcome.597  Robinson contends 
that culpability is ‘not so fickle as to be a product of the current social 
context’,598 but the sophistication of the alternative standards of culpability 
coincides with the sophistication of society.  Today, the key distinction is 
between subjective, objective and no-fault standards of culpability.599   
 
Given ‘the increased potential for technology-related accidents in our fast-
paced culture’,600 for example, using a mobile phone while driving, Garfield 
suggests that the criminal law must reassess whether it is necessary to 
criminalise careless conduct. The contemporary technological revolution forces 
a consideration of the reluctance to use an objective standard of culpability and 
                                                 
592 Stuart P Green, 'Why it's a Crime to Tear the Tag off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and 
Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses' (1997) 46 Emory Law Journal 1533, 1557. 
593 Mark Weinberg, 'Moral Blameworthiness - The 'Objective Test' Dilemma' (2003) 24 
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594 Ibid, 176. 
595 Paul H Robinson, 'A Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability' (1979-1980) 31 
The Hastings Law Journal 815, 851. 
596 L Waller and C R Williams, Criminal Law: Text and Cases (10th ed, 2005) 12. 
597 Ibid. 
598 Paul H Robinson, 'A Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability' (1979-1980) 31 
The Hastings Law Journal 815, 849. 
599 Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers and Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (3rd ed, 2005) 
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600 Leslie Yalof Garfield, 'A More Principled Approach to Criminalizing Negligence: A 
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no-fault liability, for example, negligence, carelessness strict liability and 
absolute liability, in modern day offences.601  The criminal law needs to keep 
up with advances in technology and control problems that were previously non-
existent or previously not considered blameworthy.602  Where the criminal law 
expands to control these new problems, it should not automatically be assumed 
that the effect of the criminal law is weakened, but in fact it could be argued 
that social welfare interests are advanced by using criminal law.603   
 
In any event, when creating criminal offences, Williams maintains that some 
key questions relating to culpability must be answered.604   For example,  
 
‘How far is it proper to make a mental element an essential ingredient of 
an offence?  Ought a particular offence to require intention, or should it 
be capable of being committed by recklessness, or just negligence, or 
even be an offence of strict liability, with virtually no element of 
fault?’.605   
 
While not providing any guidance on how to answer these questions, Williams 
emphasises that the scope of the criminal law expands by reinterpreting the 
nebulous culpability concepts from a moral and social perspective.606   
 
In addition to nebulous culpability concepts, Alexander considers whether 
additional standards of culpability should be used in criminal law or whether a 
unifying standard of culpability could be used.607  He recognises the following 
standards of culpability: ‘purpose [also known as intention], knowledge, 
recklessness, and negligence’.608  Rather than recommending that additional 
standards of culpability should be used in criminal law, he suggests that 
recklessness incorporates knowledge, purpose and wilful blindness.609  He 
contends that these standards of culpability ‘exhibit the basic moral vice of 
insufficient concern for the interests of others’.610  He concludes that 
recklessness ‘can serve as a comprehensive, unified conception of criminal 
culpability’.611  Similarly, the Criminal Law Officers Committee of the 
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Australian Standing Committee of Attorneys-General in 1992 stated that 
recklessness is the ‘default fault element’,612  and the ‘basic level of 
culpability’613 unless otherwise specified.  In contrast to Alexander, the 
Criminal Law Officers Committee of the Australian Standing Committee of 
Attorneys-General’s leaves open the possibility of using standards of 
culpability other than recklessness.   
 
Ashworth states that there is a ‘widespread assumption’ that one standard of 
culpability should apply in all criminal offences.614  While Ashworth’s 
comment appears to be practical because it creates certainty, he dilutes the 
notion of ‘one standard’ by using a broad descriptor, that is, mens rea, in which 
he incorporates ‘intention, knowledge and subjective recklessness’.615  Using 
this construction, the notion of ‘one standard’ is not a unifying descriptor.  
Further, this understanding of ‘one standard’ overlooks the reality that an 
objective standard and no-fault liability, for example, negligence, carelessness, 
strict liability and absolute liability, do have a place in the criminal law. 
 
Other commentators steer away from advocating a universal standard of 
culpability.  For example, McSherry and Naylor conclude that any quest for a 
universal standard of culpability, whether it be objective or subjective, is 
‘doomed to failure’.616  While they do not subscribe solely to the objective or 
subjective standards of culpability, they also overlook the no-fault standard of 
culpability in their statement.  Consequently, this chapter does not seek a single 
unifying standard of culpability to be applied to all criminal offences, but rather 
seeks to explore the conceptual boundaries of subjective and objective 
standards of culpability and no-fault liability, and identify whether it is 
appropriate for the criminal law to use one or more of these standards of 
culpability in the context of making and/or distributing visual recordings.  The 
next section will examine the conceptual boundaries of the subjective standard 
of culpability. 
 
4.2 Conceptual Boundaries of a Subjective Standard of Culpability 
 
A subjective standard of culpability focuses on the individual’s intention, that 
is, the offender’s perspective, rather than the consequences of the conduct.617  
                                                 
612 Criminal Law Officers Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, 
Chapter 2 General Principles of Criminal Responsibility, Final Report Model Criminal Code 
(1993) 33. 
613 Ibid. 
614 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 201.  Note that Ashworth uses 
‘should’ and not ‘does’.  He does not further clarify the notion of ‘widespread assumption’ by 
referring to the public or criminal lawyers. 
615 Ibid. 
616 Bernadette McSherry and Bronwyn Naylor, Australian Criminal Laws:  Critical 
Perspectives (2004) 65. 
617 Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 2005) 185. 
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The subjective standard of culpability does not focus on harmful consequences 
because these are outside of the control of the individual.618  A subjective 
standard of culpability maintains that ‘blame should be ascribed on the basis of 
an individual’s intention, not consequences, accompanying such action.’619   
 
According to the Criminal Law Officers Committee of the Standing Committee 
of Attorneys-General, intention, knowledge and recklessness fall within a 
subjective standard of culpability,620 and wilful blindness is not a separate fault 
element but is subsumed by the concepts of ‘knowledge’ and ‘recklessness’.621  
On this basis, wilful blindness will not be discussed further, but the conceptual 
boundaries of ‘intention’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘recklessness’ will be explored in 
turn.  This will be followed by a discussion about when it is appropriate for the 




Intention does not have a concrete definition.622  It is the most stringent mental 
element.623  Intention is expressed in various pieces of legislation as ‘intention’, 
‘with intent to’, ‘with the purpose of’ and ‘wilfully’.624  However, wilfully 
regularly includes recklessness, which is a separate subjective standard of 
culpability and is discussed below.625  Other words used to denote intention are 
‘“intent,” “will,” “wantonness,” “volition,” “purpose,” “aim,” “design,” and 
“deliberation,” with their derivatives; also “means to”.’626  A person may have 
several intentions in mind when they do an act, but the criminal law is 
interested in the one particular intention proscribed by the offence and does not 
                                                 
618 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 185. 
619 Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 2005) 185. 
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culpability:  Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 
2005) 174, 178 and 180. 
621 Criminal Law Officers Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, 
Chapter 2 General Principles of Criminal Responsibility, Final Report Model Criminal Code 
(1993), 29. 
622 Bernadette McSherry and Bronwyn Naylor, Australian Criminal Laws:  Critical 
Perspectives (2004) 69.  See also Nicola Lacey, 'A Clear Concept of Intention: Elusive or 
Illusory?' (1993) 56 The Modern Law Review 621, 621 where Lacey suggests that ‘theoretical 
and practical consensus around a clear concept of intention seems as far away as ever’. 
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review the offender’s conduct in general.627  The Criminal Law Officers 
Committee of the Australian Standing Committee of Attorneys-General states 
that, 
 
A person has intention with respect to conduct when he or she means to 
engage in that conduct.  A person has intention with respect to a 
circumstance when he or she believes that it exists or that it will exist.  
A person has intention with respect to a result when he or she means to 
bring it about or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of 
events.628 
 
Ashworth notes that an abstract meaning of intention is unhelpful and it needs 
to be linked to the consequences or purpose.629  Findlay, Odgers and Yeo 
suggest that the core of intention is purpose.630  Similarly, Ashworth asserts that 
the core of intention is ‘aim, objective, or purpose’.631  Lacey, Quick and Wells 
refer to this as direct or purposive intention,632 which is a ‘decision to bring 
certain consequences or states of affairs about in so far as it lies within one’s 
powers to do so and with the aim of so doing.’633  Schloenhardt provides a 
straightforward definition, that is, intention captures an offender who ‘meant to 
do the act or meant to achieve the consequences’.634  While the commentators 
use slightly different terminology they appear to embrace the same fundamental 
idea.  Equating intention with purpose is useful in the context of making and/or 
distributing visual recordings because a person who accidentally left their 
mobile phone camera on in a communal change room and makes a visual 
recording of another person undressing is not as culpable as a person who set 
out to visually record a person in such circumstances.  
 
The conception is complicated by the notions of ‘oblique intention’ and 
‘transferred intention’.  Williams asserts that oblique intention is the ‘inevitable 
side-effect’ of the offender’s purpose.635  Williams’ use of side-effect is 
consistent with the notion of oblique, but his use of inevitable is more 
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628 Criminal Law Officers Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, 
Chapter 2 General Principles of Criminal Responsibility, Final Report Model Criminal Code 
(1993) 22. 
629 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 175. 
630 Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers and Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (3rd ed, 2005) 
16.  Further, McSherry and Naylor suggest that when intention is viewed as purpose, it reflects 
a ‘tension between intention as a form of subjective fault and voluntariness in relation to 
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632 Nicola Lacey, Celia Wells and Oliver Quick, Reconstructing Criminal Law Text and 
Materials, Law in Context (3rd ed, 2003) 52. 
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synonymous with direct than oblique. Arguably, Lacey, Quick and Wells adopt 
a definition of oblique intention that is easier to understand, but still consistent 
with Williams.  Their definition of oblique intention allows the ‘jury to make a 
finding of intention when the defendant has done an act in the knowledge that a 
particular result will or is virtually certain to occur’.636  McSherry and Naylor 
set a lower threshold and suggest that oblique intention is ‘purpose plus 
foresight of probable consequence’.637  McSherry and Naylor’s use of probable 
consequence broadens the reach of oblique intention compared to Williams’ use 
of inevitable side-effect and narrows the gap between intention and 
recklessness, which is discussed below.  Irrespective of which definition of 
oblique intention is accepted, oblique intention broadens the scope of the term 
‘intention’. 
 
An additional type of intention is transferred intention.  It receives little 
coverage in the literature because it is only applied to limited offences, for 
example, murder and unlawful wounding.638  It occurs where the offender 
commits the crime by completing the necessary physical elements, but with a 
different person in mind.639  Transferred intention is less common than the 
other definitions of intention referred to above, but it is important to making 
visual recordings because a person may visually record a different person to 
whom they intended. 
                                                
 
Irrespective of the definition of intention adopted, it is different to desire and 
motive.  Intention does not necessarily require desire.640  ‘Intention is that 
species of desire on the part of a person that is coupled with his [or her] own 
actual or proposed conduct to achieve satisfaction.’641  In contrast to desire and 
intention, motive refers to emotions, for example, ‘jealousy, fear, hatred, desire 
for money, perverted lust, or even, as in so-called “mercy killings”, compassion 
or love’.642  Generally, motive is referred to as the ulterior intention, that is, the 
intention for the end result, while intention relates to the means of achieving the 
end result.643  Williams concludes that motive is the intention with which the 
constituents of the actus reus were brought about.644  The dividing line between 
intention and motive is complex, particularly given the definitions of intention 
above that refer to consequences, that is, the end result.  In any event, motive is 
an example of circumstantial evidence that proves the offender’s state of 
 
636 Nicola Lacey, Celia Wells and Oliver Quick, Reconstructing Criminal Law Text and 
Materials, Law in Context (3rd ed, 2003) 52. 
637 Bernadette McSherry and Bronwyn Naylor, Australian Criminal Laws:  Critical 
Perspectives (2004) 70. 
638 Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 2005) 176. 
639 Ibid 176. 
640 Ibid.  ‘In ordinary speech, “intention” and “motive” are often convertible terms.  For the 
lawyer, the word “motive” generally refers to some further intent which forms no part of the 
legal rule’:  Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 1983) 75. 
641 Glanville Williams, Criminal Law The General Part (2nd ed, 1961) 36. 
642 Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 2005) 175. 
643 Glanville Williams, Criminal Law The General Part (2nd ed, 1961) 48. 
644 Ibid. 
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mind.645  In contrast to intention, knowledge is a lesser standard of subjective 




McSherry and Naylor state that an offender may be criminally responsible if 
‘he or she acts with knowledge that a particular circumstance exists or 
awareness that a particular consequence will result from the performance of the 
conduct’.646  It should be noted that they refer to actual knowledge and not 
imputed knowledge.647  Similarly, the Criminal Law Officers Committee of the 
Australian Standing Committee of Attorneys-General affirms that, ‘[a] person 
has knowledge of a circumstance or a result when he or she is aware that it 
exists or will exist in the ordinary course of events’.648 
 
Knowledge can be distinguished from intention.  Ashworth contends that 
knowledge pertains to the circumstances of the crime, whereas intention 
pertains to the consequences of the crime.649  However, his distinction is 
questionable given the result of contrasting intention and motive above.  In 
particular, it was asserted that intention related to the means of achieving the 
end result while motive related to the end result.  Despite this, knowledge is 
concerned with the circumstances of the crime and intention is concerned with 
arguably the consequences or the means of achieving the consequences. 
Ashworth suggests that separating knowledge and intention on the basis of 
circumstances and consequences is acceptable, but is difficult in some 
offences.650  He does not support this comment with any examples of difficult 
offences, but perhaps attempted rape may be one.  However, Ashworth 
identified a means to distinguish intention from knowledge, that is, a person 
may intend something that does not come to fruition, but a person cannot know 
something that is not in fact true.651  The next and final standard of subjective 
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Colvin defines ‘recklessness’ as ‘the unjustifiable taking of a known risk’.652  
Recklessness describes a person’s state of mind when they are ‘aware of a risk 
that a particular consequence is likely to result’, while they perform an act.653   
The essence of recklessness is the offender’s awareness of risk.654  The risks 
must be substantial and a real chance rather than a remote chance.655  A 
reckless offender chooses to place their own interests ahead of others, if the risk 
materialises.656    The risk is assessed from the offender’s perspective and is 
thus subjective.657   
 
The Criminal Law Officers Committee of the Australian Standing Committee 
of Attorneys-General states that, 
 
A person is reckless with respect to a circumstance when he or she is 
aware of substantial risk that it exists or will exist and it is, having 
regard to the circumstances known to him or her, unjustifiable to take 
the risk.  A person is reckless with respect to a result when he or she is 
aware of a substantial risk that it will occur and it is, having regard to 
the circumstances known to him or her, unjustifiable to take the risk.658 
 
Recklessness is distinguishable from intention and knowledge.  Recklessness is 
generally a lower standard of culpability than intention659 and knowledge.660  
As discussed above, intention requires the offender to have the purpose of 
bringing about certain consequences.  In contrast, an offender who is reckless 
foresees that certain consequences may occur.661  The distinction between 
                                                 
652 Eric Colvin, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 1991) 129.  See also R v Crabbe (1995) 
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oblique intention and recklessness is harder to draw, especially given that the 
literature provides inconsistent requirements for the foresight in oblique 
intention, that is, probable or virtual certainty.  If oblique intention adopts a 
foresight of a probable consequence, the gap between intention and 
recklessness is narrowed.   
 
Despite the reservation about the scope of oblique intention, the key difference 
between recklessness and intention is that the former relates to foresight and the 
latter relates to purpose.  Foresight is also the key to distinguishing recklessness 
from knowledge.  Knowledge requires ‘foresight of an outcome as a virtual 
certainty’,662 but recklessness requires foresight of an outcome as a probable 
outcome.  Having considered the conceptual boundaries of intention, 
knowledge, and recklessness, it is necessary to consider when it is appropriate 
for the criminal law to adopt a subjective standard of culpability. 
 
4.3 Adopting a Subjective Standard of Culpability 
 
As discussed above, a subjective standard of culpability includes intention, 
knowledge and recklessness.663   Lacey, Quick and Wells suggest that the 
mental element of an offence is grounded in autonomy of the individual664 
because it places weight on the offender’s conduct and circumstances.665  A 
subjective standard of culpability regards individuals as ‘autonomous persons 
with a general capacity to choose among alternative courses of behaviour, and 
respect for their autonomy means holding them liable only on the basis of their 
choices’.666  It is the individual’s ‘choice and control’667  that leads to criminal 
liability.  Accordingly, punishing intentional conduct, reckless conduct and 
conduct done with knowledge is usually justified because the individual has 
‘chosen to engage in anti-social and morally blameworthy conduct’.668   
 
The notion of ‘individual autonomy’ arose in chapter 2.  In that chapter, 
respecting individual autonomy was explored as a principle underpinning the 
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decision on whether to criminalise conduct.  A subjective standard of 
culpability also rests on the notion of individual autonomy.  Individuals should 
only be criminally liable for their conduct if they have the capacity and 
opportunity to act differently.669  However, individual choice does not justify 
why the specific example of making and/or distributing visual recordings 
should be framed with a subjective standard of culpability.   
 
In a criminal case, the prosecution must prove the mental element.670  Bronitt 
and McSherry contend that proof of fault is central to the criminal law and this 
helps to explain why there has been a modern reluctance to utilise no-fault 
liability in the criminal law.671  Proving subjective culpability is difficult 
because it is impossible to look directly into the offender’s mind to see whether 
they satisfy the requisite mental element at the relevant time.672  If an offender 
does not confess their state of mind, a prosecutor will need to produce 
supporting evidence to prove it.  Examples of supporting evidence include the 
offender’s conduct before, during and after the act.673  Further, Dresser asserts 
that attributing a mental state to an offender involves attributing a mental state 
based on the person’s ‘environment, perceptual capacities, interests, and past 
experiences’.674   
 
Similarly, Bronitt and McSherry contend that subjectivity means that the ‘trier 
of fact must make an assessment of fault in relation to the particular accused, 
taking into account his or her behaviour, experiences and characteristics such as 
age, social and cultural background’.675  Consequently, a subjective standard of 
culpability has been described as unpredictable and leads to each ‘case being 
governed by personal and perhaps emotional considerations’.676  Bronitt and 
McSherry contend that difficulties in proving subjective states of mind gave 
popularity to an objective standard of culpability.677  While a subjective 
standard of culpability may be more difficult to prove than an objective 
standard of culpability, this reason by itself is not sufficient to reject a 
subjective standard of culpability in the specific context of making and/or 
distributing visual recordings. 
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674 R Dresser, 'Culpability and Other Minds' (1992) 2 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law 
Journal 41, 78. 
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Where the offence involves serious consequences for the convicted offender, 
the criminal law is less likely to depart from a subjective mental element.678  
Bronitt and McSherry state that intention is the standard of culpability in ‘most 
serious crimes’.679 Similarly, Williams argues that intention is usually used in 
serious offences where there is a deliberate offender.680  Ashworth suggests that 
offences requiring proof of fault are taken more seriously by the public and 
integrated into our thinking681 and hence have a stronger deterrent effect.   
 
Where a serious offence has a subjective standard of culpability, this is referred 
to as correspondence, that is, where the fault and conduct elements 
correspond.682  Aligning serious offences with a subjective standard of 
culpability is consistent with the notion that criminal punishment be reserved 
for people who voluntarily break the law and recognise the harmful aspect of 
their conduct or consequences.683  The notion of ‘correspondence’ is similar to 
the notion of ‘contemporaneity’, which requires the fault element to be 
contemporaneous in time with the conduct element to constitute an offence.684  
The rationale for contemporaneity is that the criminal law should judge a 
person’s character at the time of the offence rather than over a period of time.685  
Ashworth asserts that individual fairness is central to the issue of criminalising 
serious offences.686  A subjective standard of culpability is usually used in 
conjunction with serious offences, higher penalties, more stigma and greater 
deterrence.  Chapter 2 established that making and/or distributing visual 
recordings are non-serious compared to other crimes.  Determining that the 
conduct is ‘non-serious’ suggests that a subjective standard of culpability may 
not be necessary for making and/or distributing visual recordings.   
 
Findlay, Odgers and Yeo state that recklessness is generally associated with 
‘socially unjustifiable risk-taking’.687  According to Bronitt and McSherry, in 
‘deciding whether an act is justifiable[,] its social purpose or social utility is 
important.’688  The literature does not explain the distinction between social 
purpose and social utility, or provide examples of conduct that would meet 
these notions.  To simplify the terminology, this chapter will use ‘socially 
desirable purpose’ as this was used in chapter 2.  In the context of making 
and/or distributing visual recordings, the purpose of the making and/or 
distribution should be considered.  For example, was the visual recording made 
                                                 
678 Ibid 188. 
679 Ibid 174. 
680 Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 1983) 70. 
681 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 168. 
682 Ibid 159. 
683 Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 2005) 173. 
684 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 161. 
685 Ibid. 
686 Ibid 169. 
687 Andreas Schloenhardt, Queensland Criminal Law: Critical Perspectives (2006) 17. 
688 Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 2005) 181. 
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for the sexual gratification of the maker or a third party, to humiliate or 
embarrass a person in the visual recording?  These examples do not have an 
important social purpose and were labelled as ‘socially undesirable purposes’ in 
chapter 2.  In contrast, visual recordings made to capture landmarks where 
people are incidentally caught in the background, sports and games, or to 
photograph family and friends have a more important social purpose.   These 
examples are ‘socially desirable purposes’.  Thus, the purpose of the offender is 
important in the context of making and/or distributing visual recordings 
because not all examples of this conduct should be prohibited by the criminal 
law.  The purpose of the offender should be taken into account when assessing 
the offender’s criminal liability.   
 
To recap the key points above, in a modern technological age, the criminal law 
has at its disposal a subjective standard of culpability.  In the context of making 
and/or distributing visual recordings, a subjective standard of culpability looks 
to the state of mind of the person making and/or distributing the visual 
recording.  It holds offenders responsible for their choices.  The proof of 
subjective culpability is more onerous for the prosecution.  A subjective 
standard of culpability is appropriate where the offence is serious and results in 
a high penalty and high stigma.  Chapter 2 established that making and/or 
distributing visual recordings is non-serious compared to other offences.  Thus, 
the non-serious nature of making and/or distributing visual recordings does not 
support the automatic imposition of a subjective standard of culpability.  
However, as not all examples of making and/or distributing visual recordings 
should be criminalised because some examples serve a socially desirable 
purpose, the purpose of the offender sheds light on their conduct and should be 
considered.  While there are arguments for and against using a subjective 
standard of culpability in the context of making and/or distributing visual 
recordings, the purpose of the offender is a crucial determinant in the 
criminalisation of this conduct and thus, a subjective standard of culpability 
should be an element of offences pertaining to making and/or distributing visual 
recordings.   
 
It is now necessary to consider whether the criminal law should adopt an 
objective standard of culpability in the context of making and/or distributing 
visual recordings in a contemporary environment.  In doing this, the next 
section will explore the conceptual boundaries of an objective standard of 
culpability including ‘negligence’ and ‘carelessness’.   
 
4.4 Conceptual Boundaries of an Objective Standard of Culpability 
 
An objective standard of culpability focused on the consequences of the 
action.689  In doing so, an objective standard of culpability attributes blame on 
                                                 
689 Ibid 185. 
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the basis of outcome, luck or chance,690 that is, where the offender has no 
control over the outcome.  Bronitt and McSherry provide a useful example in 
this respect, that is, an act of careless driving that misses a child and an act of 
careless driving that causes the death of a child.691  From a moral perspective, 
these two situations should be different.692  In the context of making visual 
recordings, an example would be where a person carelessly uses their mobile 
phone camera in a communal change room and visually records a person 
undressing, compared to a person who carelessly makes a visual recording in a 
communal change room but does not capture anyone because no one used the 
communal change room at that time.  Not taking the consequences of an act 
into consideration weakens the criminal law because causing harm is important 
to the criminal law and a completed offence should be treated differently to an 
attempted offence.693  Examples of an objective standard of culpability include 




Criminal negligence only arises where a duty of care694 established by the 
criminal law has been breached, that is, where a person’s acts or omissions do 
not satisfy the standard of care that would have been observed by a reasonable 
person.695  The Criminal Law Officers Committee of the Australian Standing 
Committee of Attorneys-General recognise negligence as an objective standard 
of culpability696 and arguably it is the ‘high risk’ that justifies the 
criminalisation of the conduct.  Negligent conduct is assessed by an objective 
standard, usually what a reasonable person would have done or known in the 
same situation.697   
 
Garfield suggested that legislators have continued to require gross negligence 
as a minimum for creating a criminal offence.698  In contrast, Ashworth left the 
debate open between requiring gross and simple negligence before 
                                                 
690 Ibid. 
691 Ibid 186. 
692 Ibid. 
693 Ibid. 
694 For example in Queensland, various duties are set out in Criminal Code (Qld) ss 285-290. 
695 Eric Colvin, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 1991) 148. 
696 Criminal Law Officers Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, 
Chapter 2 General Principles of Criminal Responsibility, Final Report Model Criminal Code 
(1993) 22. 
697 Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers and Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (3rd ed, 2005) 
19.  See also Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 
2005) 173.  Compare Kenneth W Simons, 'Deontology, Negligence, Tort, and Crime' (1996) 76 
Boston University Law Review 273, which suggests that ‘the community standard for 
individual… negligence reflects both a social determination of costs and benefits and a norm of 
reciprocity’:  283. 
698 Leslie Yalof Garfield, 'A More Principled Approach to Criminalizing Negligence: A 
Prescription for the Legislature' (1997-1998) 65 Tennessee Law Review 875, 890. 
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criminalising serious conduct.699  Simons contends that negligence is not a 
sufficient standard of culpability and recommends that the ‘minimum standard 
for criminal liability in principle should be culpable indifference – a grossly 
insufficient concern for the interests of others’.700  The notion of ‘culpable 
indifference’ is more appropriate for the  
 
retrospective question whether the defendant’s risky and unjustifiable 
conduct displayed serious moral insensitivity to others, than to the 
prospective question whether the actor’s conduct (and similar conduct 
by others) would cause significant disutility.701   
 
If negligence is theoretically deemed to be an inappropriate standard of 
culpability in criminal law, then carelessness is also likely to be refuted as an 
appropriate standard of culpability in criminal law.  Carelessness is another 
example of an objective standard of culpability.  Carelessness requires a lower 
standard of culpability than negligence.  The conceptual boundaries of 




McSherry and Naylor assert that while the ordinary meaning of carelessness 
may fall within the ordinary meaning of recklessness,702 in a legal context, 
carelessness fits more squarely within the notion of ‘negligence’.703  More 
directly, Schloenhardt contends that carelessness is not sufficient to amount to 
recklessness.704  Carelessness, and thus negligence, use an objective standard of 
culpability rather than a subjective standard,705 while recklessness uses a 
subjective standard of culpability.   
 
The criminal law generally treats recklessness as more serious than 
negligence706 and thus carelessness.  However, this is not always the case.  For 
example, Ashworth asserts that a negligent person may be more culpable than a 
reckless person where a ‘person who knowingly takes a slight risk of harm is 
less culpable than another person who fails to think about or recognize a high 
risk of the same harm’.707 
                                                 
699 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 194. 
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702 Bernadette McSherry and Bronwyn Naylor, Australian Criminal Laws:  Critical 
Perspectives (2004) 75. 
703 Ibid 76.  Cf Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 
2005) 183 who state that carelessness is not sufficient to amount to criminal liability, but is 
sufficient for civil liability. 
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Having considered the conceptual boundaries of negligence and carelessness, it 
is timely to review when it is appropriate for the criminal law to adopt an 
objective standard of culpability in the context of making and/or distributing 
visual recordings in the 21st century. 
 
4.5 Adopting an Objective Standard of Culpability 
 
In contrast to a subjective standard of culpability, Waller and Williams argue 
that an objective standard of culpability results in a ‘consistent application of 
the criminal law from case to case.’708  An objective standard of culpability is 
viewed as a consistent measure that everyone can apply.709  It is easier to prove 
because everyone has ‘an intuitive idea of how to apply that standard’710 and an 
objective standard of culpability saves ‘trouble and cost’.711  The ease of proof 
does not provide a strong ground for using an objective standard of culpability 
in the context of making and/or distributing visual recordings because ease of 
proof is a practical issue and does not specifically relate to making and/or 
distributing visual recordings.  Further, the ease of proof is questionable 
because an objective standard of culpability hinges on nebulous terms like 
reasonable and thus the application of an objective standard of culpability may 
be inconsistent.   
 
The reasonable or ordinary person standard is provided with the ‘veneer of 
legitimacy’ because it is expressed as objective.712  The objective standard 
assumes that there is community consensus on reasonable conduct.713  
However, the community consensus on this issue is doubtful as every person 
has their own idea of what is reasonable or not.714  Further, the notion of 
‘reasonable person’ needs to shift with advances in technology and the 
reasonable or ordinary person needs to become technologically savvy.  The trier 
of fact will construct their own meaning of the term, which may be 
inconsistently applied and thus lead to an unfair outcome for the accused.715  
Ashworth asserts that an objective standard of culpability  
 
‘appear[s] much more malleable and unpredictable than subjective tests 
that ask whether or not a defendant was aware of a given risk, and they 
                                                 
708 Ibid 13. 
709 Ibid. 
710 Tony Honore, 'Responsibility and Luck' (1988) 104 The Law Quarterly Review 530, 535. 
711 Ibid. 
712 Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 2005) 184. 
713 Ibid. 
714 L Waller and C R Williams, Criminal Law: Text and Cases (10th ed, 2005) 13. 
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 120
explicitly leave room for courts and even prosecutors to make social 
judgements about the limits of the criminal sanction.’716   
 
Thus, the consistent and predictable application of an objective standard of 
culpability is doubtful, especially in a changing technological environment. 
 
A further criticism with the reasonable person standard is that it fails to take 
into account the personal characteristics of the accused including race and 
gender.717  However, embedding such personal characteristics into the 
reasonable person standard would make it meaningless.718  It could be argued 
that the ordinary person test used in the excuse of provocation attempts to 
overcome these problems because it takes the offender’s personal attributes, for 
example, sex, race, relationships and history, into account in determining the 
gravity of the provocation and only considers age in terms of immaturity in 
determining whether the ordinary person would be deprived of the power of 
self-control.719  Despite these inherent defects in the reasonable person 
standard, the key reason for departing from an objective standard of culpability 
is that ‘there should be no criminal responsibility in the absence of moral 
blameworthiness’.720 
 
Waller and Williams contend that objective mental elements have resulted in a 
transfer of decision making power from the jury to the judge.  In particular, a 
judge utilises his or her own conception of ‘reasonableness’ to determine 
whether a case has any evidence upon which a jury might decide how a 
reasonable person would conduct themselves.  This is problematic where a 
judge’s conception of reasonableness is different to a jury’s because if a judge 
                                                 
716 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 195.  Lacey, Quick and Wells 
also suggest that objective tests result in ‘highly discretionary regulation’:  Nicola Lacey, Celia 
Wells and Oliver Quick, Reconstructing Criminal Law Text and Materials, Law in Context (3rd 
ed, 2003) 56.  They suggest that the objective test is either entirely objective where there is no 
investigation into who is the reasonable person, or a modified objective test where some of the 
accused person’s individual characteristics are taken into account:  56. 
717 Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 2005) 184. 
718 Mark Weinberg, 'Moral Blameworthiness - The 'Objective Test' Dilemma' (2003) 24 
Australian Bar Review 173, 187.  Further, Garfield asserts that to ensure consistency, a formula 
or principle should be used to criminalise ordinary negligence:  Leslie Yalof Garfield, 'A More 
Principled Approach to Criminalizing Negligence: A Prescription for the Legislature' (1997-
1998) 65 Tennessee Law Review 875, 916. 
719 Stingel v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 312, 326.  The reason for only considering age in the 
second part of the provocation test is that, ‘the process of development from childhood to 
maturity is something which, being common to us all, is an aspect of ordinariness’:  330. 
720 Mark Weinberg, 'Moral Blameworthiness - The 'Objective Test' Dilemma' (2003) 24 
Australian Bar Review 173, 186.  Cf Leslie Yalof Garfield, 'A More Principled Approach to 
Criminalizing Negligence: A Prescription for the Legislature' (1997-1998) 65 Tennessee Law 
Review 875, 905 where he stated, ‘Today, some courts and legislatures have retreated from the 
notion of imposing punishment without a mental element and have included a mens rea of 
ordinary negligence in regulatory crimes.  By requiring proof of ordinary negligence, courts and 
legislatures have protected society from the harm that regulatory crimes seek to deter without 
permitting convictions absent any mens rea.’ 
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considers that there is no relevant evidence on an issue arising in a case, the 
jury is precluded from considering the issue.721  Thus, in practice, objective 
mental elements place greater decision making power in the hands of judges 
and this may be unfair to an accused where a jury has a different conception of 
reasonableness to a judge.   
 
Arguably, criminalising negligence serves a general deterrent effect by warning 
the community to take care in proscribed situations.722  However, critics have 
pointed out ‘there is little deterrent value in punishing negligent acts since the 
actor is usually unaware of the risks attributable to his [or her] conduct’.723  
Further, the negligent offender does not necessarily realise the potential 
sanctions.724  Bronitt and McSherry assert that criminalising negligence 
‘operates harshly against those who have a physical or intellectual disability’725 
and are unable to meet the reasonable person standard.  Similarly, Honore 
argues that criminalising negligence essentially imposes strict liability on those 
people who are unable to attain the objective standard.726  Ashworth expresses 
this point in a positive manner, that is, he suggests that as ‘long as the 
individual had the capacity to behave otherwise, it is fair to impose liability in 
those situations where there are sufficient signals to alert the reasonable citizen 
to the need to take care.’727  Perhaps in the context of making and/or 
distributing visual recordings, public information and corporate policies on, for 
example, the appropriate use of mobile phone cameras and the 
inappropriateness of visual recording people in communal change rooms, 
provide such sufficient warnings.  The Criminal Law Officers Committee of the 
Australian Standing Committee of Attorneys-General recommends that the 
standard for criminal negligence should require the reasonable person to step 
into the shoes of the accused at the relevant time.728 
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Where the consequences for the community outweigh the consequences for the 
offender, the criminal law is more likely to depart from a subjective mental 
element729 and thus use negligence, carelessness, strict liability and absolute 
liability.  Garfield also contends that social welfare is important to criminalising 
careless behaviour.730  Balancing social welfare and the unfairness to the 
offender is arbitrary and is just as complicated as the process of comparing 
social welfare and individual welfare that was discussed in chapter 2.   
 
An objective standard of culpability affords greater weight to the ‘seriousness 
of consequences and the deterrent effect of conviction and punishment’731, as 
opposed to a subjective standard of culpability, which places more emphasis on 
the seriousness of the mental state of the individuals.732   In this way, an 
objective standard of culpability is similar to the harm principle, which is 
discussed in chapter 2, because the harm principle focuses on the consequences 
of the conduct.  Chapter 2 established that the level of harm involved in making 
and/or distributing visual recordings is non-serious and thus an objective 
standard of culpability may not be necessary in this context. 
 
Ashworth asserts that negligence may be an appropriate standard where there 
are ‘well-known risks of serious harm’,733 where ‘the conduct is extremely 
dangerous and may cause harm to a significant number of people’,734 and the 
offender has the capacity to take the necessary precautions.735  Further, criminal 
law is justified ‘when potential harm is likely to occur and is likely to be grave, 
either because it is likely to cause death, serious bodily injury, or widespread 
public injury’.736  More specifically, Garfield recommends that ordinary 
negligence should be criminalised when three conditions are satisfied, that is, 
when many people frequently engage in the conduct, where many people will 
suffer harm as a result of the conduct, and where a reasonable person knows of 
                                                 
729 Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 2005) 188.  
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Negligence: A Prescription for the Legislature' (1997-1998) 65 Tennessee Law Review 875, 
877. 
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the likely harm from the conduct.737  Garfield overlooks a duty of care as a 
condition, which begs the question about whether a person who makes and/or 
distributes visual recordings owes a duty of care to act reasonably towards other 
people physically present in the community who may be visually recorded.  
Such a duty may be implausible in an environment where visual recording 
technologies are commonly used, but there are other compelling reasons for not 
using negligence as the standard of culpability in the context of making and/or 
distributing visual recordings.   
 
Many people regularly engage in, for example, making visual recordings and 
distributing them on the Internet.  Even in cases where the recording may cause 
harm, this conduct does not result in serious or grave harm; will not cause 
death, serious injury or widespread public injury.  Consequently, based on 
Garfield’s criteria above, negligence is not an appropriate standard of 
culpability for making and/or distributing visual recordings. 
 
The criminalisation of negligent conduct has been criticised because it defeats 
the purpose of using criminal law as a last resort for the most damaging 
wrongs.738  The criminal law should not be used to ‘cure all potential societal 
ills’739 and, even though the community may be concerned about people 
negligently making and/or distributing visual recordings, over-criminalisation is 
a good reason for not prohibiting this conduct. 
 
According to Garfield, carelessness is an appropriate standard of culpability in 
criminal law, where the society views the accused as sufficiently 
blameworthy740 and where the conduct is substantial and ‘likely to yield grave 
harm’.741  Garfield suggests that punishing careless conduct will ‘fortify 
notions that society discourages such conduct and will encourage people to take 
precautions to lessen the risks accompanying inadvertent’742 conduct.  
Garfield’s view on culpability indirectly reinforces the importance of the harm 
principle.  As discussed in chapter 2, none of the examples of making and/or 
distributing visual recordings are likely to result in serious or grave harm and 
thus under Garfield’s view are not deserving of the carelessness standard of 
culpability.   
 
To summarise the key points made above, the criminal law has at its disposal an 
objective standard of culpability such as negligence and carelessness, to address 
offences that might occur in a technological environment.  Where the criminal 
law opts to use an objective standard of culpability, it will be criticised because 
it is inconsiderate for those who are unable to meet an ordinary or reasonable 
                                                 
737 Ibid 917. 
738 Ibid 909.   
739 Ibid 910. 
740 Leslie Yalof Garfield, 'A More Principled Approach to Criminalizing Negligence: A 
Prescription for the Legislature' (1997-1998) 65 Tennessee Law Review 875, 878. 
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person standard because of an intellectual or physical disability; it punishes 
offenders who are unaware of the risks associated with their conduct and it may 
result in inconsistencies for offenders because people do not have a shared 
understanding of the concept of ‘reasonable’ or ‘ordinary’.  In the context of 
making and/or distributing visual recordings, it is not necessary to use an 
objective standard of culpability because this conduct does not involve serious 
or grave harm; it is not extremely dangerous; it does not cause extensive public 
injury and it is implausible to frame a duty of care to everyone in the 
community who may be visually recorded.   
 
Having discussed the objective standard of culpability, it is important to 
consider the conceptual boundaries of a no-fault standard of culpability, that is, 
absolute liability and strict liability, and explore when it is appropriate for the 
criminal law to use a no-fault standard of culpability for offences that may be 
committed in the modern era.  
 
4.6 Conceptual Boundaries of a No-fault Standard of Culpability 
 
In offences containing a no-fault standard of culpability, the offender’s state of 
mind is generally irrelevant.  Similarly to an objective standard of culpability, 
the consequences of the conduct are important to a no-fault standard of 
culpability.  However, a no-fault standard of culpability differs from an 
objective standard of culpability because the Crown is not required to prove a 
fault element.  In an offence of absolute liability, the Crown only has to prove 
the physical elements.  In contrast, a strict liability offence permits an accused 
to raise their state of mind via the excuse of an honest and reasonable mistake 
of fact.743   
 
4.7 Adopting a No-fault Standard of Culpability 
 
                                                 
743 For example in Queensland, refer to Criminal Code (Qld) s 24 on this excuse.  See also 
Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 2005) 189. Note 
that Husak tried to salvage the term strict liability and stated that strict liability is not ‘liability 
in the absence of mens rea, but rather as liability that may be imposed on a defendant who is 
substantially less at fault than the typical perpetrator of that offense’:  Douglas N Husak, 
'Varieties of Strict Liability' (1995) VIII Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 189, 207.  
Further, Husak identified seven types of strict liability, that is, ‘(1) a defendant’s guilt need not 
be proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) a defendant could be convicted 
despite his lack of mens rea; (3) liability was not defeasible by any of the justifications that 
defeat liability for other offenses; (4) liability was not defeasible by any of the excuses that 
defeat liability for other offenses; (5) a defendant could be vicariously liable even though he 
had no relationship to the perpetrator that enabled him to control the latter’s conduct; (6) a 
defendant need not have performed any voluntary act on which his liability could be based; and 
(7) any innocent purpose a defendant may have had would be irrelevant to his liability’:  225.  
Delving into these seven types of strict liability is beyond the scope of this thesis.   
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As illustrated below, the literature suggests that a no-fault standard of 
culpability is usually justified for reasons of convenience; that the conduct is 
trivial; that the penalty does not include imprisonment; that the conduct requires 
extreme care; and to ensure compliance and ease of proof. 
 
Strict liability and absolute liability offences are often justified on the basis of 
expediency.744  Strict and absolute liability offences are usually ‘trivial social 
mischiefs that hamper the smooth daily running of society’745 and are 
regulatory offences at the periphery of the criminal law.746  However, the 
criminalisation of trivial misconduct should only occur if it is done on a 
principled basis.  The criminal law should be used as a last resort and not a first 
resort to correct social problems.  Making and/or distributing a visual recording 
is at the margins of criminal law and in chapter 2, it was established that this 
conduct is non-serious.   
 
A no-fault standard of culpability should be confined to trivial offences because 
no-one should be imprisoned without sufficient proof of fault.747   Lacey, Quick 
and Wells contend that strict liability should be used when the ‘penalties are 
low, and where stigma attached to conviction is low’.748  They state that strict 
liability is ‘marginalised as exceptional, relatively non-serious and calling for 
special justification’.749  Findlay, Odgers and Yeo suggest that absolute and 
strict liability should be confined to trivial offences because it is ‘not worth the 
public expense of requiring the prosecution to prove a subjective mental 
state’.750  Chapter 2 established that making and/or distributing a visual 
recording involved non-serious harm based on the living-standard analysis tool.  
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20. 
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California Law Review 955, 963. 
748 Nicola Lacey, Celia Wells and Oliver Quick, Reconstructing Criminal Law Text and 
Materials, Law in Context (3rd ed, 2003) 52.  Ashworth agrees with this point:  Andrew 
Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 169.   
749 Nicola Lacey, Celia Wells and Oliver Quick, Reconstructing Criminal Law Text and 
Materials, Law in Context (3rd ed, 2003) 50. 
750 Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers and Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (3rd ed, 2005) 
20. 
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It did not raise the question whether imprisonment was an appropriate 
maximum sentence for making and/or distributing visual recordings.  If a term 
of imprisonment is appropriate as a maximum penalty for this conduct, a no-
fault standard of culpability would not be an appropriate standard of culpability 
because an accused should not be imprisoned without the Crown proving his or 
her fault.  Sentencing issues are beyond the scope of this thesis, but a maximum 
penalty of imprisonment may be appropriate in the context of making and/or 
distributing visual recordings because stalking, which received prominence in 
the late twentieth century, has been criminalised and attracts a maximum 
penalty of imprisonment.751  Stalking is a similar problem to making and/or 
distributing visual recordings because, for example, it may include watching 
another person, it may be humiliating or invasive, and it may involve an abuse 
of power.  Thus, while making and/or distributing visual recordings is non-
serious based on the living-standard analysis tool, it may not necessarily be 
trivial per se because it may in fact deserve a maximum penalty of 
imprisonment. 
 
Where a crime is non-serious, Ashworth supports the use of strict liability to 
protect public safety or alleviate social concern.752  Similarly, Salako suggests 
that where people consciously do an activity that involves a relationship with 
the public, strict liability should be attached to the conduct.753  Salako states 
that strict liability and absolute liability offences are created to advance ‘some 
social, political and economic goals’.754  Of course, these goals are ‘open to 
conflicting, and often, acrimonious analyses’.755  The community has expressed 
concern about how some people have used the latest visual recording 
technologies756 and this has necessitated new social obligations.  While the 
society expects its citizens to exercise care,757 the relevant issue is whether the 
standard of culpability relevant to making and/or distributing a visual recording 
should be a no-fault standard of culpability. 
 
Greater care will be expected from citizens when the harm to others is more 
serious.758  An example of increased social obligations emerged during the 
                                                 
751 See especially Criminal Code (Qld) s 359E. 
752 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 173-4.  See also Tony Honore, 
'Responsibility and Luck' (1988) 104 The Law Quarterly Review 530, which suggests that strict 
liability should be attached to risky activities:  553.  Wassertstrom suggests that some strict 
liability offences may reduce undesirable conduct, which benefits the community, but at the 
same time deletes desirable conduct:  Richard A Wasserstrom, 'Strict Liability in the Criminal 
Law' (1959-1960) 12 Stanford Law Review 731, 739.  He states that the perpetuation of strict 
liability offences is justifiable if a utilitarian argument can be made:  738. 
753 Solomon E Salako, 'Strict Criminal Liability: A Violation of the Convention?' (2006) 70 The 
Journal of Criminal Law 531, 536. 
754 Ibid 548. 
755 Ibid. 
756 Refer to the media reports discussed in chapter 1. 




Industrial Revolution in the 19th century in the United States when new 
regulatory offences were introduced to protect the society from hazardous 
conduct that threatened, for example, the safety of food and, required 
negligence as the standard of culpability.759  A no-fault standard of culpability 
goes beyond an objective standard of culpability, for example, negligence, and 
requires ‘a legal obligation of extreme (not merely reasonable) care’.760  A no-
fault standard of culpability has the effect of prohibiting the conduct, 
irrespective of the state of mind of a reasonable person or the offender.  Chapter 
2 established that the level of harm involved in making and/or distributing a 
visual recording is not serious and thus the expected standard of care is 
correspondingly low.  While this conduct impinges upon privacy interests,761 it 
is not hazardous in the sense necessary to justify an extreme standard of care.   
 
Wasserstrom does not support the use of strict liability in the criminal law, even 
if the conduct is non-serious.  He states that strict liability is not justified by low 
penalties or the ease of proving strict liability offences.762    He suggests that 
the reason why low penalties are attributed to strict liability offences is because 
of the revulsion towards the concept of ‘strict liability’.763  He also states that 
the low penalties attached to strict liability offences have an ineffective 
deterrent function and higher penalties would make these offences more 
effective.764  Even though Wasserstrom is speaking about strict liability 
offences, his comments are equally applicable to absolute liability offences, and 
do not support the use of no-fault liability in criminal law. 
                                                
 
Ashworth asserts that criminalising conduct, which threatens prosecution and 
conviction, may have the indirect benefit of compliance.765  For example, if a 
person was aware that certain conduct was governed by a strict liability offence, 
the person may exercise greater caution.766  This is referred to as a ‘compliance 
strategy’, where conformity to the law is secured without the need to process or 
 
759 Leslie Yalof Garfield, 'A More Principled Approach to Criminalizing Negligence: A 
Prescription for the Legislature' (1997-1998) 65 Tennessee Law Review 875, 878. 
760 Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 2005) 189.  
Bronitt and McSherry provide some examples of absolute liability offences, predominantly 
from New South Wales:  189.  These examples target the protection of the environment and 
revenue, the control of industrial conditions and the preservation of road safety:  189. 
761 See chapter 5 on this point. 
762 Richard A Wasserstrom, 'Strict Liability in the Criminal Law' (1959-1960) 12 Stanford Law 
Review 731, 734.  Salako says its unclear whether low penalties carry social stigma:  Solomon 
E Salako, 'Strict Criminal Liability: A Violation of the Convention?' (2006) 70 The Journal of 
Criminal Law 531, 535. 
763 Richard A Wasserstrom, 'Strict Liability in the Criminal Law' (1959-1960) 12 Stanford Law 
Review 731, 741. 
764 Ibid 737. 
765 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 168.  See also Kenneth W 
Simons, 'Deontology, Negligence, Tort, and Crime' (1996) 76 Boston University Law Review 
273, which suggests that absolute liability should be imposed where the ‘injurer is extremely 
unlikely to respond to legal incentives’:  278. 
766 Richard A Wasserstrom, 'Strict Liability in the Criminal Law' (1959-1960) 12 Stanford Law 
Review 731, 736. 
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punish offenders.767  However, this requires the ‘expectation of individual 
conformity’768 to be reasonable and for the community to be aware that the 
proscribed conduct is wrong.769  This is an important criticism of a no-fault 
standard of culpability, which brands people as criminals even though they 
have not done anything that the community considers blameworthy.770  Further, 
a no-fault standard of culpability is inconsistent with the aims of criminal law 
and defy the ‘accepted standards of criminal culpability which prevail in the 
community.’771  These reasons also support the decision not to use a no-fault 
standard of culpability in the present example of making and/or distributing 
visual recordings.   
 
Strict liability and absolute liability offences are easier to prove than a 
subjective and an objective standard of culpability because the prosecutor only 
needs to prove that the accused committed the physical elements of the 
offence.772  A no-fault standard of culpability increases the chances of 
convicting an offender in a case where fault is difficult to prove.773  However, 
this by itself, is not a convincing reason for adopting a no-fault standard of 
culpability in the context of making and/or distributing a visual recording.   
 
People charged with strict liability offences are afforded more individual 
fairness than those charged with absolute liability offences.774  The reason for 
this is that strict liability enables the offender to claim an honest and reasonable 
mistake of fact, whereas absolute liability does not offer the offender such 
opportunity.  This is a relevant preference in the context of making and/or 
distributing a visual recording because the offender may wish to argue that they 
mistakenly thought that their mobile phone camera was turned off, that they 
mistakenly attached the wrong visual recording to an email, which was 
distributed to a large audience, or that they mistakenly believed they had a 
‘socially desirable purpose’. 
 
While the criminal law may implement a no-fault standard of culpability, 
making and/or distributing visual recordings does not sit squarely within this 
category of culpability.  To sum up the discussion above, this conduct is not 
                                                 
767 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 168. 
768 Ibid 909. 
769 Richard A Wasserstrom, 'Strict Liability in the Criminal Law' (1959-1960) 12 Stanford Law 
Review 731, 735.  Further, Salako provides numerous examples of strict liability offences in the 
United Kingdom including protection of trees and wildlife, selling tobacco to a child and being 
a parent of a child who failed to attend school regularly:  Solomon E Salako, 'Strict Criminal 
Liability: A Violation of the Convention?' (2006) 70 The Journal of Criminal Law 531, 532.  
Salako also notes that the categories of potential strict liability offences are not closed:  533. 
770 Richard A Wasserstrom, 'Strict Liability in the Criminal Law' (1959-1960) 12 Stanford Law 
Review 731, 734-5. 
771 Ibid 734. 
772 Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 2005) 187. 
773 Peter Cane, 'Fleeting Mental States' (2000) 59 Cambridge Law Journal 273, 281. 
774 Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers and Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (3rd ed, 2005) 
20. 
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trivial enough because in certain instances it may be worthy of imprisonment as 
a maximum penalty.  Further, it is not serious enough so as to necessitate 
extreme care as opposed to reasonable care.  This conduct falls in between 
trivial and serious conduct.  While a no-fault standard of culpability offers the 
benefits of expediency, compliance and ease of proof by the Crown, these do 
not justify why making and/or distributing visual recordings, as opposed to 
other criminal activity, should attract a no-fault standard of culpability.  As a 
result, a no-fault standard of culpability should not be attributed to making 
and/or distributing visual recordings. 
 
Discarding a no-fault standard of culpability brings the discussion back to a 
subjective standard of culpability.  While the discussion above suggested that a 
subjective standard of culpability may be appropriate in the context of making 
and/or distributing visual recordings, it should be considered whether a modern 
approach to culpability might avoid the dichotomy between a subjective and an 
objective standard of culpability. 
 
4.8 Avoiding the Subjective and Objective Culpability Dichotomy 
 
With respect to the subjective and objective standards of culpability, Robinson 
and Darley maintain that there was a paradigm shift between common law and 
modern criminal codes.  They do not define modern criminal codes and 
presumably this means any Code.  They argue that the common law took an 
objective approach to criminality, which focuses on the consequences of the 
conduct.  In contrast, modern criminal codes took a subjective approach, which 
focuses on the individual’s intention.775  The subjective approach taken by the 
modern criminal codes is significant because the responses to making and/or 
distributing visual recordings have been legislative rather than judicial.  As 
discussed above, the legislative responses to this conduct have placed great 
emphasis on a subjective standard of culpability. 
 
Robinson and Darley assert that the subjective and objective views of criminal 
liability are ‘unnecessarily dichotomous’776 and that there is no need to take the 
same stance on all issues.  They hypothesised that there should be a subjective 
                                                 
775 Paul Robinson and John Darley, 'Objectivist Versus Subjectivist Views of Criminality:  A 
Study in the Role of Social Science in Criminal Law Theory' (1998) 18 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 409, 412.  The objective approach is also known at the traditionalist approach and the 
subjective approach is also known as the modernist approach:  415.  With regard to the 
modernist approach, Robinson and Darley focus on the Model Penal Code.  Note that this 
conflicts with Garfield’s historical account.  He suggests that the subjective approach is the 
traditionalist approach and the objective approach is the modern approach:  Leslie Yalof 
Garfield, 'A More Principled Approach to Criminalizing Negligence: A Prescription for the 
Legislature' (1997-1998) 65 Tennessee Law Review 875, 877.  Presumably, the discrepancy 
relates to the century that they attribute to the term traditional. 
776 Paul Robinson and John Darley, 'Objectivist Versus Subjectivist Views of Criminality:  A 
Study in the Role of Social Science in Criminal Law Theory' (1998) 18 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 409, 415. 
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view of criminal liability and an objective view of grading the punishment 
deserved.777  This thesis is concentrating on criminal liability as opposed to 
grading punishment and thus Robinson and Darley recommend a subjective 
view for liability.   
 
To test their hypothesis about using a subjective view for liability and an 
objective view for grading, they conducted an initial vignette study in New 
Jersey.  In essence, they surveyed 27 students and 21 jury-eligible people to 
determine whether people take an objective or subjective view of liability and 
grading.778  The results of the survey indicated that most of the respondents 
surveyed took a subjective view of liability, that is, a person who intends to 
commit a crime and does an act towards it is criminally liable even if they do 
not commit harm or the crime was impossible to commit.779  Further, the results 
of the survey indicated that most of the respondents took an objective view of 
grading.780  They did not support the subjective view of grading, which ignores 
the importance of resulting harm and treats a person who had the intent to 
commit harm as morally equivalent to a person who caused harm.781  Their 
survey navigates previously unchartered territory and highlights the importance 
of subjective culpability at the liability stage, that is, ‘[w]hen it comes to setting 
the minimal requirements for conduct to count as a crime’.782  However, the 
low number of respondents surveyed in New Jersey means that the results 
cannot be extrapolated to the United States or world in general.  Consequently, 
there is an opportunity for researchers to conduct a valid and reliable survey 
that has a larger number of respondents.  In any event, Robinson and Darley’s 
work highlights the importance of using a subjective standard of culpability. 
 
While Robinson and Darley state that the dichotomy between subjective and 
objective standards of culpability is unnecessary,783 their work does not avoid 
or overcome the dichotomy.  It merely confirms the subjective view of criminal 
liability.  It does not acknowledge the no-fault standard of culpability, that is, 
strict and absolute liability.  Thus, a more sophisticated survey would recognise 
that the standards of culpability are not dichotomous, and can be divided into 
three standards of culpability, that is, subjective, objective or no-fault standards 
of culpability.  This chapter has recognised these categories of culpability and 
explored when it is appropriate for the criminal law to adopt these standards of 




                                                 
777 Ibid 416. 
778 Ibid 416. 
779 Ibid 435. 
780 Ibid. 
781 Ibid 416 and 435. 
782 Ibid 435. 
783 Ibid 415. 
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The criminal law has at its disposal subjective, objective or no-fault standards 
of culpability.  In the context of making and/or distributing visual recordings, 
which is an example of conduct that is at the margins of the criminal law, the 
criminal law is forced to examine which standard of culpability is appropriate.  
This chapter explored the conceptual boundaries of culpability, intention, 
knowledge, recklessness, negligence, carelessness, absolute liability and strict 
liability.   
 
While a subjective standard of culpability did not appear to be appropriate in 
the context of making and/or distributing visual recordings because the conduct 
was non-serious and has a low stigma, a subjective standard of culpability sheds 
light on the offender’s purpose, which is important because the offender may 
have a socially desirable purpose for making and/or distributing a visual 
recording.  Consequently, a subjective standard of culpability, that is, intention, 
knowledge and recklessness is appropriate in this context. 
 
An objective standard of culpability, that is, negligence and carelessness, is 
inappropriate in the context of making and/or distributing visual recordings 
because this conduct does not involve serious or grave harm; it is not extremely 
dangerous and it does not cause extensive public injury.  Further, the criminal 
law is criticised where it uses an objective standard of culpability because it is 
unfair to those that are unable to meet an ordinary or reasonable person 
standard because of an intellectual or physical disability; it punishes offenders 
who are unaware of the risks associated with their conduct and it may result in 
inconsistencies for offenders because people do not have a shared 
understanding of the concept of reasonable or ordinary. 
 
A no-fault standard of culpability, that is, strict liability and absolute liability, is 
not appropriate in the context of making and/or distributing visual recordings.  
This conduct is not serious enough so as to necessitate extreme care rather than 
merely reasonable care.  Further, the conduct is not nessarily trivial and may 
deserve a maximum penalty of imprisonment.  This conduct falls in between 
these two extremes.  While a no-fault standard of culpability offers the benefits 
of expediency, compliance and ease of proof by the Crown, these do not justify 
why making and/or distributing visual recordings, as opposed to other criminal 
activity, should attract a no-fault standard of culpability.  As a result, a no-fault 
standard of culpability is not appropriate in the context of making and/or 
distributing a visual recording. 
 
On balance, the criminal law should adopt a subjective standard of culpability 
for making and/or distributing visual recordings, which is largely consistent 
with the approach taken by the existing legislation in the various jurisdictions.  
As discussed above, the existing legislation generally adopts both a subjective 
and objective standard of culpability with respect to making visual recordings 
and a subjective standard of culpability with regard to distributing visual 
recordings.  Waller and Williams suggest that in recent years there has been an 
adoption of subjective mental elements, which gives the juries the power to 
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decide what the accused intended.784   This shift from objective to subjective 
mental elements reflects the view that people should be punished for what they 
mean to do.785  Thus, what a person actually means to do is of paramount 
importance.786  Similarly, Colvin suggests that the ‘current orthodoxy of 
subjectivism has been made a valuable contribution to the orderly development 
of the criminal law and should not be abandoned lightly’.787  However, this is 
not to undermine the important role of an objective standard of culpability and 
the proliferation of strict liability and absolute liability offences.   
 
Bronitt and McSherry recognise the struggle between subjective and objective 
standards of culpability.  In particular, they suggest that rather ‘than view 
objective forms of liability as a deviation from the “true” principle of fault, the 
better view is that there is a perpetual tension between subjective and objective 
accounts of culpability in the criminal law.’788  At some points in time for some 
offences, intention appears to be more in important in criminal law than 
consequences, while at other times, consequences are more important than 
intention.789  The instability of culpability in criminal law reflects the diverse 
functions of modern criminal law790 and any attempt to find a grand universal 
theory of culpability is illusive.791  While this chapter has not sought to identify 
a universal standard of culpability, it has established that a subjective standard 
of culpability is appropriate in the context of making and/or distributing visual 
recordings. 
 
This chapter has explored culpability, which takes into account the perspective 
of the person making and/or distributing the visual recording. The next chapter 
examines consent, which considers the important issue of the view of the 
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5 CHAPTER 5:  CONSENT 
 
The previous chapter explored the conceptual boundaries of culpability and 
discussed when it is appropriate to use subjective and/or objective standards of 
culpability to determine liability for an offence.  This was relevant to the thesis 
question, when should conduct be criminalised and, more specifically, when 
should making and/or distributing a visual recording be criminalised, because if 
the offender lacked the requisite culpability for an offence, the conduct should 
not be criminalised.  Of course, this brief summary overlooks strict and 
absolute liability offences that were discussed in chapter 4.   
 
While the previous chapter took into account the offender’s perspective, that is, 
the person making and/or distributing the visual recording, this chapter 
examines the perspective of the person who is visually recorded.  This chapter 
will consider when it is appropriate for the legislature to include lack of consent 
as an element of an offence and will then examine the conceptual boundaries of 
consent.  If a visual recording offence contains the element of lack of consent, 
the lack of consent of the person visually recorded needs to be proved to 
establish criminal liability.  If a visual recording offence does not contain the 
element of consent, the consent of the person visually recorded should be 
irrelevant to establishing criminal liability.  Like many offences against the 
person, the role of consent is an important issue in framing criminal offences 
pertaining to making and/or distributing visual recordings.   
 
In the current context, as noted in chapter 1, the conceptual boundaries of 
consent, particularly implied consent, are important because, in many instances, 
a person does not know that they are visually recorded at the time the recording 
is made.  Many legislative responses to making and/or distributing visual 
recordings have included the element of lack of consent, but do not define it.792  
The notion of ‘implied consent’ is particularly problematic in contemporary 
society because advances in mobile phone cameras, digital cameras, video 
cameras and the Internet beg questions about the appropriate use of such 
pervasive technologies.  Does an individual impliedly consent to being visually 
recorded when they appear in a public place?  Does an individual in a public 
place impliedly consent to having their image distributed on the Internet?  Is it 
                                                 
792 See especially Criminal Code (Qld) ss 227A and B, Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) s 
21G and Video Voyeurism Act 18 USC §1801(a) (2004).  The United Kingdom voyeurism 
offence arguably makes the proof of consent more difficult for the Crown as it requires to prove 
that the offender knew that the victim did not consent, not merely that the victim did not 
consent:  Sexual Offences Act 2003 (UK) s 67(1).  New Zealand takes a slightly broader 
approach to consent than Queensland, New South Wales, the United States and the United 
Kingdom.  In New Zealand, the definition of ‘intimate visual recording’, which is imported into 
the offences for making and publishing an intimate visual recording, refers to ‘without the 
knowledge or consent of the person who is the subject of the recording’:  Crimes Act 1966 (NZ) 
s 216G.  Note that the voyeurism offence in Criminal Code (Can) s 162(1) and (4) do not 
expressly refer to consent, but they hinge on a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ and 
‘surreptitiously’:  Criminal Code (Can) s 162(1). 
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appropriate to surreptitiously visually record other people?  If so, in what 
circumstances?  Is there a relationship between implied consent and privacy?  
This chapter will discuss these issues, and will examine the scope of ‘consent’, 
which includes implied consent, and then consider various approaches to the 
role of consent in the criminal law. 
 
5.1 Conceptual Boundaries of Consent 
 
As mentioned above, if a lack of consent is an element of an offence, the 
boundaries of consent are important to determining the perimeter of the 
criminal law.  Consent is an ‘all-or-nothing concept’.793  As Brett notes, ‘[o]ne 
need only have a pro attitude;  the question of how much one wanted to do this 
action is irrelevant’.794  McSherry and Naylor provide a list of adjectives for 
consent, which include ‘explicit, implicit, express, implied, presumed, 
informed, unwilling, reluctant, grudging, half-hearted, [and] unreserved’.795  
Other concepts have been used to refer to consent including agreement, 
permission, desire, will, assent and acquiescence.796  These synonyms are 
vague and do not clarify the concept of ‘consent’, but they have been employed 
in the case law, for example, Kimmorley v Atherton; ex parte Atherton.797 
Many definitions are little more than ‘consent is consen 798t’.  
                                                
 
The concept of ‘consent’ can be viewed from several perspectives.  For 
example, Wertheimer took a theoretical approach to consent in the context of 
rape and provides three accounts of what he describes as ‘the ontology of 
consent’,799 that is, the subjective view, performative view and hybrid view.  
The subjective view of consent refers to the victim’s mental state,800 while the 
performative view of consent indicates that consent is behavioural and that an 
act is required for consent.801  The subjective and performative views of 
consent are combined in the hybrid view, which requires a mental state and 
act.802  Drawing on the work of Bryden, Wertheimer states that consent is better 
 
793 Kenneth W Simons, 'The Relevance of Victim Conduct in Tort and Criminal Law' (2004-
2005) 8 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 541, 546. 
794 Nathan Brett, 'Sexual Offences and Consent' (1998) XI Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence 69, 71. 
795 Bernadette McSherry and Bronwyn Naylor, Australian Criminal Laws:  Critical 
Perspectives (2004) 211. 
796 Notes, 'Consent, Liability and Guilt:  A Study in Judicial Method' (1954-1955) 7 Stanford 
Law Review 507, 513. 
797 Non-fatal offences against a person that include the element of consent are for example, 
assault, assault occasioning bodily harm and serious assault, which are provided in Queensland 
in Criminal Code (Qld) ss 335, 339 and 340, respectively. 
798 Notes, 'Consent, Liability and Guilt:  A Study in Judicial Method' (1954-1955) 7 Stanford 
Law Review 507, 513. 
799 Alan Wertheimer, 'What is Consent?  And is it Important?' (1999-2000) 3 Buffalo Criminal 





understood from the performative view.  To illustrate this statement, 
Wertheimer uses marriage as an example.  In particular, a person does not 
consent to be married because they have the necessary mental state (that is, they 
want or intend to get married), but they consent to marriage by doing an act, 
that is, saying ‘I do’.803  The notion that an act is necessary before there is 
consent is interesting in the context of making and/or distributing visual 
recordings because it prompts a question whether a person appearing in a public 
place has done an act sufficient to constitute consent to being visually recorded, 
or further, consent to having the visual recording distributed to world at large. 
 
Wertheimer weakens his argument when he said it does not matter whether a 
performative or subjective approach was taken to consent, but that it was 
important to understand that consent was resolved by ‘moral argument’.804  
Presumably a ‘moral argument’ requires the role of consent in the criminal to 
be determined by the morality approach to consent.  The morality approach to 
consent will be discussed below.  The morality approach intersects with the 
public interest approach to the role of consent, which will also be discussed 
below. 
 
While Bix carves up the consent terrain differently to Wertheimer, he considers 
that the moral or public value of the activity is important in determining the 
issue of consent.  Bix also states that the level of harm to which the victim 
consents, the possible harm that was consciously considered by the victim and 
the level of harm inflicted by the offender are important in resolving whether 
there is valid consent.805  This is interesting because it makes a connection 
between consent and harm, and reinforces the importance of the harm principle, 
which was discussed in chapter 2.  Further, Bix’s explanation of consent 
reinforces the quantitative approaches to consent, which are discussed below. 
 
5.1.1 Consent as Used in Non-fatal Offences Against a Person 
 
Despite Wertheimer and Bix approaching consent from a theoretical 
perspective, their views are reflected in an ad hoc fashion in the case law 
relating to non-fatal offences against a person, for example, Lergesner v 
Carroll806  and R v Brown.807  This is significant in the context of making 
and/or distributing visual recordings because non-fatal offences against a 
person more closely resemble this criminal conduct than other areas of criminal 
                                                 
803 Ibid 567. 
804 Ibid. 
805 Brian Bix, 'Consent, Sado-masochism and the English Common Law' (1997-1998) 17 
Quinnipiac Law Review 157, 174. 
806 [1991] 1 Qd R 206. 
807 [1993] 2 WLR 556.  Note that consent has been deemed irrelevant to heterosexual 
sadomasochism:  R v Emmett unreported, 18 June 1999, No 9901191/Z2. 
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law for example, property offences or drug offences.  There is not a single 
definition of ‘consent’ that serves all purposes.808   
 
In the context of injury or a risk of injury, the Law Commission for England 
and Wales frames a complex definition of consent.809  Their definition is useful 
in the context of making and/or distributing visual recordings because this 
conduct may result in an injury or risk of injury such as psychological harm, 
humiliation and embarrassment.  Their definition of ‘consent’ includes express 
or implied consent. 
 
In Queensland, Hoare J in Kimmorley v Atherton; ex parte Atherton810 takes the 
concept of ‘consent’ further than the Law Commission for England and Wales 
in the context of assault and states that it ‘may be express or it may be implied 
or tacit’.811  His Honour further states that a ‘person may consent (by 
acquiescence) to some particular course of conduct without being an 
enthusiastic co-operator’.812  His Honour does not expand on the concepts of 
express, implied, tacit or acquiescence or attempt to distinguish them.  Express 
consent may be viewed at the core of the concept of ‘consent’, while implied 
and tacit consent may be in the periphery of the notion of ‘consent’.  According 
to the literature, there is tacit consent, where ‘one remains silent or passive in 
circumstances where, given certain conventions, such …conduct simply counts 
as consenting’.813  In contrast, implied consent is not silent or passive, but is 
more assertive.  Extending the concept of ‘consent’ to tacit complicates the 
boundaries of consent in the context of making and/or distributing visual 
recordings because the person visually recorded is often unaware that they are 
being visually recorded and is silent, and thus they should not necessarily be 
regarded as consenting to the visual recording.     
 
5.1.2 Implied Consent 
 
The notion of ‘implied consent’ is grounded in the ‘ordinary incidents of social 
intercourse’.814 These are ‘commonplace, intentional but non-hostile acts such 
                                                 
808 AP Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 612. 
809 England and Wales, Law Commission for England and Wales, Consent in the Criminal Law, 
Consultation Paper No. 139 (1995) [4.52]. 
810 Non-fatal offences against a person that include the element of consent are for example, 
assault, assault occasioning bodily harm and serious assault, which are provided in Queensland 
in Criminal Code (Qld) ss 335, 339 and 340, respectively. 
811 Several other cases discuss the concept of consent in the context of non-fatal offences 
against the person, for example, Boughey v The Queen (1986) 60 ALJR 422, R v Watson [1987] 
1 Qd R 440, R v Raabe [1984] 1 Qd R 115, McNamara v Duncan (1971) 26 ALR 584, 
Kirkpatrick v Tully [1991] 2 Qd R 291, Lergesner v Carroll [1991] 1 Qd R 206, Re Lenfield 
(1993) 114 FLR 195 and Horan v Ferguson [1995] 2 Qd R 490. 
812 [1971] Qd R 117, 137. 
813 Jeffrie G Murphy, 'Consent, Coercion, and Hard Choices' (1981) 67 Virginia Law Review 
79, 92. 
814 Boughey v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 10, 24. 
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as patting another on the shoulder to attract attention or pushing between others 
to alight from a crowded bus’.815  Even though they involve an ‘application of 
force’,816 they do not amount, for example, to an assault because they are not 
done with hostility and more compellingly, the recipient impliedly consents to 
them as part of social intercourse.  The High Court of Australia argues that 
‘actual hostility or hostile intent’817 may change an ‘ordinary incident of social 
intercourse into battery at common law or assault for the purposes of the 
Code.’818  The High Court decision in Boughey v The Queen is significant here 
because if making visual recordings could be said to be ‘ordinary incidents of 
social intercourse’ then arguably people who are visually recorded, impliedly 
consent to the conduct of the person making the visual recording.  Further, 
impliedly consenting to the distribution of visual recordings may be an ordinary 
incident in limited circumstances, for example, if it is done by a newspaper or 
television channel.  Of course, some of the examples of making visual 
recordings illuminated in chapter 1 can never be considered to be ‘ordinary 
incidents of social intercourse’, for example, visually recording a person while 
they are showering, using a toilet or undressing.  On the other hand, making a 
visual recording in a public place may be considered to be an ‘ordinary incident 
of social intercourse’, with exception to up-skirt filming, which should not fall 
within this category. 
 
Returning to the concept of ‘implied consent’, Williams suggests that three 
conditions must be present.  Firstly, the victim must know the act is being done 
or proposed to be done in relation to their body by the offender who is 
present.819  This means that a person cannot consent to an act unless they know 
what is done.  Secondly, the victim must have the ability to refuse consent.820  
For example, an unconscious person is unable to consent.  Thirdly, the victim 
must indicate his or her refusal to consent by, for example, words, gestures or 
resistance.821  These conditions appear to be neat but are likely to be of limited 
application in the context of making and/or distributing visual recordings 
because the person who is visually recorded is usually not aware that they are 
being visually recorded at the time it is done.  For example, the parents of the 
children who were secretly visually recorded at South Bank Parklands in 
Brisbane only later found out what had happened when the visual recordings 
appeared on the Internet.822  Further, people who are up-skirt filmed may never 
find out that it has happened in relation to their body.  The small size and zoom 
capabilities of digital cameras, and the ability to transmit visual recordings, for 
example, from a digital camera back to a webpage in real time, enable a person 
making a visual recording to be absent from the location where the visual 
                                                 
815 Boughey v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 10, 25. 
816 Criminal Code (Qld) s 245. 
817 Boughey v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 10, 25. 
818 Boughey v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 10, 25. 
819 Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 1983) 550. 
820 Ibid. 
821 Ibid. 
822 See the discussion of this incident in chapter 1. 
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recording is made.  Thus, in the context of making and/or distributing a visual 
recording, it may be impossible for the person who is visually recorded to 
indicate their refusal to consent.    
 
When exploring the conceptual boundaries of consent, whether consent has 
been vitiated is a further important consideration.  Williams states that consent 
may be vitiated in three situations.823  Firstly, where a victim’s consent is 
vitiated by mistake or fear.824  Secondly, a victim’s consent is vitiated where a 
victim is incapable of consenting because he or she falls within a vulnerable 
group, for example, children.825  Thirdly, where public policy denies anyone 
from consenting to the act, for example, if the act is immoral or injures 
society.826  If the consent of a victim is vitiated in one or more of these three 
situations, the criminal law steps in to protect the victim.  Further, Simester and 
Sullivan discuss a range of factors that vitiate consent including fear of force; 
force; coercion; threats; opportunities; and mistake or ignorance about the 
offender’s identity, conduct or consequences; and the age of understanding 
necessary for effective consent.827  In addition to this literature, legislative 
definitions of consent, generally used in the context of sexual offences, provide 
guidance on whether consent is vitiated. 
 
For example, in Queensland, consent is not voluntary for the purposes of rape 
and sexual assault if it is obtained by force, threat or intimidation, fear of bodily 
harm, exercise of authority, false and fraudulent representations about the 
nature or purpose of the act or a mistaken belief induced by the accused that the 
accused was the victim’s sexual partner.828  Similarly in Canada, consent is 
vitiated where there is an application of force, threats or fear of the application 
of force, fraud or an exercise of authority.829  However, the Canadian definition 
of consent applies to all assaults, not just sexual assaults.  The legislative 
definition of consent in New Zealand is more comprehensive than the 
                                                 
823 Ibid. 
824 Ibid 551.  See also Simon Blackburn, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (2005) definition of 
consent, which states that ‘coercion, exploitation, fraud, [and] deception’ imply at a lack of 
consent.  ‘Conversely, just or permissible transactions imply either the actual or potential 
consent of affected parties’.  The definition of consent also raises the term ‘potential consent’, 
which is based on motivations, knowledge, rationality and situation of the agent.  The 
dictionary also provides an example of tacit consent, that is, where a person does not actually 
consent to the laws of the country, but is bound by the laws. 
825 Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 1983) 551. 
826 Ibid.  McSherry and Naylor put forward female genital mutilation, indigenous customary 
law and sadomasochism as examples of acts where consent is vitiated on public policy grounds:  
Bernadette McSherry and Bronwyn Naylor, Australian Criminal Laws:  Critical Perspectives 
(2004) 198-202.  They suggest that these examples show how one culture can intrude on other 
cultures:  198. 
827 AP Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 612-617. 
828 Criminal Code (Qld) s 348. 
829 Criminal Code (Can) s 265(3).  Further, see Criminal Code (Can) s 273.1(2), which provides 
further guidance on when there is no consent in the case of sexual assault.  With regard to 
whether fraud or force vitiates consent see F H Beale, 'Consent in the Criminal Law' (1894-
1895) 8 Harvard Law Review 317, 320-3. 
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definitions in Queensland and Canada.  The New Zealand provision maintains 
that there is no consent to a sexual activity just because there is a lack of protest 
or physical resistance to the activity.830  Despite each jurisdiction using 
different wording, the key themes are force and fraud, both of which are not 
relevant to the examples of visual recording provided in chapter 1.  However, if 
the victim’s consent is vitiated, there would be no consent, and the lack of 
consent element of an offence would be satisfied.  In such a case, the conduct 
would be criminalised if the other elements of the offence are satisfied.    While 
the vitiation of consent is very important to the conceptual boundaries of 
consent, it may have limited application in the context of making and/or 
distributing visual recordings because, in many of the examples used in chapter 
1, the person visually recorded was not aware this was occurring.  Vitiation of 
consent will be relevant where, for example, a person is aware that they are 
being visually recorded, but they have been overborne by the person making the 
visual recording.   
 
The purpose of this discussion on the conceptual boundaries of consent is to 
show that there is no universal definition of consent that serves all jurisdictions 
and all offences.  Definitions of consent have been derived from the criminal 
law literature, case law and legislation.  Consent may be express, implied or 
tacit.  Further, it may be vitiated in numerous ways including by force, threat of 
force and exercise of authority.  In the context of making and/or distributing 
visual recordings, if the person who is visually recorded expressly consents to 
the making and/or distribution of the visual recording, the conduct should not 
be criminalised.  However, it is a different situation if the person has had their 
consent vitiated.  In that case, there is a lack of consent.  Most of the examples 
in chapter 1 did not involve express consent or a vitiation of consent.  In fact, 
most of the examples in chapter 1 involve people who were not aware that they 
were being visually recorded at the time it was done.  Consequently, implied 
and tacit consent are particularly relevant to making and/or distributing visual 
recordings.  Whether a person impliedly consents to making and/or distributing 
visual recordings should be determined by reference to the context.  Given the 
importance of implied consent in this context, it is integral to consider whether 
a lack of consent should be an element of offences pertaining to making and/or 
distributing visual recordings. 
 
5.2 Unpacking the Approaches to the Role of Consent 
 
Having considered the notion of ‘consent’, this chapter will explore the 




• Quantitative plus exceptions, 
                                                 
830 Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) s 128A. 
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• Individual autonomy, 
• Paternalism, 
• Morality, and 
• Contextual. 
 
The first five approaches on this list were derived from the 1995 England and 
Wales’ Consultation Paper entitled, Consent in the Criminal Law,831 while the 
sixth approach is constructed from the literature on privacy.  In discussing the 
first five approaches, the 1995 England and Wales’ Consultation Paper does not 
settle on a single approach or attempt to prioritise the approaches.  In fact, the 
Consultation Paper suggests that the role of consent in the criminal law is a 
question for the legislature and depends on the political climate.832  This 
chapter charters new territory by applying the five approaches in the context of 
making and/or distributing visual recordings.   When applied here to visual 
recording and distribution, all of these five approaches to consent suggest that 
the consent of the person visually recorded is relevant to an offence pertaining 
to making and/or distributing visual recordings and that a lack of consent 
should be element of such an offence.  
                                                
 
The thesis identifies a relationship between implied consent and privacy.  This 
relationship is particularly significant in the context of making and/or 
distributing visual recordings because a person who enters a public place may 
have a right to privacy and may not necessarily impliedly consent to being 
visually recorded or having their image distributed across the Internet.  The 
inverse of this may also be true.  After engaging with the literature on 
privacy,833 a contextual approach to consent is constructed.  This is the sixth 
and final approach to consent listed above.  The contextual approach to consent 
offers a pragmatic approach to implied consent and better enables the criminal 
law to cope with contemporary challenges such as making and/or distributing 
visual recordings.       
Individual autonomy and morality emerged in chapter 2 as principles that may 
underpin the decision to criminalise conduct.  In examining consent, individual 
autonomy and morality emerge again because these principles provide a means 
for approaching the role of consent.  
 
 
831 England and Wales, Law Commission for England and Wales, Consent in the Criminal Law, 
Consultation Paper No. 139 (1995) 245-276.  The philosophical component of the Consultation 
Paper were written by Paul Roberts and subsequently published in Paul Roberts, 'The 
Philosophical Foundations of Consent in the Criminal Law' (1997) 17 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 389. 
832 The importance of politics in the criminalisation debate was illuminated in chapter 2.   
833 William L Prosser, 'Privacy' (1960) 48 California Law Review 383, Elizabeth Paton-
Simpson, 'Privacy and the Reasonable Paranoid:  The Protection of Privacy in Public Places' 
(2000) 50 University of Toronto Law Journal 305, Daniel Solove, 'Conceptualizing Privacy' 
(2002) 90 California Law Review 1087 and Daniel Solove, 'A Taxonomy of Privacy' (2006) 
154 University of Pennsylvania 477. 
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After discussing the six approaches to the role of consent in the criminal law, it 
is clear that a victim’s lack of consent is relevant to making and/or distributing 
visual recordings and that a lack of consent should be an element of an offence 
pertaining to this conduct.   
 
5.2.1 Quantitative Approach to Consent 
 
In the 1995 England and Wales’ Consultation Paper on consent,834 Roberts 
argues that the vital issue underpinning the role of consent in the criminal law is 
quantitative.  The notion of ‘quantitative’ focuses on the degree of harm 
involved in the type of conduct.835  The quantitative approach draws a line 
along a harm continuum, which divides where consent is effective and where 
consent is ineffective.  The ambit of the concept of ‘harm’ is crucial to the 
quantitative approach to consent.  Chapter 2 discussed the concept of ‘harm’.   
   
To determine whether a jurisdiction adopts a quantitative approach to consent 
in its statutory offences depends on whether a lack of consent is relevant to 
some offences but not others.  Queensland is a good example of a jurisdiction 
that provides a quantitative approach to consent in non-fatal offences against a 
person because  making and/or distributing visual recordings is akin to this 
conduct, as opposed to other offences, for example property, motor vehicle, or 
homicide offences.  In Queensland,836 consent is an element in the definition of 
assault.837  The element of assault and thus the concept of ‘consent’ are 
imported into the offences of assault,838 assault occasioning bodily harm839 and 
serious assault.840  The element of consent is explicitly included in the sexual 
assault841 and rape842 offences.  In contrast to these offences in Queensland, 
grievous bodily harm843 and unlawful wounding844 do not contain the element 
of consent explicitly and do not include the element of assault and thus consent.  
                                                 
834 England and Wales, Law Commission for England and Wales, Consent in the Criminal Law, 
Consultation Paper No. 139 (1995) 245. 
835 R v McIntosh [1999] VSC 358, where a man pleaded guilty to manslaughter because his 
sexual partner died during bondage sex. 
836 See generally R S O'Regan, 'Consent to Assaults Under the Queensland Criminal Code' 
(1992-1993) 17 University of Queensland Law Journal 287. 
837 Criminal Code (Qld) s 245. 
838 Criminal Code (Qld) s 335.  Similarly, the Canadian equivalent requires a lack of consent:  
Criminal Code (Can) s 265(1).  Contrast the New Zealand provision on common assault, which 
does not refer to consent:  Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) s 196. 
839 Criminal Code (Qld) s 339.  See also Lergesner v Carroll (1989) 49 A Crim R 51.  
Similarly, the Canadian equivalent regarding assault occasioning bodily harm requires a lack of 
consent:  Criminal Code (Qld) s 265(2).  Note that the Canadian equivalent lumps all types of 
assault together.    
840 Criminal Code (Qld) s 340. 
841 Criminal Code (Qld) s 352(1)(b).  Similarly, the Canadian equivalent regarding sexual 
assault requires a lack of consent:  Criminal Code (Can) s 265(2). 
842 Criminal Code (Qld) s 349.   
843 Criminal Code (Qld) s 320. 
844 Criminal Code (Qld) s 323. 
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Thus, consent is irrelevant to grievous bodily harm and unlawful wounding, but 
it is debatable whether this is deliberate or due to a drafting oversight.845  If a 
person consents to grievous bodily harm or unlawful wounding, the offence 
will be made out if the elements in these offences are satisfied.  Consequently, 
Queensland’s quantitative approach to consent draws a line along the harm 
continuum above serious assault.   
 
Even though the quantitative approach used in the Queensland non-fatal 
offences against a person appears to be an efficient means of determining 
whether consent is effective or ineffective, it has its drawbacks.  The Model 
Criminal Code Officers Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-
General criticises the importation of consent into the assault offences on the 
basis of assault as the key criterion.846  For example, consent is irrelevant in 
Queensland to the offence of unlawful wounding according to the ruling in 
Kaporonovski,847 but yet unlawful wounding may only involve a trivial nick, 
and thus there is no necessary correlation between the degree of harm and 
consent.848  Further, a person in Queensland may legally consent to a high 
degree of violence, for example, assault occasioning bodily harm and assault 
with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, given that assault and thus consent is 
an element of these offences.849  In addition to anomalies under the Queensland 
approach, there are other criticisms of the quantitative approach, which will be 
discussed below. 
 
The quantitative approach to consent used in Queensland makes the consent of 
the victim relevant where assault is an element of the offence and, broadly 
speaking, to the less serious non-fatal offences against a person.  As discussed 
above, the focal point of the quantitative approach is the concept of ‘harm’, 
which was examined in chapter 2.  Chapter 2 established that on the harm 
continuum, making and/or distributing a visual recording was generally less 
serious than non-fatal offences against a person such as grievous bodily harm 
and more akin to assault, assault occasioning bodily harm and serious assault.  
Building on this finding from chapter 2 and applying the quantitative approach 
to consent, it could logically be argued that consent should be relevant to 
making and/or distributing visual recordings and it would be appropriate to use 
lack of consent as an element of an offence pertaining to this conduct. 
 
                                                 
845 See generally Kaporonovski (1975) 133 CLR 209. 
846 Model Criminal Code Officers Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, 
Non Fatal Offences Against the Person (1998) 123. 
847 (1975) 133 CLR 209. 
848 Model Criminal Code Officers Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, 
Non Fatal Offences Against the Person (1998).123. 
849 Model Criminal Code Officers Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, 
Non Fatal Offences Against the Person (1998) 123. 
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The 1995 England and Wales’ Consultation Paper on consent highlights several 
of the flaws in approaching consent in a quantitative manner.850  Firstly, the 
level of harm is not always a ‘morally significant factor in evaluating its 
wrongfulness’.851  For example,  
 
[a]rm-twisting to effect a robbery is morally worse than justified killing 
in self-defence, and a punch in the face causing no lasting damage is 
morally worse than the amputation of a leg, if the former is inflicted by 
a mugger on the street and the latter is performed by a surgeon with 
consent in order to prevent the spread of bone cancer.852   
 
Secondly, the quantitative approach implies that the relationship between 
consent and harm that is relevant to various social contexts can be generalised 
to one proposition.853   However, the conception of consent for the purposes of 
sexual offences may need to be expressed differently to assault offences.  
Thirdly, describing conduct is difficult without using terms such as ‘‘harm,’ 
‘injury,’ ‘wrong,’ ‘victim,’ [and] ‘violence,’’,854 which are ‘skewed by 
concealed moral judgments masquerading as value-free descriptions of the 
empirical world’.855   
 
Finally, using a quantitative approach as a ‘blueprint for [this aspect of] 
criminalisation’856 lacks commonsense because it would result in the 
criminalisation of activities that are currently permitted under the criminal law, 
for example, surgery and contact sports.857  Of course, this final criticism is an 
exaggeration in codified jurisdictions such as Queensland, which adopt a 
quantitative approach to consent and yet surgery and contact sports are not 
criminalised in Queensland.  The quantitative approach provides a 
straightforward means for drawing a line along the harm continuum to 
determine whether an individual’s consent should be respected by the criminal 
law.   If the dividing line is drawn too low on the harm continuum, there is a 
need to introduce exceptions as many worthwhile activities that involve serious 
harm, for example, surgery, must be permitted in contemporary society.  While 
making and/or distributing visual recordings was classified as non-serious in 
chapter 2, the next section of this chapter will show that it may be necessary to 
use a quantitative plus exceptions approach to deal with this contemporary 
problem.   
 
                                                 
850 England and Wales, Law Commission for England and Wales, Consent in the Criminal Law, 
Consultation Paper No. 139 (1995) 246. 
851 Ibid 247. 
852 Ibid. 
853 Ibid. 





5.2.2 Quantitative Plus Exceptions Approach to Consent 
 
In the context of non-fatal offences against a person, England does not adopt a 
strict quantitative approach to consent.  In Appendix C of the 1995 England and 
Wales’ Consultation Paper on consent, Roberts describes the English approach 
to consent in non-fatal offences against a person as the ‘quantitative-rule-plus-
exceptions approach’,858 which, similarly to the quantitative approach, respects 
an individual’s consent to common assault,859 but does not respect an 
individual’s consent to bodily harm or more serious offences.860   Thus, 
England draws a dividing line along the harm continuum for the purposes of 
consent above assault.  However, unlike the quantitative approach in 
Queensland, England introduces exceptions in cases involving bodily harm or 
more serious harm.  For example, consent is relevant to contact sports, rough 
horseplay, tattooing, body piercing and surgery, but it is not relevant to female 
genital mutilation, indigenous customary practices and homosexual 
sadomasochism.861  These exceptions are based on principles, for example, 
individual autonomy, morality and public interest (social welfare), which were 
discussed in chapter 2.  Individual autonomy and morality are considered below 
as theoretical approaches to the role of consent in criminal law, while public 
interest will be explored now. 
 
Where public interest is adopted as an exception to the quantitative plus 
exceptions approach, consent is ineffective where there is an injury to the 
public interest as well the person injured.862  Ormerod states that there is a 
                                                 
858 England and Wales, Law Commission for England and Wales, Consent in the Criminal Law, 
Consultation Paper No. 139 (1995) 248 and Paul Roberts, 'The Philosophical Foundations of 
Consent in the Criminal Law' (1997) 17 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 389, 404.  This 
approach assumes that there are exceptions for ‘surgical treatment, tattooing, risky sports and 
exhibitions, and the like’:  404.   
859 R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498. 
860 AP Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 618. 
861 Bernadette McSherry and Bronwyn Naylor, Australian Criminal Laws:  Critical 
Perspectives (2004) 188 and 197.  McSherry and Naylor suggest that the empirical evidence 
that which shows the widespread practice of violence against women supports the 
criminalisation of female genital mutilation:  198-9. Further, note that female genital mutilation 
has been criminalised in some jurisdictions, for example in Criminal Code (Qld) s 323A(2).  On 
another note, see Warren, Coombes and Tucker (1996) A Crim R 78 with regard to the 
irrelevance of consent to indigenous customary practices such as payback.  With regard to 
dangerous sports and surgery, Leng discusses how the individual’s interest coincides with the 
public interest:  Roger Leng, 'Consent in Criminal Law' (1988) 13 Holdsworth Law Review 129, 
130.  With regard to surgery, see Department of Health and Community Services (NT) v JWB 
(Marion’s case) (1992) 175 CLR 218, 232.  If the patient or their agent is unable to consent to 
surgery, doctors may operate in an emergency to preserve life or prevent serious permanent 
injury, but this does not extend to convenient treatment:  Murray v McMurchy [1949] 2 DLR 
442.  For further discussion on sadomasochism see Cheryl Hanna, 'Sex is Not a Sport: Consent 
and Violence in Criminal Law' (2000-2001) 42 Boston College Law Review 239. 
862 See especially Coney (1882) 8 QBD 534, 539, which involved a prize-fight.  Stephen J 
stated, ‘the injuries given and received in prize-fights are injurious to the public, both because it 
is against the public interest that the lives and the health of the combatants should be 
endangered by blows, and because prize-fights are disorderly exhibitions, mischievous on many 
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public interest when the society is disturbed by witnessing or knowing about 
the conduct and when health services are burdened by the conduct.863  In the 
context of making and/or distributing visual recordings, health services may not 
be burdened by this conduct because, unlike other non-fatal offences against a 
person, it does not generally involve physical injuries.  Arguably, there is still a 
public interest in this conduct because society knows about the potential for 
inappropriate use of mobile phone cameras and digital cameras, for example, in 
up-skirting. 
 
The quantitative plus exceptions approach to consent draws a line at bodily 
harm, such that if a person attempts to cause or causes bodily harm to another 
without a good reason, it is not in the public interest and the conduct is 
criminalised.864  In explaining the notion of ‘public interest’, Lord Lane CJ in 
Attorney General’s Reference (No 6 of 1980)865 states that it does not matter 
whether the conduct occurred in a public or private place. 
 
Kell uses the notion of ‘social utility model’866 to refer to the quantitative plus 
exceptions approach to consent.   In this model,  
 
once injury reached the level of bodily harm, the accused was required 
to demonstrate that the particular activity was needed in the public 
                                                                                                                                  
obvious grounds.  Therefore the consent of the parties to the blows which they mutually receive 
does not prevent those blows from being assaults’:  549. 
863 David Ormerod, 'Consent and Offences Against the Person: Law Commission Consultation 
Paper No. 134' (1994) 57 The Modern Law Review 928, 939. 
864 Bernadette McSherry and Bronwyn Naylor, Australian Criminal Laws:  Critical 
Perspectives (2004) 191.  See also English case law such as Attorney General’s Reference (No 
6 of 1980) [1981] QB 715, R v Brown [1993] 2 WLR 556, R v Coney (1882) 8 QBD 534 and R 
v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498 on this point.  The minority in R v Brown [1993] 2 WLR 556 
considered the public interest test.  See also Lord Mustill (a dissenting judge) on this point.  In 
this case, five men performed consensual homosexual sadomasochistic acts in a private place.  
The acts resulted in injuries, but the men did not require medical attention and thus did not 
burden the health service.  See also Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 
2006) 322 regarding the health service issue.  According to Ashworth, the majority in R v 
Brown [1993] 2 WLR 556 demonstrated ‘an overwhelming distaste for the defendant’s 
activities, and a determination to describe it in language designed to produce the conclusion that 
it should be criminalized’:  Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 322.  
Further, see other relevant English case law such as R v Coney (1882) 8 QBD 534 and R v 
Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498.   
865 [1981] QB 715, 719.  Further, Lord Lane CJ recognised that many types of conduct resulting 
in bodily harm were criminalised because it was ‘needed in the public interest’:  719.  This case 
involved a street fight between two youths.  In particular, Lord Lane CJ stated, ‘Nothing which 
we have said is intended to cast doubt on the accepted legality of properly conducted games and 
sports, lawful chastisement or correction, reasonable surgical interference, dangerous 
exhibitions, etc.  These apparent exceptions can be justified as involving the exercise of a legal 
right, in the case of chastisement or correction, or as needed in the public interest, in the other 
cases’:  719.   
866 David Kell, 'Social Disutility and the Law of Consent' (1994) 14 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 121, 122. 
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interest (social utility), rather than the prosecution having to prove that 
good reason exists for prohibiting the conduct (social disutility).867   
 
The social utility and disutility model was utilised in the R v Brown,868 by the 
majority and minority, respectively.  The Model Criminal Code Officers 
Committee interpret the majority view in R v Brown869 as requiring the conduct 
to be socially beneficial before consent would be relevant,870 while the minority 
indicate that the consensual conduct is prima facie lawful unless there are social 
reasons for invalidating the consent.871  R v Brown872 involves homosexual 
sadomasochism.  This conduct does not amount to an exception under the 
quantitative plus exceptions approach to consent.  Lord Lowry and Lord 
Templeman in separate judgments indicate that sadomasochistic homosexual 
activities are not beneficial to the welfare of society or family life.873  While 
their decisions refer to ‘society’, they ‘display a degree of moral censure’874 
and thus their comments illuminate an overlap between the quantitative plus 
exceptions approach to consent and the morality approach to consent.   
 
The quantitative plus exceptions approach to consent may conflict with the 
individual autonomy approach to consent because the former protects public 
interests while the latter protects individual interests.  However, Vandervort 
explains how the potential conflict may be resolved.  She states that the 
criminal law is committed to the promotion of public interests and only protects 
individual interests to the extent that they coincide with public interests.875  
Similarly to Vandervort, but in the context of sexual offences, the court in the 
Canadian case of R v Welch,876 withdrew the issue of consent from the jury and 
stated that individual autonomy must yield to the public interest where sexual 
activities involve the deliberate infliction of bodily harm.877  Thus, individual 
interests that do not coincide with public interests are ignored, where bodily 
harm is involved.  This is important in the context of making and/or distributing 
visual recordings because chapter 2 identified the difficulty in prioritising 
public over individual interests in the form of privacy and freedom of 
                                                 
867 Ibid.  The majority in R v Brown [1993] 2 WLR 556 took a social utility approach, while the 
minority adopted a social disutility approach.  See also Paul J Farrugia, 'The Consent Defence: 
Sports Violence, Sadomasochism, and the Criminal Law' (1996-1999) 8 Auckland University 
Law Review 472, 495. 
868 [1993] 2 WLR 556. 
869 [1993] 2 WLR 556. 
870 Criminal Law Officers Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, 
'Chapter 5 Fatal Offences Against the Person' in Final Report Model Criminal Code (1993)  
125. 
871 Ibid. 
872 [1993] 2 WLR 556.  Note that consent has been deemed irrelevant to heterosexual 
sadomasochism:  R v Emmett unreported, 18 June 1999, No 9901191/Z2. 
873 R v Brown [1993] 2 WLR 556, 583 and 566. 
874 Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 2005) 533. 
875 Lucinda Vandervort, 'Consent and the Criminal Law' (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 
485, 494. 
876 (1996) 101 CCC (3d) 216. 
877 (1996) 101 CCC (3d) 216, 239. 
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expression.  However, always prioritising public interests when bodily harm is 
involved may not be very helpful in the context of making and/or distributing 
visual recordings because this conduct may not generally involve bodily harm, 
for example, serious psychological harm, and may usually be more akin to 
common assault.   
 
Blindly yielding to the public interest at the expense of individual autonomy 
does have drawbacks.  For example, it may force the conduct to go 
underground878 and it may support a dominant culture impinging on the 
practices of another culture or subculture.879 At a conceptual level, the public 
interest exception rests on the vague notion of ‘public interest’,880 which neither 
explains the current cases falling under the public interest exception, nor 
provides appropriate guidance for future bodily harm cases.881    
 
The quantitative plus exceptions approach to consent used in England has been 
heavily criticised.  Simester and Sullivan suggest that the ‘English [criminal] 
law is internally inconsistent and, on occasion, irrational in determining 
whether consent to the risk of significant harm is effective’.882  The quantitative 
plus exceptions approach is ‘not the most direct or the most sophisticated 
approach’.883  It overlooks moral considerations at the quantitative stage, but 
reintroduces them at the exceptions stage.  Roberts describes the exceptions as 
‘messy’ and ‘ad hoc’.884  As technology advances and creates contemporary 
issues, new exceptions may need to be considered.  Finally, Roberts argues that 
a quantitative plus exceptions approach ‘places unwarranted restrictions on 
individual freedom and fuels a disturbingly expansionist tendency in the 
criminal law’.885 
 
In the context of assault in England, McSherry and Naylor recognise that 
delineating when a person can and cannot consent to injury is a problem.886  
Ashworth states that the relevance of consent in the criminal law is complex 
because of difficulties in differentiating assault from assault occasioning bodily 
                                                 
878 Bernadette McSherry and Bronwyn Naylor, Australian Criminal Laws:  Critical 
Perspectives (2004) 202. 
879 See especially R v Brown [1993] 2 WLR 556, where homosexual sado-masochism was 
undermined by dominant heterosexual culture.  See also Bernadette McSherry and Bronwyn 
Naylor, Australian Criminal Laws:  Critical Perspectives (2004) 198. 
880 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 325. 
881 Brian Bix, 'Consent, Sado-masochism and the English Common Law' (1997-1998) 17 
Quinnipiac Law Review 157, 170. 
882 AP Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 610.  Further, 
Simester and Sullivan state, ‘[w]hy violence perpetrated for sport, horseplay, or ornamentation 
has an acceptability denied to sexual fulfilment lies beyond reason’:  621. 
883 England and Wales, Law Commission for England and Wales, Consent in the Criminal Law, 
Consultation Paper No. 139 (1995) 248. 
884 Ibid. 
885 Ibid. 
886 Bernadette McSherry and Bronwyn Naylor, Australian Criminal Laws:  Critical 
Perspectives (2004) 188. 
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harm.887  Determining the role of consent in the criminal law would be clearer 
if England provided, for example, a legislative response to assault and assault 
occasioning bodily harm that expressly states whether consent is an element of 
these offences.  Further, at common law, it is not clear whether consent is an 
element of an offence or a defence,888 and this impacts on whether the Crown 
or the accused have to prove consent.  As a result, Ashworth recognises that 
drawing a line on a harm continuum for the purposes of consent is difficult889 
and it is not the answer to determining the effectiveness of consent on the basis 
of vague concepts such as ‘public interest’.  The criticisms associated with the 
quantitative approach and quantitative-rule-plus-exceptions approach ‘provide a 
powerful prima facie case against slavishly adopting’890 these approaches.  
Before discussing more preferable approaches to the role of consent, this 
section will apply the quantitative plus exceptions approach to making and/or 
distributing visual recordings. 
 
The quantitative plus exceptions approach to consent used in England involves 
an extra step compared to the quantitative approach that is used, for example, in 
Queensland.  Under the English quantitative plus exceptions approach, if the 
harm involved is less than bodily harm, the victim’s consent is relevant and it is 
appropriate to use lack of consent as an element of the offence.  If the harm 
involved constitutes bodily harm or more serious harm, the conduct must fall 
within an exception before the victim’s consent will be effective.  Chapter 2 
established that distributing a visual recording involves greater harm than 
simply making one.  Further, chapter 2 recognised that making visual 
recordings in private places and of intimate acts involves more harm than 
public places and public acts.  More importantly for the purposes of the 
quantitative approach, chapter 2 determined that the harm involved in making 
and/or distributing a visual recording is non-serious in all instances.     
 
The question that remains is whether making and/or distributing a visual 
recording is more akin to assault or assault occasioning bodily harm because 
this impacts on whether there is a need to consider whether the conduct falls 
within an exception to the quantitative approach.  The most convincing 
argument is that making and/or distributing visual recordings is more akin to 
assault because the conduct does not involve any physical harm and generally 
only results in minor psychological harm.  In this case, the quantitative plus 
exceptions approach would make the consent of the person who was visually 
recorded relevant, there would be no need to find an exception and a lack of 
                                                 
887 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 325. 
888 Model Criminal Code Officers Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, 
Non Fatal Offences Against the Person (1998) 123.  In considering whether the defence of 
consent is available, various factors should be considered including ‘the type of harm caused, 
the age of the person consenting, the consenting party’s ability to consent, whether a legal 
guardian can consent instead, and whether the harm had been done for the benefit of the 
consenting party’:  Editorial, 'Consensual Harm' (2005) 29 Criminal Law Journal 197, 198. 
889 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 325. 
890 Ibid 249. 
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consent should be an element of an offence pertaining to making and/or 
distributing visual recordings.   This begs a question about the scope of implied 
consent and this is addressed below under the contextual approach. 
 
If this is incorrect, and making and/or distributing a visual recording is more 
akin to assault occasioning bodily harm, the quantitative plus exceptions 
approach may make the consent of the person who was visually recorded 
relevant or irrelevant depending upon theoretical justifications including 
individual autonomy, morality, paternalism, which are discussed in detail 
below.   
 
Given the possible conflict between the public interest exception to the 
quantitative plus exceptions approach to consent and the individual autonomy 
approach to consent, it is timely to explore the individual autonomy approach to 
consent.  The individual autonomy approach was one of the theoretical 
approaches to consent identified by the 1995 England and Wales’ Consultation 
Paper on consent.891 
 
5.2.3 Individual Autonomy Approach 
 
Respecting individual autonomy is another approach to consent.  Under this 
approach, if a lack of consent is an element of the offence and a person consents 
to the conduct, it is not an offence because the victim’s consent is respected.  
Respecting an individual’s consent is important in the context of making and/or 
distributing visual recordings because people regularly consent to be visually 
recorded, for example, in family photographs, and taking this right away from 
people is clearly inappropriate.  The notion of ‘individual autonomy’ in the 
form of privacy and freedom of expression was examined in chapter 2. The 
crux of this approach to consent depends on whether the criminal law should 
respect the consent of the victim and, the content of consent. 
 
The view of some leading criminal law theorists suggests that there is no link 
between the issue of whether the criminal law should or should not respect the 
consent of the victim and the harm or the risk of harm resulting from the 
offender’s conduct.  For example, Simester and Sullivan declare that individual 
autonomy is a ‘key value’892 and that ‘if the harm in question is self-regarding 
and freely consented to, state intervention is unjustified’.893  Similarly, 
Ashworth maintains that the ‘principle of individual autonomy suggests that the 
liberty to submit to (the risk of) injury, however serious, ought to be 
                                                 
891 England and Wales, Law Commission for England and Wales, Consent in the Criminal Law, 
Consultation Paper No. 139 (1995) 251.  Note that the Commission used the concept of 
liberalism instead of individual autonomy.  However, to be consistent with chapter 2, which 
drew on the criminalisation literature and in turn the notion of individual autonomy, this chapter 
is using the notion of individual autonomy.  
892 AP Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 609. 
893 Ibid. 
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respected’.894  Thus, if the victim consents to the offender’s conduct, consent is 
relevant and the conduct is not an offence.  In contrast to this view, it has been 
contended that the state should respect individual autonomy if the infliction of 
bodily harm does not constitute serious harm.895  This is a more stringent view 
of respecting individual autonomy and may lead to a similar conclusion to the 
quantitative or the quantitative plus exceptions approaches explored above.   
 
From the perspective of consent, individual autonomy requires an individual to 
have a range of reasonable options realistically available to them.896  It also 
requires an individual to have ‘access to relevant information’,897 particularly 
about their capacities, circumstances, consequences of their actions and the 
likely reactions of others.898  An autonomous person is assumed to have 
sufficient maturity.899  Children are deemed incompetent to give consent to 
matters that seriously interfere with their interests.900  Parents or legal guardians 
make important life decisions in the best interests of their children because 
children are not assumed to have sufficient intellectual intelligence or 
experience.901  A child’s preference should be respected where it is neutral or 
promotes their interests.902  In some situations involving serious harm, the 
criminal law respects the consent of adults and thus does not criminalise the 
conduct.903   However, as discussed in chapter 2, making and/or distributing a 
visual recording does not involve serious harm, and thus there is more scope for 
the criminal law to respect the consent of a person visually recorded.   
 
Roberts states that individual autonomy provides a more accurate account of 
criminalisation than paternalism.  He states that the criminal law only 
constrains individual autonomy to the extent necessary to ensure that everyone 
receives the same level of autonomy, but acknowledges that on rare occasions 
paternalism underpins criminalisation.904  Generally speaking, paternalism is 
the opposite of individual autonomy because it does not respect an individual’s 
                                                 
894 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 323. 
895 Editorial, 'Consensual Harm' (2005) 29 Criminal Law Journal 197, 198. 
896 R George Wright, 'Consenting Adults:  The Problem of Enhancing Human Dignity Non-
Coercively' (1995) 75 Boston University Law Review 1397, 1431. 
897 Ibid 1430. 
898 Ibid 1430-1. 
899 England and Wales, Law Commission for England and Wales, Consent in the Criminal Law, 
Consultation Paper No. 139 (1995) 259. 
900 Ibid.  Note that the Law Commission for England and Wales’ Consultation Paper does not 
provide any examples of conduct that promotes or seriously interferes with a child’s interests. 
901 Ibid 259-260. 
902 Ibid 260. 
903 Two examples that commonly emerge in the literature where the criminal law decided to 
respect the consent of the victim are R v Wilson [1996} 3 WLR 125 and R v Aitken [1992] 1 
WLR 1006.  While these examples do not relate to making and/or distributing visual 
recordings, they demonstrate that the criminal law is prepared to accept the victim’s consent in 
some situations where the conduct results in serious harm.  
904 Paul Roberts, 'The Philosophical Foundations of Consent in the Criminal Law' (1997) 17 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 389, 400. 
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consent.  The next section will explore paternalism as an approach for making 
consent ineffective. 
 
5.2.4 Paternalistic Approach to Consent 
 
The 1995 England and Wales’ Consultation Paper on consent discusses a 
paternalistic approach to consent, which does not respect any individual’s 
autonomy.905  This approach would not include lack of consent as an element of 
the offence and makes consent irrelevant.  It restricts ‘personal freedom’906 and 
is justified on the basis of ‘public policy and public interest’.907  A paternalistic 
approach is used to protect people from themselves.908 
 
Kell stresses that much thought needs to be put into the types of harm covered 
by paternalism, for example, physical and psychological harm, because the 
lesser the threshold of harm, the more likely the respect for individual 
autonomy will be ‘nugatory’.909  Chapter 2 refers to paternalism under the 
principle of harm, which is a principle that underpins the decision to criminalise 
conduct.  Chapter 2 indicated that paternalism was not favoured as a means of 
justifying the criminalisation of conduct.   For example, Simester and Sullivan 
disavow ‘coercion through the criminal law as a means of furthering an 
individual’s best interests’,910 that is, paternalism.  The argument against 
criminalising conduct on the basis of paternalism is that the offender does not 
cause harm to others and merely causes harm to themself.  
 
Kell states that paternalism intervenes when the harm reaches a certain level to 
protect the individual’s well-being.911  He does not offer guidance on how the 
                                                 
905 England and Wales, Law Commission for England and Wales, Consent in the Criminal Law, 
Consultation Paper No. 139 (1995) 251. 
906 Paul J Farrugia, 'The Consent Defence: Sports Violence, Sadomasochism, and the Criminal 
Law' (1996-1999) 8 Auckland University Law Review 472, 473. 
907 Ibid. 
908 England and Wales, Law Commission for England and Wales, Consent in the Criminal Law, 
Consultation Paper No. 139 (1995) 266. 
909 David Kell, 'Social Disutility and the Law of Consent' (1994) 14 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 121, 133. 
910 AP Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 609. 
911 David Kell, 'Social Disutility and the Law of Consent' (1994) 14 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 121, 134.  Roberts states that paternalism involves the view that ‘protecting or 
enhancing a person’s welfare can be a good reason for interfering with that person’s autonomy, 
or, more colloquially, one may interfere with a person’s autonomy for that person’s own good.  
This contrasts with, for example, the liberal conception of well-being according to which a 
person’s autonomy should be respected even on occasions when [he or] she chooses to damage 
[his or] her welfare, providing [he or] she does so willingly and in full knowledge of the 
consequences’:  Paul Roberts, 'The Philosophical Foundations of Consent in the Criminal Law' 
(1997) 17 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 389, 393.  When Roberts refers to ‘person’s own 
good’, he recognises that it could involve two ‘conceptions of human interests’:  393.  The first 
conception, are the ‘interests a person recognizes or chooses for [himself or] herself’:  393.  The 
second conception, are the ‘interests a person ought to recognize or choose for [himself or] 
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required level of harm should be established, but it has been suggested that 
serious bodily harm912 is the ordained level.  Thus, where serious bodily harm 
is involved, paternalism requires ‘scrutiny of the purpose and reasonableness of 
the accused’s harm-producing conduct’.913  Such an approach to paternalism 
would have the same effect as a quantitative approach. 
 
Rather than suggesting a quantitative approach, the Model Criminal Code 
Officers Committee recommends that the individual autonomy approach to 
consent (discussed above) and the paternalism approach to consent, be 
balanced.  More specifically, the Model Criminal Code Officers Committee 
states that  
 
the law must balance the state’s paternalistic role in protecting 
individuals from their own poor decisions with the freedom of the 
individual to make poor decisions.  This balance is struck, differently in 
different times and according to different activities.914   
 
In this regard, Roberts makes a compelling point that the criminalisation of 
conduct is rarely grounded on the basis of paternalism and that individual 
autonomy is the more convincing ground, which was discussed above.  Farrugia 
insists that taking a paternalistic approach to consent ‘may promote that 
person’s overall long-term freedom, autonomy, integrity, and dignity.’915  Even 
when individual autonomy is preferred over paternalism, ultimately the balance 
struck may be said to be in favour of paternalism because the decision is 
preserving the individual’s well-being.  
 
A paternalistic approach to consent makes the consent of the person visually 
recorded ineffective and criminalises the conduct.  In the context of making 
and/or distributing visual recordings, if paternalism intervenes at the point of 
harm akin to serious bodily harm, the criminal law should not step in to protect 
the people that consent to being visually recorded because the level of harm 
resulting from this conduct (as discussed in chapter 2) is unlikely to reach the 
ordained level.  This means that the consent of the person who is visually 
recorded is important and a lack of consent should be an element of an offence 
pertaining to making and/or distributing visual recordings.  A paternalistic 
approach to the role of consent in the criminal law is not popular and is unlikely 
to be taken in the context of making and/or distributing visual recordings.  
                                                                                                                                  
herself, whether or not she knows she has them or ought to have them’:  393.  Roberts provides 
the former with the label of ‘paternalism’, but provides the latter with the label of ‘moral 
paternalism’:  393.  
912 Editorial, 'Consensual Harm' (2005) 29 Criminal Law Journal 197. 
913 Ibid 198. 
914 Criminal Law Officers Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, 
'Chapter 5 Fatal Offences Against the Person' in Final Report Model Criminal Code (1993)  
119. 
915 R George Wright, 'Consenting Adults:  The Problem of Enhancing Human Dignity Non-
Coercively' (1995) 75 Boston University Law Review 1397, 1433. 
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However, for completeness, in the unlikely event that a paternalistic approach 
to consent is taken, the criminal law should protect the well-being of vulnerable 
groups in society, for example, protecting children from consenting to visual 
recordings that are distributed for the sexual gratification of adults. 
 
As mentioned above, the Model Criminal Code Officers Committee recognises 
that the loyalty to individual autonomy and paternalism change over time.  
Similarly, the morality approach to consent changes over time. 
 
5.2.5 Morality Approach to Consent 
 
The 1995 England and Wales’ Consultation Paper on consent highlights the 
role of consent in criminal law from the perspective of morality.916  Simester 
and Sullivan explain that, under the morality approach to consent, conduct is 
criminalised because it is immoral, despite the victim consenting to the conduct, 
and thus, a lack of consent would not be an element of the offence.  Simester 
and Sullivan state that ‘if conduct is sufficiently immoral or degrading, that of 
itself merits the punishing of persons who engage in such conduct, 
notwithstanding the consensual nature and self-regarding quality of the acts 
concerned’ (their emphasis).917  However, Simester and Sullivan do not provide 
any insight on how to judge when conduct reaches the level of ‘sufficiently 
immoral or degrading’ and it depends on the ambit of morality.918   
 
The notion of ‘morality’ needs to be fluid to adapt to changes in society, for 
example, the moral quality of technology enabled conduct such as the 
increasing use of small digital cameras and mobile phone cameras; the 
increasing examples reported by the media of up-skirt filming; and the 
increasing number of visual recordings made in bathrooms and toilets as well as 
the advent of the Internet as a means of distributing visual recordings to a wide 
audience.  The changing nature of morality emerged as an issue in chapter 2, 
when morality was considered as a principle underpinning the decision to 
criminalise conduct.  Chapter 2 acknowledged that it is difficult to find a shared 
understanding of morality and that the concept changes over time and in place.  
 
Even though up-skirt filming and visually recording a person while they engage 
in a private bodily function, such as using a toilet, is distasteful, it should not be 
an offence, if the person visually recorded consents to it.  Thus, if a person 
consents to being visually recorded in distasteful circumstances, the criminal 
law should respect the person’s consent and only disregard it on the basis of 
immorality on rare occasions, such as sexual objectification.   
                                                 
916 England and Wales, Law Commission for England and Wales, Consent in the Criminal Law, 
Consultation Paper No. 139 (1995) 251. 
917 AP Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 610. 
918 England and Wales, Law Commission for England and Wales, Consent in the Criminal Law, 
Consultation Paper No. 139 (1995) 273. 
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Despite recognising that morality normatively underpins the criminalisation of 
consensual activity, Simester and Sullivan argue that morality is ‘not a proper 
basis for the deployment of criminal law in a modern democracy’.919  Thus, the 
morality approach is not a popular means of approaching the role of consent in 
the criminal law.  This brings the discussion to a pragmatic rather than 
theoretical approach to consent, which is based on waiving privacy. 
 
5.2.6 Contextual Approach to Consent   
 
This section creates a novel approach to the role of consent in the criminal law, 
which will be referred to as the contextual approach to consent.  It is not a 
quantitative or theoretical approach, and it does not determine whether the 
victim consented based on whether the conduct occurs in a public or private 
place.  It is a practical means of determining whether a person has impliedly 
consented to being visually recorded or having their image distributed.  The 
contextual approach holds that if a person has a right to privacy, for example, 
from being visually recorded, it may follow that they do not impliedly consent 
to this conduct.920  This approach to consent has not been considered elsewhere 
in the criminalisation literature, but it has been considered in relation to 
criminal procedure and surveillance.921  Even though the contextual approach 
to consent is a practical approach, it does not relate to the ‘Pragmatics Filter’ 
which, as mentioned in chapter 1, considers the pragmatic outcome of the 
criminal law and requires a cost and benefit analysis of the consequences of the 
criminal law.922   
 
As will be discussed below, the contextual approach to consent created in this 
thesis is based on privacy literature.923  While privacy traditionally falls under 
the branch of tort law rather than criminal law, it is particularly important to 
making and/or distributing a visual recording.  This conduct raises several key 
                                                 
919 AP Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 622. 
920 The conception of implied consent will be discussed below under this contextual approach to 
consent. 
921 See New South Wales, New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Surveillance, Interim 
Report No. 98 (2001), [2.102] where it is submitted that parties to a conversation should 
reasonably expect that their conversation will not be monitored unless they have expressly 
consented to the monitoring.  See generally R v Duarte [1990] 1 SCR 30, where La Forest J 
discusses a reasonable expectation of privacy and the policy implications against recording 
conversations and warrantless surveillance. 
922 Jonathan Schonsheck, On Criminalization:  An Essay in the Philosophy of the Criminal Law 
(1994) 33. 
923 With regard to the tort of privacy in the United States see Andrew McClurg, 'Bringing 
Privacy Law Out of the Closet:  A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places' 
(1995) 73 NC Law Review 989 and Clay Calvert and Justin Brown, 'Video Voyeurism, Privacy, 
and the Internet:  Exposing Peeping Toms in Cyberspace' (2000) 18 Cardozo Arts and 
Entertainment Law Journal 469.  With regard to the definition of privacy refer to Daniel 
Solove, 'Conceptualizing Privacy' (2002) 90 California Law Review 1087 and Daniel Solove, 'A 
Taxonomy of Privacy' (2006) 154 University of Pennsylvania 477.  A detailed exploration of 
the tort of privacy and the concept of privacy is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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issues including whether there is a right to privacy in a public place; whether an 
individual waives their right to privacy and thus impliedly consents to being 
visually recorded when they enter a public place; and whether there is a 
distinction between a public place and a private place.  These issues will be 
addressed in detail below in the following parts. 
 
If an individual’s consent to being visually recorded is automatically implied 
when they appear in a public place, are there any drawbacks associated with 
this?  As will be discussed below there are several shortcomings associated 
with this construction.  For example, it leaps from an awareness of the risk of 
being visually recorded in a public place to a waiver of privacy and thus 
consent to the making of the visual recording.  Further, it treats observing 
another person with a naked eye the same as making a visual recording of 
another person, when in fact the two are very different and the latter may 
involve a permanent record.  Another difficulty with implying consent to being 
visually recorded in a public place is that it discriminates against homeless 
people who do not have a choice but to appear in public places, and imposes 
costs on people who wish to go to public places but maintain their privacy.  
These problems will be discussed in detail below.  Therefore, the general 
proposition, that there is no right to privacy in a public place, is problematic. 
 
The modern conceptions of ‘privacy’ outlined below do not carve the privacy 
terrain into public and private places, but recognise that privacy may exist in a 
public place and accept that privacy is a matter of degree.  Rather than settling 
on a single overarching definition of privacy, a contextual approach to privacy 
(and thus consent) will be taken.  A contextual approach delves into the social 
practices disrupted and the way in which privacy is disrupted in a given 
situation.  While this approach is more flexible than a rigid overarching 
definition of privacy, it provides a framework in which to situate new 
contemporary privacy problems.  Making and/or distributing visual recordings 
is an example that raises the issue whether an individual has a right to privacy 
and thus impliedly consents to reasonable infringements on that right.     
  
As discussed below, if a person is visually recorded whilst they, for example, 
are using a toilet, undressing or engaging in a sexual activity; or if they are up-
skirt filmed, a contextual approach protects the privacy of the person visually 
recorded.  The effect of respecting a person’s privacy is that the person visually 
recorded cannot be said to have impliedly consented to being visually recorded.  
In the same circumstances, if a person expressly consented to being visually 
recorded, their express consent should be valid unless it was vitiated.  The 
issues underpinning the contextual approach to consent will now be fleshed out 
in more detail. 
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5.2.6.1  General Proposition:  No Right to Privacy in a Public Place 
 
Prosser’s oft cited article on privacy sets out a general proposition that a person 
consents to intrusion as soon as they leave their home and thus there is no right 
to be let alone in a public place, for example a public street.924  He states that if 
a person follows another person in a public place, it is no intrusion on the latter 
person’s privacy.  His comment (admittedly made in 1960) does not foresee the 
introduction of a stalking offence.  More importantly, Prosser argues that taking 
a photograph of another person in a public place is not an invasion on privacy 
because it is no different from a person writing an account of what they saw in 
a public place.925  Prosser’s view normatively suggests that privacy in a public 
place is not worthy of protection.926  In the context of making and/distributing 
visual recordings, Prosser’s view is that if a person is in a public place they 
impliedly consent to being visually recorded by another person.  Such a view 
requires one to distinguish a public place from a private place. 
 
5.2.6.1.1 Distinction Between Public Place and Private Place 
 
Paton-Simpson argues that a public place ‘covers a wide range of locations, 
from bustling thoroughfares to remote getaways’.927  It is doubtful whether a 
single definition of public and private place could serve all necessary purposes.  
Paton-Simpson notes that a public place may be publicly accessible, but also 
private in the sense of seclusion.928  In the context of the Internet, Calvert and 
Brown argue that cyberspace can be a public place because millions of people 
can access vast amounts of information, but at the same time, it can be a private 
place where only people who pay a subscription may access some websites.929  
It is idea of restricting access that makes some parts of the web private.   
 
The criminal offences pertaining to making visual recordings in breach of 
privacy and voyeurism shed more light on the notion of ‘private place’.  For 
example, the legislative response in Queensland to making and/or distributing 
visual recordings provides a definition of private place, which assists in 
separating a public and private place.  In Queensland, a private place has been 
defined as ‘a place where a person might reasonably be expected to be engaging 
in a private act’.930  In turn, a private act is defined as ‘(a) showering or 
                                                 
924 William L Prosser, 'Privacy' (1960) 48 California Law Review 383. 
925 Andrew McClurg, 'Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet:  A Tort Theory of Liability for 
Intrusions in Public Places' (1995) 73 NC Law Review 989, 1025. 
926 Elizabeth Paton-Simpson, 'Privacy and the Reasonable Paranoid:  The Protection of Privacy 
in Public Places' (2000) 50 University of Toronto Law Journal 305, 321. 
927 Ibid. 
928 Ibid 322. 
929 Clay Calvert and Justin Brown, 'Video Voyeurism, Privacy, and the Internet:  Exposing 
Peeping Toms in Cyberspace' (2000) 18 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 469, 
499.  
930 Criminal Code (Qld) s 207A. 
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bathing;  or (b) using a toilet;  or (c) another activity when the person is in a 
state of undress;  or (d) intimate sexual activity that is not ordinarily done in 
public’.931  The legislative response in Queensland does not define a public 
place, but logically it does not include a toilet, bathroom, bedroom or 
communal change room because these are places where private acts are done, 
and thus they are private places. 
                                                
 
In contrast, the New South Wales provision for filming for indecent purposes 
does not refer to public or private place.  Instead of using the public and private 
place dichotomy to inform whether conduct is criminalised, it refers to the 
intrusion on privacy.  In particular, it refers to ‘engaged in a private act’, which 
occurs ‘if the person is engaged in using the toilet, showering or bathing, 
carrying on a sexual act of a kind not ordinarily done in public or any other like 
activity’.932  Similarly, the United Kingdom legislative response to voyeurism 
does not separate the concepts of public and private place, but rather refers to a 
‘private act’.  This includes ‘using the lavatory’,933 and ‘doing a sexual act that 
is not of a kind ordinary done in public’.934  Further, the Canadian voyeurism 
offence refers to a ‘place in which a person can reasonably be expected to be 
nude, to expose his or her genital organs or anal region or her breasts, or to be 
engaged in explicit sexual activity’.935  The New Zealand provision takes the 
same approach as the Canadian provision.936  While it refers to place, it does 
not explicitly refer to public and private places, but focuses on the intrusion on 
privacy.  The United States provision regarding video voyeurism is more 
explicit, and applies where the victim has a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’, 
irrespective of whether the voyeurism occurs in a public or private place.937 
 
Consequently, the legislative responses to voyeurism, and making and/or 
distributing visual recordings in breach of privacy are not necessarily anchored 
around the public and private place dichotomy.  They focus on the intrusion on 
privacy, irrespective of whether it occurred in a public or private place, and 
usually hinge on a reasonable expectation of privacy.  The notion of ‘privacy’ 
will be discussed below.  The legislative responses illustrate that a bathroom, 
toilet, bedroom and communal change room are places where the expectation of 
privacy is paramount. 
 
 
931 Criminal Code (Qld) s 207A. 
932 Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) s 21G(2)(b). 
933 Sexual Offences Act 2003 (UK) s 68(1)(b). 
934 Sexual Offences Act 2003 (UK) s 68(1)(c). 
935 Criminal Code (Can) s 162. 
936 Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) s 216G. 
937 Video Voyeurism Act 18 USC §1801(b)(5(B) (2004). 
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5.2.6.1.2  Problems with the General Proposition that there is no Right 
to Privacy in a Public Place 
 
Prosser’s general proposition that there is no right to privacy in a public place is 
problematic.  Firstly, it is ‘grounded in the notion of consent’938 and has been 
described as the ‘knowledge equals consent’ approach.939  It assumes that 
people are aware that the risk to privacy is greater in public than in private.940  
It leaps from an ‘awareness of risk to waiver of privacy’.941  The general 
proposition implies that as the awareness of risk increases, the notion of 
‘privacy’ erodes and ultimately there will be no right to privacy.  When the 
awareness of risk changes over time and with advances in technology, there is a 
corresponding change in the expectation of privacy.  For example, as people 
become more aware that others engage in up-skirt filming in shopping malls, 
does it follow that if a female walks into a shopping mall with a skirt on, she 
consents to others filming up her skirt?  It is absurd to think that the answer to 
this question would be yes, but this is the unreasonable conclusion that is 
offered by Prosser’s general proposition.  Calvert and Brown developed this 
example in their excellent article on video voyeurism and argue that it would 
place a ‘legal dress code on women.  Wear a short skirt or dress and you take a 
risk.  Wear slacks or pants and you’re protected’.942  Further, if a female does 
not mind whether other people see her underwear, she would choose not to 
wear a dress943 or would pull her dress up herself.944  Thus, it is unsound for the 
general proposition to equate an awareness of risk with a waiver of privacy. 
 
To combat the changing nature of awareness of risk and expectations of 
privacy, Solove recommends a ‘normative component’945 in the conception of 
privacy and not simply a focus on ‘current [or historical] expectations of 
privacy’946 to shape future privacy laws.947  While in theory this appears 
compelling, he does not develop the notion of ‘normative component’.  
McClurg offers more guidance on how to tackle the changing awareness of risk 
issue by specifying that a person ‘must have voluntarily consented to the 
                                                 
938 Andrew McClurg, 'Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet:  A Tort Theory of Liability for 
Intrusions in Public Places' (1995) 73 NC Law Review 989, 1039. 
939 JDR Craig, 'Invasion of Privacy and Charter Values:  The Common-Law Tort Awakens' 
(1997) 42 McGill Law Journal 355, 396. 
940 Elizabeth Paton-Simpson, 'Privacy and the Reasonable Paranoid:  The Protection of Privacy 
in Public Places' (2000) 50 University of Toronto Law Journal 305, 332. 
941 Ibid 333. 
942 Clay Calvert and Justin Brown, 'Video Voyeurism, Privacy, and the Internet:  Exposing 
Peeping Toms in Cyberspace' (2000) 18 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 469, 
495. 
943 Ibid. 
944 Ibid 496. 




specific risk at issue’948 and not merely be aware of the risk.  According to 
McClurg, ‘to find true consent, the plaintiff must have full knowledge of the 
risk and voluntarily choose to encounter it’.949     
 
A further criticism with the general proposition that there is no right to privacy 
in a public place is that it fails to recognise the distinction between simply 
consenting to being in a public place and consenting to be visually recorded.950  
Paton-Simpson suggests that implied consent in a public place is limited to 
being casually observed by others nearby.951  An observation by the naked eye 
is not the equivalent of making a visual recording.952   
 
Making a visual recording intensifies the invasion of privacy compared to 
observing another person with the naked eye in three ways.  Firstly, it allows a 
person making a visual recording to take an image of an individual and 
scrutinise the visual recording  at a later date.  As a result the person visually 
recorded ‘loses control over an aspect of’953 themselves.  This is intensified 
when the visual recording captures moving images rather than still images 
because it enables the person making the visual recording to capture 
‘appearance, facial expressions, gestures, gaze, posture and even speech’.954  
Secondly, a visual recording may be a permanent record and intricate details 
that are not picked up by the naked eye in a transitory glance may be picked up 
in a visual recording at a later point in time.955  Thirdly, as a visual recording 
may be a permanent record, it may be distributed, for example, on the Internet 
to a world wide audience,956  or in a different context.957  This is problematic 
because people dress and act according to their environment.958  Therefore, 
                                                 
948 Andrew McClurg, 'Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet:  A Tort Theory of Liability for 
Intrusions in Public Places' (1995) 73 NC Law Review 989, 1040. 
949 Ibid 1039. 
950 Ibid 1039-40. 
951 Elizabeth Paton-Simpson, 'Privacy and the Reasonable Paranoid:  The Protection of Privacy 
in Public Places' (2000) 50 University of Toronto Law Journal 305, 336. 
952 Andrew McClurg, 'Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet:  A Tort Theory of Liability for 
Intrusions in Public Places' (1995) 73 NC Law Review 989, 1041. 
953 Ibid 1042. 
954 Ibid 1043.  In fact, moving images can capture ‘mood (anxiety, depression, happiness), 
attitude towards others (anger, love, wariness, boredom, impatience), mental state 
(concentration, puzzlement, self-confidence), or bodily state (fatigue, alertness, hunger)’:  1044. 
955 Ibid 1042. 
956 Ibid. 
957 Ibid 1043.  See also Elizabeth Paton-Simpson, 'Privacy and the Reasonable Paranoid:  The 
Protection of Privacy in Public Places' (2000) 50 University of Toronto Law Journal 305, 321 
on this issue.  In particular, Paton-Simpson states that people act and dress differently in public 
places because they know that they will be scrutinized by others to some extent.  In private 
places, people relax their guard because they know or believe they will only be scrutinized by 
family and friends. 
958 Andrew McClurg, 'Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet:  A Tort Theory of Liability for 
Intrusions in Public Places' (1995) 73 NC Law Review 989, 1043.  See also Standing Committee 
of Attorneys-General, Unauthorised Photographs on the Internet and Ancillary Privacy Issues 
(2005) <http://www.ag.gov.au> at 1 October 2005, [33]. 
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consenting to being in a public place is not the same as consenting to being 
visually recorded and Prosser’s general proposition ignores this distinction. 
 
Another problem with Prosser’s general proposition is that it assumes that 
people have a free choice in revealing information about themselves in 
public.959  Paton-Simpson recognises that people often do not have a choice but 
to appear in public,960 for example, a homeless person.  Similarly, McClurg 
notes that people spend a lot of time in public places to survive in the 
community.961  Homeless people, Indigenous and youth cultures spend a larger 
portion of their time in public places962 than others in society who can afford to 
live in private places.963  Thus, Prosser’s general proposition is discriminatory 
and it is important to recognise privacy in public places because it enables more 
privacy equality.964  For example, a homeless person’s consent should not be 
automatically implied because they are generally always present in a public 
place. 
 
The general proposition that there is no right to privacy in a public place 
assumes that people take precautions in public places if they wish to keep 
anything private.965  McClurg states that people continuously take appropriate 
precautions to protect private body parts and private acts from the public 
view.966  Similarly, Paton-Simpson maintains that reasonable people act 
according to the circumstances and do not act as though everyone is staring at 
them.967  A person is deemed to have waived their right to privacy if they do 
not take appropriate precautions.968  Thus, the general proposition that there is 
no right to privacy in a public place requires people to take appropriate 
precautions to protect their privacy in a public place, which is socially costly 
and discriminates against subcultures.969  For example, if there was no right to 
privacy in a public place, some women may choose not to bathe topless at 
public beaches.  It is important to recognise the right to privacy in a public 
place and not to automatically assume that topless female bathers at public 
beaches have lost their right to privacy. 
                                                 
959 Elizabeth Paton-Simpson, 'Privacy and the Reasonable Paranoid:  The Protection of Privacy 
in Public Places' (2000) 50 University of Toronto Law Journal 305, 337. 
960 Ibid 338. 
961 Andrew McClurg, 'Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet:  A Tort Theory of Liability for 
Intrusions in Public Places' (1995) 73 NC Law Review 989, 1040. 
962 David Brown et al, Brown, Farrier, Neal and Weisbrot's Criminal Laws - Materials and 
Commentary on Criminal Law and Process in New South Wales (4th ed, 2006) 86. 
963 Elizabeth Paton-Simpson, 'Privacy and the Reasonable Paranoid:  The Protection of Privacy 
in Public Places' (2000) 50 University of Toronto Law Journal 305, 343. 
964 Ibid. 
965 Ibid 321. 
966 Andrew McClurg, 'Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet:  A Tort Theory of Liability for 
Intrusions in Public Places' (1995) 73 NC Law Review 989, 1137. 
967 Elizabeth Paton-Simpson, 'Privacy and the Reasonable Paranoid:  The Protection of Privacy 
in Public Places' (2000) 50 University of Toronto Law Journal 305, 322. 
968 Ibid. 
969 Ibid 343 for an example on homosexuals. 
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In addition to the problems discussed above, the general proposition that there 
is no right to privacy in a public place, treats privacy as an ‘all-or-nothing 
concept’,970 is ‘too rigid’,971 and overlooks the difference between a loss of 
privacy to one or a few and a loss of privacy to the world at large.972  It has also 
been described as ‘unrealistic and places an unfair burden on those who value 
their privacy’.973  Thus, Prosser’s general proposition is problematic for the 
reasons outlined above.  In the context of making and/or distributing visual 
recordings, it is absurd to think, for example, that people consent to up-skirt 
filming just because it happens when they are in a public place.  Thus, privacy 
may exist in a public place.   
 
5.2.6.2  Recognising that there is a Right to Privacy in a Public Place 
 
McClurg974 and Paton-Simpson975 recognise a right to privacy in a public place 
and do not automatically imply consent to an intrusion on privacy merely 
because a person is in a public place.  McClurg argues that people do not 
surrender all of their privacy (or consent to anything) merely because they 
venture into a public place:976  ‘Privacy is a matter of degree’.977  Paton-
Simpson suggests that one way of determining whether a person has impliedly 
consented to an intrusion on privacy in a public place is to ‘imagine the likely 
response if express permission had been sought’.978  For example, in the 
context of making and/or distributing visual recordings, if a person who had 
been visually recorded is likely to refuse to give express consent to being 
visually recorded, it could not be said that they impliedly consented to being 
visually recorded.  However, this begs questions about whether implied consent 
should be determined subjectively from the perspective of the person visually 
recorded or objectively from the perspective of a reasonable or ordinary person.  
McClurg and Paton-Simpson support the notion of ‘privacy’ in a public place, 
which stems back to the ‘legend of Lady Godiva and Peeping Tom of 
Coventry’.979   
 
                                                 
970 Andrew McClurg, 'Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet:  A Tort Theory of Liability for 
Intrusions in Public Places' (1995) 73 NC Law Review 989, 1040-1. 
971 Ibid 1041. 
972 Elizabeth Paton-Simpson, 'Privacy and the Reasonable Paranoid:  The Protection of Privacy 
in Public Places' (2000) 50 University of Toronto Law Journal 305, 322. 
973 Andrew McClurg, 'Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet:  A Tort Theory of Liability for 
Intrusions in Public Places' (1995) 73 NC Law Review 989, 1040. 
974 Ibid 1041. 
975 Elizabeth Paton-Simpson, 'Privacy and the Reasonable Paranoid:  The Protection of Privacy 
in Public Places' (2000) 50 University of Toronto Law Journal 305. 
976 Andrew McClurg, 'Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet:  A Tort Theory of Liability for 
Intrusions in Public Places' (1995) 73 NC Law Review 989, 1041. 
977 Ibid. 
978 Elizabeth Paton-Simpson, 'Privacy and the Reasonable Paranoid:  The Protection of Privacy 
in Public Places' (2000) 50 University of Toronto Law Journal 305, 337. 
979 Ibid 327.  This legend was described in more detail in chapter 1. 
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5.2.6.2.1 Conception of Privacy  
 
As recognised above, there is a right to privacy in a public place and this in turn 
means that a person’s consent to being visually recorded or having their image 
distributed on the Internet cannot be implied merely because the person was in 
a public place.  Thus, if a person is in a public place, when should their consent 
to being visually recorded and/or having their image distributed on the Internet, 
be implied?  The answer to this question depends on when the criminal law 
should protect the person’s privacy and prompts an examination of the 
conceptual boundaries of privacy.  Thus, the following discussion provides an 
overview of the concept of ‘privacy’.   
 
McClurg states that ‘[m]ost modern definitions of privacy offered by scholars 
are expansive enough to allow recognition of a right to privacy in public’.980  
While not defining the notion of ‘modern’, he does explicitly refer to Westin’s 
definition of privacy.  Westin’s definition centres on the control of information 
about oneself.981  He suggests that, in a public place, people do not expect to be 
under covert surveillance or have solitude, and they do expect to be observed 
by others.982  His definition recognises a right to privacy in a public place and, 
goes on to identify some specific examples of public places such as shops, 
restaurants and hotels.  It must be questioned whether his comment about covert 
surveillance applies in the 21st century when there is a prevalent use of 
surveillance cameras in public places, such as public malls, shopping centres 
and train stations.  Further, the widespread use of visual recording technologies 
have made us aware that many people in society have the ability to capture our 
image and distribute it on the Internet, and thus our expectations about 
surveillance are likely to have shifted since 1967 when Westin made this 
comment. 
 
Solove tracks different conceptions of privacy as falling under six headings.983  
The first conception was Warren and Brandeis’ classic definition of the ‘right to 
be let alone’.984  The second conception involves protecting oneself from the 
access by others.985  The third conception is anchored on secrecy, while the 
fourth conception is anchored on controlling information about oneself.  
Westin’s definition of privacy is consistent with this fourth conception of 
privacy stated above.986  The fifth conception as summarised by Solove hinges 
                                                 
980 Andrew McClurg, 'Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet:  A Tort Theory of Liability for 
Intrusions in Public Places' (1995) 73 NC Law Review 989, 1029. 
981 Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967) 7. 
982 Ibid 112. 
983 Daniel Solove, 'Conceptualizing Privacy' (2002) 90 California Law Review 1087, 1092. 
984 S Warren and L Brandeis, 'The Right to Privacy' (1890) IV Harvard Law Review 193, 195. 
985 See generally Ruth Gavinson, 'Privacy and the Limits of Law' (1980) 89 The Yale Law 
Journal 421 for more information on this conception of privacy. 
986 See generally Charles Fried, 'Privacy' (1968) 77 The Yale Law Journal 475 on this 
conception of privacy. 
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on protecting one’s dignity and personality.987  As will be seen below, dignity 
is particularly relevant to making a visual recording of a person who is using a 
toilet, showering or undressing.  The final definition of privacy entails 
controlling access to intimate relationships.988  Solove’s work is useful because 
he collates the mainstream views of privacy in six pigeonholes.989  However, it 
leaves unanswered whether making and/or distributing visual recordings neatly 
fall within one or more of these pigeonholes.   
 
In most examples of making and/or distributing visual recordings, such as 
uploading an up-skirt film on the Internet, there are two intrusions on privacy.  
The first intrusion on privacy occurs when making a visual recording.  It may 
breach a ‘physical zone of privacy and the sense of security that comes with 
it’.990  Thus, the first intrusion falls under the first and second definitions of 
privacy identified above by Solove; that is, the right to be let alone and to 
protect oneself from the access by others.  The second intrusion on privacy 
occurs when a visual recording is distributed, for example, on the Internet.  The 
distribution of a visual recording prohibits a person from controlling 
information about them.991  Distributing a visual recording arguably falls under 
the fourth definition of privacy identified by Solove above, which is, 
controlling information about oneself.  Consequently, the conduct involved in 
making and/or distributing visual recordings can be pigeonholed into several 
definitions of privacy illuminated above, but cannot always be confined to a 
single overarching definition of privacy tracked by Solove.   
 
Solove does not rank or rate the six definitions above and criticises all of them 
for being ‘too narrow or too broad’992 or overlapping.  For example, he 
disapproves of Warren and Brandeis’ classic conception of privacy for failing 
to indicate how privacy is valued compared to other interests, for example, free 
speech,993 and for not explaining the situations in which people should be let 
alone.  Warren and Brandeis’ conception is often misunderstood to support the 
‘non-interference by the state at all’, when in fact it should support ‘state 
                                                 
987 See generally Edward J Bloustein, 'Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity:  An Answer to 
Dean Prosser' (1964) 39 New York University Law Review 962 on this conception of privacy. 
988 See especially Daniel Solove, 'Conceptualizing Privacy' (2002) 90 California Law Review 
1087, 1092 and Charles Fried, 'Privacy' (1968) 77 The Yale Law Journal 475, 477 on this 
conception of privacy. 
989 See especially Edward J Bloustein, 'Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity:  An Answer to 
Dean Prosser' (1964) 39 New York University Law Review 962, Charles Fried, 'Privacy' (1968) 
77 The Yale Law Journal 475, Ruth Gavinson, 'Privacy and the Limits of Law' (1980) 89 The 
Yale Law Journal 421, William L Prosser, 'Privacy' (1960) 48 California Law Review 383, and 
S Warren and L Brandeis, 'The Right to Privacy' (1890) IV Harvard Law Review 193. 
990 Clay Calvert and Justin Brown, 'Video Voyeurism, Privacy, and the Internet:  Exposing 
Peeping Toms in Cyberspace' (2000) 18 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 469, 
488. 
991 Ibid. 
992 Daniel Solove, 'Conceptualizing Privacy' (2002) 90 California Law Review 1087, 1092. 
993 Ibid 1101. 
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interference in the form of legal protection against other individuals’.994  
Gavinson criticises Warren and Brandeis’ notion of ‘privacy’ for ‘covering 
almost any conceivable complaint anyone could ever make’.995  Solove does 
not adopt or promote any of the six conceptions, but develops his own 
approach.996  As will be discussed below, his approach to privacy provides a 
useful structure for dealing with making and/or distributing visual recordings.   
 
Solove avoids developing an overarching definition of privacy because such a 
definition often cannot be applied to a variety of scenarios involving privacy.997  
His flexible approach is path breaking because it provides a framework within 
which to situate multifarious invasions on privacy, which may emerge in the 
future as a result of advances in technology.  The flexibility of his approach is 
important to making and/or distributing visual recordings because invasions on 
privacy evolve with advances in mobile phone cameras, video cameras and the 
Internet.  Further, his approach does not involve segregating privacy intrusions 
into public and private places, and he is aware that the distinction between 
public and private places changes over time in any event, according to altering 
attitudes and advances in technology.998  He suggests that the public and private 
dichotomy is informed by history and culture.  Thus, Solove’s approach is 
inconsistent with Prosser’s general proposition that there is no right to privacy 
in a public place.     
 
Solove conceptualises ‘privacy’ by concentrating on the ‘types of disruption 
and the specific practices disrupted’.999  He suggests that specific practices can 
be disrupted in several ways.  He provides several examples, but the ones most 
pertinent to making and/or distributing visual recordings are interfering with a 
person’s peace of mind, invading a person’s solitude, destroying a person’s 
reputation and ascertaining control of the facts about another person.1000  
Solove describes his approach as a ‘bottom-up contextualized approach’ and 
maintains that it is vital in ‘today’s world of rapidly changing technology’.1001  
Roberts also states that consent is a function of its context.1002  The flexibility 
offered by a contextual approach to privacy is important because making and/or 
distributing visual recordings are regularly disrupting our social practices in 
changing ways due to advances in the capacity of mobile phone cameras, video 
cameras and the Internet.  For example, the size of digital cameras has 
decreased to such an extent that they may be embedded in a person’s shoe to 
enable up-skirt filming.   
                                                 
994 Ibid. 
995 Ruth Gavinson, 'Privacy and the Limits of Law' (1980) 89 The Yale Law Journal 421, 438. 
996 Daniel Solove, 'Conceptualizing Privacy' (2002) 90 California Law Review 1087, 1126. 
997 Ibid, 1099. 
998 Ibid 1132. 
999 Ibid 1130. 
1000 Ibid. 
1001 Ibid 1154. 
1002 Paul Roberts, 'The Philosophical Foundations of Consent in the Criminal Law' (1997) 17 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 389, 403. 
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Solove applies his contextual approach to privacy to McNamara v Freedom 
Newspapers Inc,1003 which is a 1991 American case on the tort of public 
disclosure of private facts. While Solove’s emphasis is on new problems not 
fitting into old conceptions of privacy, he chooses to illustrate his approach to 
privacy by using this case, which occurred almost 10 years before he published 
his journal article.  While it is not clear why he chose this particular case, the 
facts of this case portray an example of making and distributing a visual 
recording.  In that case, a high school boy’s genitalia were unintentionally 
revealed on a soccer field and a newspaper published a photograph of the boy in 
such circumstances.1004  The Court held that, as the photograph was taken in a 
public place, the boy could not argue that a photograph of his exposed genitals 
were private facts.  This decision overlooks the notion that ‘privacy’ is a matter 
of degree and may exist in a public place.  Solove disagrees with the Court’s 
decision, and rightly so, and defends the boy’s privacy.  He advocates that there 
are social practices to conceal nude bodies and to excrete body wastes in private 
because these activities are embarrassing, distressing, ‘animal-like’, 
‘disgusting’, ‘vulnerable’ and ‘weak’.1005 These social practices are ‘deeply 
connected to human dignity’, which falls under the fifth definition of privacy 
identified by Solove above.  Solove states that  
 
[w]e scrub, dress, and groom ourselves in order to present ourselves to 
the public in a dignified manner.  We seek to cover up smells, 
discharge, and excretion because we are socialized into viewing them 
with disgust.  We cloak the nude body in public based on norms or 
decorum.  These social practices, which relegate these aspects of life to 
the private sphere, are deeply connected to human dignity.1006 
 
Similarly to Solove, Rothenberg suggests that ‘intimate acts and intimate body 
parts’ should be protected by privacy irrespective of whether the intrusion 
occurs in a public or private place,1007 because they are connected to human 
dignity.1008  Thus, the contextual approach to privacy suggests that the boy’s 
privacy should have been protected.  While a person visually recording the 
entire soccer match may have accidentally captured the boy’s genitals, the 
person making the visual recording should never have distributed it to a 
newspaper for publication.  Relating this back to consent, it could not be said 
that the boy consented to the newspaper publishing the visual recording.     
 
                                                 
1003 802 SW 2d, 904-5 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991). 
1004 Compare Ettingshausen v. Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 443.  In 
that case, Ettingshausen was not visually recorded while playing a football game, but afterwards 
while he was showering.   
1005 Daniel Solove, 'Conceptualizing Privacy' (2002) 90 California Law Review 1087, 1148. 
1006 Ibid. 
1007 Lance Rothenberg, 'Re-thinking Privacy:  Peeping Toms, Video Voyeurs, and the Failure of 
Criminal Law to Recognize a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Public Space' (1999-
2000) 49 American University Law Review 1127, 1158. 
1008 Ibid. 
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Solove’s work could be extended to other examples of making and/or 
distributing visual recordings, and there are some obvious scenarios that would 
follow suit because they involve private acts or private body parts.   These 
examples include where the person visually recorded is undressing in a change 
room, showering, using a toilet, engaging in sexual activities in a bedroom or 
being up-skirt filmed.  However, Solove has not tackled the difficult examples 
in this area, such as whether the privacy rights of a topless female bather at a 
public beach or a child playing in a public park should be protected if they are 
the focal point of a visual recording and visually recorded without their 
knowledge.  This chapter will fill this gap and address these two examples 
because they emerged in the media reports discussed in chapter 1 and were used 
in relation to the living-standard analysis tool in chapter 2.   
 
In applying the contextual approach it is necessary to consider ‘[w]hat practices 
are being disrupted?  In what ways does the disruption resemble or differ from 
other forms of disruption?  How does this disruption affect society and social 
structure?’.1009  It may be argued that topless female bathing is an accepted 
social practice in many countries including Australia.   
 
Is the social practice of a topless female bather at a public beach disrupted, if 
she is visually recorded?  Is a topless female bather disrupted in a similar way 
to a female who is up-skirt filmed?  Both examples occur in public places, but 
just because a person is visually recorded in a public place does not 
automatically mean that they have lost their right to privacy as privacy may 
exist in a public place.  Visually recording a topless female bather at a public 
beach is different to up-skirt filming because the topless female bather has 
chosen to expose her breasts to the public.  While it is true that a female who is 
up-skirt filmed has chosen to wear a skirt in public, she has not chosen to 
expose her private body parts and/or underwear to the public.  This is a key 
difference between up-skirt filming and visually recording a topless female 
bather.  Perhaps a topless female bather is not disrupted because it could be said 
that she sought attention and is happy for other people to visually record her 
and distribute a visual recording of her.  On the other hand, a topless female 
bather may be only happy if other people merely observe her body with their 
eyes or make a visual recording for their own purposes.  To complete this 
example, it is assumed that topless female bathing is a social practice that is 
disrupted.   
 
Making a visual recording of a topless female bather may disrupt their right to 
be let alone and their ability to shield themself from unwanted attention.  
However, simply looking at the topless female bather may also disrupt their 
right to be let alone and their ability to shield themselves from unwanted 
access.  Protecting privacy to the extent that no-one is able to look at a topless 
female bather at a public beach is extreme and is very unrealistic.  So, it seems 
that just because a disruption of a social practice can be linked back to one of 
                                                 
1009 Daniel Solove, 'Conceptualizing Privacy' (2002) 90 California Law Review 1087, 1147. 
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the privacy definitions tracked by Solove, it should not mean that the person’s 
privacy should necessarily be protected.   
 
An element of ‘reasonableness’1010 must step in to determine whether a social 
practice should be protected against invasions on privacy.  It is unreasonable to 
protect a topless female bather’s privacy from others observing them in a public 
place because everyone should be free to look at other people with their eyes in 
a public place.  It follows that a topless female bather at a public beach 
impliedly consents to being observed by the naked eyes of others.   
 
Whether a topless female bather’s privacy should be protected from others 
visually recording them at a public beach is less clear-cut.  In this example, the 
person is not merely looking at the topless female bather with their naked eyes, 
but they are using visual recording equipment to make an image that may be 
permanent.  At first instance, the contextual approach to privacy suggests that a 
topless female bather’s privacy should be protected because it impinges on the 
person’s right to be let alone and their ability to shield themselves from others, 
which are two of the conceptions of privacy identified by Solove and listed 
above.  An element of reasonableness probably dictates that the balance should 
swing in favour of freedom of expression rather than privacy because the use of 
visual recording equipment is important in our daily lives.   
 
Rather than jumping to a conclusion to protect freedom of expression over 
privacy in all instances of visually recording a topless female bather at a public 
beach, the contextual approach to privacy requires an examination of other 
contextual considerations.  Examples of other contextual considerations may 
include whether: 
 
• the person visually recorded is the focal point of the visual recording or is 
merely caught in the background;  
• the person visually recorded is identifiable by the visual recording;  
• the person visually recorded is engaging in a private act, or exposing private 
body parts or female breasts;  
• the person making the visual recording does so for the purpose of sexual 
objection, voyeurism, humiliation or embarrassment;  and 
                                                 
1010 This is akin to the expression of ‘a reasonable expectation of privacy’, which as noted in 
chapter 4 is used in the legislative responses to making and/or distributing visual recordings:  
Crimes Act 1966 (NZ) s 216G; Sexual Offences Act 2003 (UK) s 68; Video Voyeurism Act 18 
USC §1801(a) (2004); Criminal Code (Qld) s 227A; Criminal Code (Can) s 162(1); and 
Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) s 21G(1)(a).  ‘A reasonable expectation of privacy’ 
depends on the context.  In addition to the element of ‘a reasonable expectation of privacy’, 
these offences recognise that without consent is a relevant consideration and thus, contain it as a 
separate element.  Developing the notion of ‘a reasonable expection of privacy’ may be a 
simpler approach than a contextual approach to consent, but as will be shown in chapter 6, 
including ‘without consent’ as an element of a proposed offence and taking a contextual 
approach to consent obviates the need to embed ‘a reasonable expectation of privacy’ as an 
extra element. 
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• there is a relationship between the person making the visual recording and 
the person visually recorded.   
 
This list of contextual considerations does not purport to be an exhaustive list 
and the factors have not been prioritised because it would lead to a false sense 
of precision.  Clearly, a topless female bather is exposing female breasts, which 
falls within one of the contextual considerations listed above.  Where the 
topless female bather is identifiable, the person is the focal point of the visual 
recording, and there is no relationship between the person making the visual 
recording and the topless female bather, the privacy of the topless female bather 
should be protected.  In this situation, it could be argued that the topless female 
bather has not impliedly consented to being visually recorded.  In contrast, 
consent may be implied and privacy may not be protected if, for example, a 
husband made a visual recording of his wife who was topless bathing at a 
public beach.  In this latter situation, the relationship between the topless 
female bather and the person making the visual recording supports the waiver 
of privacy and infers implied consent.  Even though it may be said that a topless 
female bather has not impliedly consented to being visually recorded, there are 
difficulties in criminalising this conduct on the basis of principle. 
 
Chapter 2 highlighted concerns about criminalising the making of visual 
recordings of other people in public places and suggested that the freedom of 
expression of the person making the visual recording should take priority over 
the privacy of the person being visually recorded.  A different conclusion would 
make a mockery of the criminal law given that visual recording technologies 
are ubiquitous.  On the other hand, chapter 2 suggested that distributing a visual 
recording should be criminalised if it done for an undesirable social purpose 
such as sexual objectification, voyeurism, humiliation and embarrassment.  
Thus, it is necessary to consider whether a topless female bather impliedly 
consents to having a visual recording of her distributed to a wider audience or 
in a different context. 
 
When a person not only makes a visual recording of the topless female bather, 
but also distributes it, for example on the Internet, the disruption relates more to 
the topless female bather being able to control information about themselves 
because the person who made the visual recording is free to control the 
information captured in the image.  The cumulative affect of making and 
distributing visual recordings shows that this conduct is invasive on privacy 
because it falls within several of the privacy conceptions outlined by Solove.  
Thus, the contextual approach to privacy suggests that a topless female bather 
should be protected from other people distributing visual recordings of her.  An 
element of reasonableness requires the purpose of the distribution to be 
considered, for example, if the visual recording is distributed on the Internet for 
the purpose of sexually objectification, voyeurism, humiliation or 
embarrassment, it is likely that the topless female bather’s privacy should be 
protected and that she has not impliedly consented to the distribution.   
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A range of contextual factors may be taken into consideration in determining 
whether a person would have impliedly consented to having their image 
distributed.  These include: 
 
• the audience to which the visual recording is distributed, for example, is it 
distributed to a world wide audience or a small group of friends; 
• where the visual recording is distributed, for example, whether the visual 
recording was uploaded to a voyeuristic website, an unknown website or a 
friend’s facebook site; 
• whether the person visually recorded is the focal point of the visual 
recording or is merely caught in the background;  
• whether the person visually recorded is identifiable by the visual recording;  
• whether the person visually recorded is engaging in a private act, or 
exposing private body parts or female breasts;  
• the person distributing the visual recording does so for the purpose of 
sexual objection, voyeurism, humiliation or embarrassment;  and 
• whether there is a relationship between the person making the visual 
recording and the person visually recorded.   
 
Once again, this list of contextual considerations is not exhaustive and any 
attempt to weight the factors would be open to criticism.  Clearly, a topless 
female bather exposes female breasts, and this should be taken into account 
when determining whether she has impliedly consented to the distribution of 
the image.  The topless female bather is unlikely to impliedly consent to, for 
example, her image being placed on a voyeuristic or unknown website, or being 
distributed by a person unknown to the topless female bather. 
 
It is common practice for websites that permit the sharing of visual recordings 
to require the person uploading visual recordings to indicate that they have the 
consent of the person visually recorded.1011  Thus, it is reasonable for a person 
distributing a visual recording of the topless female bather to obtain their 
express consent before distributing their visual recording, for example, on the 
Internet.  It follows that the topless female bather does not impliedly consent to 
having a visual recording of her distributed.  In such a case, it is necessary to 
obtain the topless female bather’s express consent before distributing the visual 
recording.   
 
If the situation was changed from visually recording a topless female bather to a 
child playing in a public park, the results would be similar.  The contextual 
approach would protect the privacy rights of the child from being visually 
recorded, but reasonableness dictates that freedom of expression should be 
prioritised over privacy because being able to use visual recording technologies 
is an important activity in our daily lives in the 21st century.  Parents, family 
and friends may have an inherent right to visually record their children playing 
                                                 
1011 See especially http://www.facebook.com and http://www.myspace.com.   
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in a public park, and while it is concerning that everyone has an open invitation 
to make such visual recordings, the criminal law should not criminalise this 
conduct.  The criminal law should prohibit people from distributing images of 
children where it is done for the purpose of sexual objectification, voyeurism, 
humiliation and embarrassment.   In criminalising the distributing conduct, a 
child’s consent is relevant and the contextual factors above should be 
considered.  This of course, raises another thorny issue, that is, at what age is a 
child able to impliedly or expressly consent to having their image distributed?  
Perhaps an analogy could be made with other offences involving children.1012  
 
While a contextual approach to privacy is appealing, it has shortcomings.  For 
example, Solove’s approach to privacy requires an identification of the specific 
practices disrupted and types of disruptions; and enables a decision maker to 
manipulate the conception of privacy to fit the circumstances, rather than being 
confined to one overarching definition of privacy and finding that a particular 
scenario is not protected by the definition of privacy.  Bruyer states that the 
contextual approach attempts ‘to have privacy be all things to all people, 
…[and] risks trivializing privacy for everybody’.  The consequences of this 
were shown above, where making and/or distributing a visual recording of a 
topless female bather at a public beach fell within some of the definitions of 
privacy identified by Solove, and there was a need to use reasonableness as 
means of determining whether to protect her privacy and thus not imply 
consent.  Despite the criticisms with Solove’s approach, the Australian Law 
Reform Commission in its 2008 report on privacy labels Solove’s approach as a 
‘useful template for law reform’, ‘pragmatic approach’ and ‘makes more sense’ 
than using an overarching definition of privacy.1013 
 
Solove states that ‘conceptions can still be useful without having to be 
circumscribed by fixed and sharp boundaries’,1014 and this enables privacy to 
keep up with advances in technology.  This is particularly significant to making 
and/or distributing visual recordings because the technology is continuously 
improving.   
 
To recap the contextual approach to implied consent, it is based on the 
contextual approach to privacy.  Privacy is a matter of degree and may exist in a 
public place.  Thus, there may be public privacy.  This notion may be viewed as 
an oxymoron,1015 if public and private were viewed as a mutually exclusive 
dichotomy.  However, public does not refer to place in this context, but refers to 
interests.   The notion of ‘public interest’ was discussed above as an exception 
to the quantitative plus exceptions approach to consent.  Chapter 2 considers the 
                                                 
1012 For example in Queensland, a child under 12 years is incapable of consenting to rape:  
Criminal Code (Qld) s 349(3). 
1013 Australia, Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information:  Australian Privacy 
Law and Practice, Report No. 108 (2008) [1.67]. 
1014 Daniel Solove, 'Conceptualizing Privacy' (2002) 90 California Law Review 1087, 1098. 
1015 Andrew McClurg, 'Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet:  A Tort Theory of Liability for 
Intrusions in Public Places' (1995) 73 NC Law Review 989, 1044. 
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principle of social welfare, which centres on public interests, and underpins the 
decision to criminalise conduct.  Similarly, the next chapter will consider the 
public and private dichotomy from an interest, rather than a place, perspective 
as one of the ways of distinguishing criminal law from civil law.   
 
There is no universal conception of ‘privacy’ that serves all purposes.  While 
Solove’s approach to privacy claims to offer more than a universal definition of 
privacy, his bottom up approach enables the legislature to adopt a conception of 
‘privacy’ that fits the relevant scenario.  As illustrated above, a person in a 
public place does not automatically waive their right to privacy and impliedly 
consent to being visually recorded or having their image distributed; this 
determination is dependent on the context. 
 
In modern society, where technology is ubiquitous and visually recording other 
people in public places is a common incident of social intercourse, the scope of 
‘implied consent’ is critical.  The contextual approach to consent, discussed 
above, provides a tool for dealing with the notion of ‘implied consent’.  As 
noted above, there is no implied consent where the conduct is hostile or done 
with a hostile intent.  In the context of making and/or distributing a visual 
recording, a person is unlikely to impliedly consent to being visually recorded 
or having their image distributed, if, for example, it is done so for the purpose 
of sexual objection, voyeurism, humiliation or embarrassment.   
 
The purpose of discussing various approaches to the role of consent in criminal 
law is to illustrate that irrespective of which approach is followed consent is 
always relevant to making and/or distributing visual recordings.  Thus, there is 
no need to single out a particular approach or prioritise the approaches.  The 
criminal law should make a lack of consent an element of an offence pertaining 
to making and/or distributing visual recordings and it should respect a person’s 




The myriad of approaches to consent examined in this chapter, that is, 
quantitative, quantitative plus exceptions, individual autonomy, paternalism, 
morality and contextual, suggest that the victim’s consent is relevant to making 
and/or distributing visual recordings and that a lack of consent should be an 
element of an offence controlling this conduct.  Thus, a particular approach to 
consent does not need to be singled out and the approaches do not need to be 
prioritised.  It is difficult to draw the line between what should be criminalised 
and what should not be criminalised on the basis of consent.1016  In fact, the 
principles in chapter 2, that is, harm, morality, social welfare, individual 
                                                 
1016 Ian Freckelton, 'Masochism, Self-Mutilation and the Limits of Consent' (1994) 2 Journal of 
Law and Medicine 48, 55. 
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autonomy and punishment, did the real dividing work, but consent is an 
important feature in creating new offences in this area. 
 
While the criminal law should respect a person’s express consent where the 
conduct results in non-serious harm, it is the scope of ‘implied consent’ that is 
particularly important here because often the person visually recorded does not 
know they are being visually recorded at the time it is made.  This chapter 
argues that topless female bathers at a public beach and children playing in a 
public park do not automatically impliedly consent to anyone making and/or 
distributing a visual recording of them.  Their implied consent and waiver of 
privacy depends on a range of contextual considerations, for example: 
 
• the audience to which the visual recording is distributed, for example, is it 
distributed to a world wide audience or a small group of friends; 
• where the visual recording is distributed, for example, whether the visual 
recording was uploaded to a voyeuristic website, an unknown website or a 
friend’s facebook site; 
• whether the person visually recorded is the focal point of the visual 
recording or is merely caught in the background;  
• whether the person visually recorded is identifiable by the visual recording;  
• whether the person visually recorded is engaging in a private act, or 
exposing private body parts or female breasts;  
• the person distributing the visual recording does so for the purpose of 
sexual objection, voyeurism, humiliation or embarrassment;  and 
• whether there is a relationship between the person making the visual 
recording and the person visually recorded.1017   
 
People do not impliedly consent to up-skirt filming merely because they wear a 
skirt and go out in public, and people do not impliedly consent to being visually 
recorded in private places such as in a toilet, bathroom, bedroom or communal 
change room.  Up-skirt filming and visually recording people in private places 
are not ordinary incidents of social intercourse.  The individuals in such 
recordings also do not impliedly consent to having such visual recordings 
distributed.  However, if a person expressly consents to being visually recorded 
in these instances or having such visual recordings distributed, the criminal law 
should respect their individual autonomy because of the low level of harm 
involved in this conduct compared to other more serious types of non-fatal 
offences against a person. 
 
This chapter examined the conceptual boundaries of ‘consent’ and different 
approaches to the role of consent in the criminal law as a means of determining 
whether consent should be an element of offences pertaining to making and/or 
distributing visual recordings and whether a person impliedly consents to being 
visually recorded or having their image distributed to a wider audience merely 
                                                 
1017 Note that there was some overlap between the list of contextual considerations for making 
and distributing a visual recording, and these have been synthesised into one list here. 
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because they appear in a public place.  It concluded that a lack of consent 
should be element of offences pertaining to making and/or distributing visual 
recordings.  It also suggested that implied consent should be based on 
contextual considerations and that there is no implied consent where a person 
making and/or distributing a visual recording does so for a socially undesirable 
purpose, including sexual objectification, voyeurism, humiliation and 
embarrassment. 
 
The next (and final) chapter will combine the findings from this chapter 
regarding consent with the findings from the previous chapters to articulate a 
principled approach to criminalisation and apply it to specific examples of 
making and/or distributing visual recordings that arose in media reports.  It will 
also compare the results of a principled approach to criminalisation with recent 













6 CHAPTER 6:  CONCLUSION 
 
Whether making and/or distributing visual recordings should be criminalised is 
a contemporary issue that has emerged with the advent of enhanced 
technological capabilities and the widespread availability and use of mobile 
phone cameras, digital cameras, video cameras, web cams, email, the 
blogosphere and websites that encourage the community to upload visual 
recordings to the Internet.  This conduct is at the margins of the criminal law 
and determining whether it should fall within the boundaries of the criminal law 
is a difficult issue, given that the criminal law in the 21st century has randomly 
expanded in, what at times has been, a reactive and unprincipled way to deal 
with modern issues and has been encroaching on the civil law.  This thesis 
addresses this issue by taking a principled approach to determining whether 
making and/or distributing visual recordings should be criminalised. 
 
A principled approach to criminalisation is founded on the literature.1018  
Ashworth is a leading commentator in this area and his work has been very 
valuable in shaping the principles1019 used here, including protection from 
harm, preservation of morality, promotion of social welfare, respect for 
individual autonomy, punishment of the offender, the offender’s culpability and 
the victim’s consent, which were discussed in chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5.  Chapter 2 
recognised that public opinion, the media and political climate may shape the 
criminal law, but they do not form part of a principled approach to 
criminalisation.  To sharpen the focus of the criminal law and to ensure that it 
develops in a principled manner, chapter 3 distinguishes criminal law from civil 
law.  A principled approach to criminalisation is a normative approach and it 
should prove to be a useful resource to legislatures because it provides guidance 
on whether future types of conduct should be criminalised. 
 
The arguments in this thesis are original and make a significant contribution to 
the criminalisation debate because they go well beyond the criminalisation 
literature and explore whether making and/or distributing visual recordings 
should be criminalised.  While other researchers have considered making and/or 
distributing visual recordings from a torts perspective, it has rarely been 
explored from a theoretical or criminal law perspective.   
 
                                                 
1018 See especially Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006), Nicola Lacey, 
Celia Wells and Oliver Quick, Reconstructing Criminal Law Text and Materials, Law in 
Context (3rd ed, 2003), Bernadette McSherry and Bronwyn Naylor, Australian Criminal Laws:  
Critical Perspectives (2004), Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal 
Law (2nd ed, 2005), Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers and Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal 
Justice (3rd ed, 2005) and AP Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine 
(2003). 
1019 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) and Andrew Ashworth, 'Is 
the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?' (2000) 116 The Law Quarterly Review 225. 
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This chapter will now synthesise the discussion in chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5.  In 
doing so, it will consider whether a principled approach to criminalisation 
supports the criminalisation of making and/or distributing a visual recording in 
four scenarios, which have been derived from the prominent media reports and 
were highlighted in chapter 1: 
 
1. Child playing in a public park, 
2. Topless female bather at a public beach, 
3. Up-skirt filming at a shopping centre, and 
4. Housemate showering in a bathroom. 
 
In some instances, according to a principled approach to criminalisation, 
distributing a visual recording should be criminalised, but not making such a 
visual recording, and thus making a visual recording in the above four scenarios 
will be discussed separately from distributing where appropriate.  
 
This chapter will then explore whether the current criminal law response to 
making and/or distributing visual recordings in New Zealand, Queensland, 
Canada, the United Kingdom and New South Wales,1020 is appropriate when 
measured against a principled approach to criminalisation.  These jurisdictions 
have been chosen because, as mentioned in chapter 1, they have provided a 
recent legislative response to this conduct and, by choosing five jurisdictions, it 
is easier to see whether there is a pattern in the way the criminal law treats this 
conduct.  This chapter will conclude with some recommendations for further 
research in this novel area of criminal law. 
 
6.1 A Principled Approach to Criminalising Four Scenarios 
 
The principles underpinning criminalisation and, the distinctions between 
criminal law and civil law can be synthesised into two factors, that is, the 
seriousness of the conduct and interests affected by the conduct.  Harm and 
punishment centre on the seriousness of the conduct, and suggest that conduct 
should only be criminalised if it is serious or grave.  In contrast, the principles 
of social welfare and individual autonomy, and the prohibiting and pricing 
distinction, the public and private distinction and the hybrid approach, all place 
emphasis on the interests affected by the conduct in determining whether 
conduct is criminalised.  While this thesis does not seek to weight the 
importance of the seriousness of the conduct and the interests affected by the 
conduct, because that would lead to a false sense of precision, only the latter 
                                                 
1020 Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) s 216G-N, which came into effect in December 2006;  Criminal 
Code (Qld) s 227A-C, which came into effect in December 2005;  Criminal Code (Can) s 162, 
which came into effect in November 2005;  Sexual Offences Act 2003 (UK) s 67, which came 
into effect in May 2004;  and Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) s 21G-H, which came into 
effect in March 2004. 
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factor provides a justification for criminalising some examples of making 
and/or distributing visual recordings.   
 
It should be noted that the principle of morality and the essentialist approach to 
distinguishing criminal law from civil law have been discarded from this 
synthesis.  The principle of morality should be used sparingly to justify the 
criminalisation of conduct in the 21st century because, for example, it is 
difficult to identify a universal understanding of morality and several modern 
offences have no or a limited moral dimension.  Further, if a type of conduct is 
immoral, it may not necessarily mean that the conduct should be criminalised.  
Similarly, the essentialist approach is flawed because that suggests whether 
conduct is a crime is inherently obvious and fails to appreciate that the criminal 
law evolves over time to control contemporary problems and does not offer a 
framework within which to situate novel conduct. 
 
The seriousness of the conduct and the interests affected by the conduct will be 
considered below and applied in the context of criminalising the four scenarios 
listed above.  After concluding that some examples of making and/or 
distributing visual recordings should be criminalised on a principled basis, it is 
imperative to apply the appropriate standard of culpability and role of consent 
in framing offences pertaining to this conduct. 
 
6.1.1 Seriousness of the Conduct 
 
According to the risk of harm and actual harm distinction, the criminal law 
controls conduct where there is not only actual harm, but also when there is a 
risk of harm.  In contrast, the civil law concentrates on actual harm.  However, 
just because conduct involves actual harm or a risk of harm does not 
automatically mean that the conduct should be criminalised.  Before conduct is 
criminalised on the basis of the harm principle, the level of harm should be 
serious or grave harm, in the sense that the harm impacts on a person’s survival 
or their maintenance of minimal dignity and comfort.   
 
The punishment and compensation distinction reinforces that the criminal law 
should be used to punish offenders while the civil law should be used to 
compensate victims.  The higher penalties and stigma associated with the 
criminal law suggest that the criminal law should be used for serious wrongs 
and as a last resort.  Thus, only serious or grave conduct should be criminalised 
on the basis of punishment.  The notion of ‘last resort’ should not be a 
justification for criminalisation in its own right, but merely a reinforcement that 
supports the decision to criminalise the conduct.  For example, the civil law 
would be ineffective where a person visually recorded is unidentifiable and is 
unable to bring an action in civil law, as in the case of up-skirt filming; or 
where damages cannot be calculated, for example, where a person is visually 
recorded playing in a public park, but it does not automatically follow that these 
types of making and/or distributing visual recordings should be criminalised 
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because the criminal law is the last resort.  In fact, this conduct should only be 
criminalised if another principle supports their criminalisation. 
 
Should any of the four scenarios be labelled as serious or grave?  Up-skirt 
filming at a shopping centre and visually recording a housemate showering in a 
bathroom involve a greater invasion on privacy and autonomy and freedom 
from humiliation1021 than making a visual recording of a child playing in a 
public park or a topless female bather at a public beach, but none of these four 
scenarios fall within the serious or grave levels of harm, and they are not 
serious wrongs.  These scenarios cannot be categorised the same as, for 
example, rape and murder, which seriously or gravely affect a person’s physical 
integrity.1022   
 
Now turning the discussion to whether distributing a visual recording of the 
four scenarios is serious or grave.  Distributing a visual recording should result 
in more harm and thus would be more serious than simply making a visual 
recording because it arguably involves a greater intrusion on privacy and 
autonomy, and freedom from humiliation.  However, distributing a visual 
recording of a child playing in a public park, a topless female bather at a public 
beach, a housemate showering in a bathroom; or up-skirt filming at a shopping 
centre, should be described as non-serious.  This conduct falls a long way short 
of the notions of ‘serious’ and ‘grave’ harm, and is not a serious wrong.  Thus, 
distributing visual recordings of the four scenarios should not be criminalised 
on the basis of the seriousness of the conduct.     
 
To recap the conclusions above, the non-serious nature of making and/or 
distributing visual recordings in the four scenarios does not support the decision 
to criminalise this conduct.  However, it is necessary to consider the interests 
affected by the conduct, before reaching a principled conclusion.     
 
6.1.2 Interests Affected by the Conduct 
 
In the context of making and/or distributing visual recordings, the social 
welfare principle and the individual autonomy principle are more influential in 
the decision to criminalise this conduct on a principled basis.  The prohibiting 
and pricing distinction, the public and private distinction and the hybrid 
approach fit neatly under the head of interests affected by the conduct because, 
as discussed in chapter 3, they place emphasis on social welfare interests.  The 
literature suggests prioritising social welfare interests over individual interests, 
but this is challenging in this context because both of the relevant individual 
interests, that is, privacy and freedom of expression, are also both social welfare 
                                                 
1021 Note that privacy and autonomy, and freedom from humiliation are generic-interest 
dimensions of the living-standard analysis tool, which grades the harm involved in conduct. 
1022 As discussed in chapter 2, physical integrity is another generic-interest dimension of the 
living-standard analysis. 
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interests.  However, an appropriate balance between the competing interests of 
privacy and freedom of expression is reflected in the discussion below about 
the four scenarios.   
 
While privacy is relevant to both factors, that is, seriousness of the conduct and 
interests affected by the conduct, under this latter head, the invasion on privacy 
does not need to reach a pre-ordained level of seriousness before conduct is 
criminalised, but is rather balanced against other interests. 
 
The social welfare interest of privacy should be promoted where a person 
makes and/or distributes a visual recording of another who is undressing, 
showering, using a toilet and engaging in a sexual activity; and where the visual 
recording focuses on a person’s private body parts.  In these examples, society 
should protect the public’s privacy interest more vigorously than an 
individual’s private interest of freedom of expression because there is no 
acceptable reason to promote freedom of expression.  Drawing on the four 
scenarios above, on this basis, making and/or distributing a visual recording of 
housemate showering should be criminalised, as well as up-skirt filming at a 
shopping centre and distributing such a film.  
 
When it comes to merely making a visual recording of a child playing in a 
public park or a topless female bather at a public beach, the social welfare 
principle should promote freedom of expression rather than privacy because the 
ability to make visual recordings is a freedom worth protecting in the 21st 
century and, engaging in such conduct is now an incident of the common, social 
intercourse of life as it is so ubiquitous.  Many members of the community may 
make visual recordings for a socially desirable purpose, such as recording 
family and friends.1023  It is unrealistic to suggest that the criminal law should 
prohibit people from making visual recordings of other people in public places, 
and if the criminal law did so, it would stand to lose the respect of the 
community and would be very challenging to implement because law enforcers 
may never find the visual recordings unless they see the person actually making 
the visual recordings.  Thus, it is suggested that the criminal law should protect 
freedom of expression and permit people to make visual recordings of a child 
playing in a public park and topless female bather at a public beach. 
 
A person invades another person’s privacy to a greater extent when they not 
only make a visual recording, but then they distribute it to a wider audience or 
                                                 
1023 Note that ‘socially desirable purpose’ is better determined on a case-by-case basis.  The 
Australian Law Reform Commission uses the term ‘acceptable’ visual recordings without 
exploring this further.  They acknowledge the importance of ‘family, friends, community 
bodies, school, media, the artistic community and others’ being able to make and/or distribute 
visual recordings: Australia, Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information:  
Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report No. 108 (2008) [69.131].  While many of the 
images made and/or distributed by these groups are likely to be for a socially desirable purpose, 
this is not necessarily the case.  Clearly, sexual gratification, voyeurism, humiliation and 
embarrassment are not socially desirable purposes.  
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in an inappropriate context.  For example, a person may visually record a child 
wearing a tight, wet swimming costume and upload it to a website that is 
designed for the sexual gratification of adults.  This is very concerning because 
the distribution has been done for a socially undesirable purpose.  While this 
particular example involves vulnerable members of society, this by itself does 
not mean that the conduct should be criminalised, but rather it is distributing 
visual recordings for a socially undesirable purpose that justifies the 
criminalisation of this conduct.  This is an example of where the criminal law 
should step in to protect the social welfare interest of privacy rather than 
freedom of expression.  Other socially undesirable purposes for distribution 
may include humiliation, embarrassment, voyeurism and sexual objectification.  
In these situations, the criminal law should protect the privacy of the child 
playing a public park and a topless female bather at a public beach, rather than 
the freedom of expression of the person distributing the visual recording.   
 
To sum up the conclusions made under the head of interests affected by the 
conduct in terms of the four scenarios, it is appropriate to criminalise the 
following conduct: 
  
• distributing a visual recording of a child playing in a public park where the 
distribution is for a socially undesirable purpose, for example, sexual 
gratification, voyeurism, humiliation or embarrassment;  
• distributing a visual recording of a topless female bather at a public beach 
where it is distributed for a socially undesirable purpose, for example, 
sexual gratification, voyeurism, humiliation or embarrassment; 
• up-skirt filming and distributing an up-skirt film; and 
• making and/or distributing a visual recording of a housemate showering in a 
bathroom. 
 
Having determined that this list of examples of making and/or distributing 
visual recordings should be criminalised, the next step is to apply the 
appropriate standard of culpability to them. 
 
6.1.3 Appropriate Standard of Culpability 
 
The culpability distinction between criminal law and civil law suggests that the 
criminal law should employ a subjective standard of culpability, and this is true 
in the context of making and/or distributing visual recordings. However, before 
applying a subjective standard of culpability to the examples listed above, this 
section will recap why objective and no-fault standards of culpability should be 
dispensed with in this area. 
 
An objective standard of culpability can be discarded in the context of making 
and/or distributing visual recordings because, for example, this conduct is not 
extremely dangerous and it does not cause extensive public injury.  Further, the 
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imposition of an objective standard would be unfair to those people who unable 
to meet such a standard because of an intellectual or physical ability or who are 
unaware of the risks associated with their conduct.  An objective standard of 
culpability also relies on a shared understanding of reasonable or ordinary, 
otherwise it may be applied inconsistently. 
 
A no-fault standard of culpability should also be rejected in the context of 
making and/or distributing visual recordings because the conduct, on the one 
hand, is not trivial, but on the other, the conduct is not serious enough so as to 
necessitate extreme care.  The conduct in question falls somewhere in between 
these two limits.  Even though there are many benefits to having a no-fault 
standard of culpability, for example, expediency, compliance and ease of proof 
by the Crown, these considerations are not specially applicable to making 
and/or distributing visual recordings and thus do not justify why this conduct 
should attract a no-fault standard of culpability. 
 
Even though a subjective standard of culpability, for example, intention or 
recklessness, is usually associated with serious conduct and making and/or 
distributing visual recordings is non-serious and has low-stigma, a subjective 
standard of culpability places emphasis on the purpose for which a person made 
and/or distributed a visual recording rather than the consequences of the 
conduct, and the purpose is important because if a person engages in this 
conduct for a socially desirable purpose, it should not be criminalised.  If 
person engages in this conduct for the purpose of sexual objectification, 
voyeurism, humiliation or embarrassment, there is a principled argument for 
criminalising this conduct.   
 
It is necessary to build subjective culpability into the examples of making 
and/or distributing visual recordings that should be criminalised.  It is difficult 
to see how a person who makes and/or distributes an up-skirt film, or a visual 
recording of a housemate showering in a bathroom, could possibly argue that 
they have done so for a socially desirable purpose and, that their purpose 
justifies the prioritisation of freedom of expression over privacy.  More than 
likely their purpose is for sexual gratification, voyeurism, humiliation or 
embarrassment, which is socially undesirable and, their conduct should be 
criminalised.  Thus in these situations, intention and recklessness should be 
included as the relevant standard of culpability rather than the specific intention 
of a socially undesirable purpose.  
  
A person who distributes a visual recording of a child playing in a public park 
or a topless female bather at a public beach, may do so for many reasons, 
including sharing visual recordings with family and friends, which is a socially 
desirable purpose.  However, where a person intentionally or recklessly 
distributes such a visual recording for a socially undesirable purpose, for 
example, sexual gratification, voyeurism, humiliation or embarrassment, the 
conduct should be criminalised.  The offender’s purpose for making and/or 
distributing a visual recording, could be determined on the basis of a 
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confession, or in the absence of that, inferred from the contextual 
considerations listed below for implied consent.  
 
After embedding a subjective standard of culpability, the examples of making 
and/or distributing visual recordings that should be criminalised remain 
relatively unchanged because the purpose of the offender was already factored 
into the examples of the child playing in a public park and a topless female 
bather at a public beach, when privacy interests were balanced against freedom 
of expression under the head of interests affected.  However, a subjective 
standard of culpability, in the sense of the offender’s purpose or intention rather 
than the consequences of the conduct, needs to be built into the examples of up-
skirt filming and distributing an up-skirt film, and making and/or distributing a 
visual recording of a housemate showering in a bathroom.  Attaching a socially 
undesirable purpose to the examples of up-skirt filming and the housemate 
showering does not add any value because an offender is unlikely to have a 
socially desirable purpose in such instances, so it is more important to specify 
intention and recklessness as the appropriate subjective standard of culpability.  
Accordingly, the following examples of making and/or distributing visual 
recordings should be criminalised: 
 
• intentionally or recklessly distributing a visual recording of a child playing 
in a public park where the distribution is for a socially undesirable purpose 
such as sexual gratification, voyeurism, humiliation or embarrassment;  
• intentionally or recklessly distributing a visual recording of a topless female 
bather at a public beach where it is distributed for a socially undesirable 
purpose such as sexual gratification, voyeurism, humiliation or 
embarrassment; 
• intentionally or recklessly up-skirt filming and distributing an up-skirt film; 
and 
• intentionally or recklessly making and/or distributing a visual recording of a 
housemate showering in a bathroom. (New elements emphasised) 
 
As discussed earlier in this thesis, consent then becomes an essential 
consideration.   
 
6.1.4 Role of Consent 
 
There are a number of approaches to the role of consent in the criminal law 
including the quantitative, quantitative plus exceptions, individual autonomy, 
paternalism, morality, and contextual.  Irrespective of which approach is 
adopted, they all suggest that the consent of the person visually recorded should 
be relevant to offences pertaining to making and/or distributing visual 
recordings.  As a result, there is no need to rate or weight the different 
approaches.   
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Consent may be express, implied or tacit.  If a person consents to this conduct, 
the criminal law should respect their consent.  Thus, a lack of consent should be 
element of any offence controlling making and/or distributing visual 
recordings.  For example, if a housemate expressly consents to a fellow 
housemate making and/or distributing a visual recording of them as they 
shower in a bathroom, the criminal law should respect their consent and not 
criminalise the conduct of the person making and/or distributing such a visual 
recording.  In the absence of express consent, there is not likely to be implied 
consent in a private place, including a bathroom.  Similarly, in any of the other 
examples of making and/or distributing visual recordings that should be 
criminalised, if the person visually recorded expressly consents to the conduct, 
the criminal law should respect it and not criminalise the conduct. 
 
In framing criminal offences pertaining to making and/or distributing visual 
recordings, it is the conception of ‘implied consent’ that is particularly 
important as the person visually recorded is often unaware that they are visually 
recorded at the time it happens, sometimes only becoming aware of the visual 
recording once it has been distributed on the Internet or otherwise.  A 
contextual approach to consent clarifies the notion of ‘implied consent’ in the 
modern criminal law in the context of making and/or distributing visual 
recordings.  This approach recognises that when a person enters a public place 
they do not necessarily impliedly consent to being visually recorded or having 
such a visual recording distributed.  The person has not necessarily waived their 
right to privacy because privacy may exist in a public place.  For example, it is 
illogical to suggest that if a female wears a skirt or dress to a shopping centre, 
she impliedly consents to being up-skirt filmed or having such an image 
distributed to a wider audience.  The criminal law should step in to prohibit this 
conduct as there is no implied consent in this situation. 
 
In contrast, it is no so clear-cut whether a child playing in a public park or 
topless female bather at a public beach impliedly consents to their image being 
distributed, because the reactions of children and topless female bathers will 
vary from person to person.  However, a contextual approach to the conception 
of ‘implied consent’ requires the consideration of a range of factors including: 
 
• the audience to which the visual recording is distributed, for example, is it 
distributed to a world wide audience or a small group of friends; 
• where the visual recording is distributed, for example, whether the visual 
recording was uploaded to a voyeuristic website, an unknown website or a 
friend’s facebook site; 
• whether the person visually recorded is the focal point of the visual 
recording or is merely captured incidentally in the background;  
• whether the person visually recorded is identifiable by the visual recording;  
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• whether the person visually recorded is engaging in a private act, or 
exposing private body parts or female breasts;1024  
• the person distributing the visual recording does so for the purpose of 
sexual objection, voyeurism, humiliation or embarrassment;  and 
• whether there is a relationship between the person making the visual 
recording and the person visually recorded.   
 
If it is assumed that a child playing in a public park and a topless female bather 
are identifiable and the focal point of two separate visual recordings that are 
distributed to a world wide audience via, for example, a voyeuristic website, it 
could be reasonably argued that the child and the topless female bather did not 
impliedly consent to the distribution.  Even if the distribution was done by a 
person in a position of trust to the person visually recorded, it could not be said 
that there was implied consent in this situation.  Further, there would be no 
implied consent if a person distributed a visual recording on a facebook site, for 
example, of a child playing in a public park or a topless female bather at a 
public beach, if it is distributed for the purpose of humiliation or 
embarrassment.  In such a situation, it should be appropriate to require the 
express consent of the person visually recorded before distributing the visual 
recording. 
 
Having incorporated the role of consent, a principled approach to 
criminalisation suggests that the following examples of making and/or 
distributing visual recordings should be criminalised: 
 
• intentionally or recklessly distributing a visual recording of a child playing 
in a public park where the distribution is for a socially undesirable purpose 
such as sexual gratification, voyeurism, humiliation or embarrassment, and 
without consent;  
• intentionally or recklessly distributing a visual recording of a topless female 
bather at a public beach where it is distributed for a socially undesirable 
purpose such as sexual gratification, voyeurism, humiliation or 
embarrassment, and without consent; 
• intentionally or recklessly up-skirt filming and distributing an up-skirt film 
without consent;  and 
• intentionally or recklessly making and/or distributing a visual recording of a 
housemate showering in a bathroom, without consent. (New elements 
emphasised) 
 
In the absence of the express consent of the person in the visual recording, 
consent should be determined on a case-by-case basis with reference to the 
contextual factors listed above. 
 
                                                 
1024 Note that as discussed in chapter 2, female breasts are not included in the notion of ‘private 
body parts’.  
 
 185
The next section will compare the results from a principled approach to 
criminalisation to the current criminal laws in New Zealand, Queensland, 
Canada, the United Kingdom and New South Wales.   
 
6.2 Comparing a Principled Approach to Criminalisation and the 
Current Criminal Law Response to the Four Scenarios 
 
By considering five jurisdictions, it is instructive to determine whether there is 
a pattern in the criminal law’s response to making and/or distributing visual 
recordings.  As mentioned in chapter 1, New Zealand, Queensland, Canada, the 
United Kingdom and New South Wales have been chosen because they have 
enacted recent criminal offences relating to this conduct, and the following 
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With respect to making and/or distributing a visual recording of a child playing 
in a public park or a topless female bather at a public beach, the criminal law in 
New Zealand, Queensland, Canada, the United Kingdom and New South Wales 
does not criminalise this conduct.1025  Even if this conduct is done without 
consent and for a socially undesirable purpose, it is not an offence in these 
jurisdictions.   
 
                                                 
1025 See generally Crimes Act 1966 (NZ); Criminal Code (Qld); Criminal Code (Can); Sexual 
Offences Act 2003 (UK) and Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW).  Elsewhere, I have argued 
that this conduct does not fall within other criminal and quasi-criminal offences including 
stalking, public nuisance and indecent acts:  Kelley Burton, 'Why Voyeurs Can Get Away With 
It' (2005) 25 Proctor 19. 
 187
Consistently, the principled approach to criminalisation advocated in this thesis 
suggests that making these visual recordings should not be criminalised because 
such conduct is worth protecting in the 21st century.  Similarly, the stakeholders 
who contributed to the 2008 Australian Law Reform Commission Report on 
privacy did not recommend the criminalisation of making visual recordings of 
children or adults.1026  In particular, they recognise the importance of “family, 
friends, community bodies, schools, media, the artistic community and 
others”1027 being able to make and distribute “acceptable”1028 visual recordings.  
 
On the other hand, a principled approach to criminalisation supports the 
criminalisation of distributing a visual recording of a child playing in a public 
park or a topless female bather at a public beach, where it is done without 
consent and for the purpose of sexual gratification, voyeurism, humiliation or 
embarrassment, because these are socially undesirable purposes.  As 
highlighted above, the criminal laws currently do not regulate this conduct, and 
as a result, a principled approach to criminalisation suggests that the scope of 
the criminal law in these jurisdictions could expand further to deal with this 
modern issue.  
 
With regard to up-skirt filming without consent, this conduct is specifically 
criminalised in New Zealand and Queensland.1029  Further, distributing an up-
skirt film without consent, for example, on the Internet, is also criminalised in 
New Zealand and Queensland.1030  While these provisions in New Zealand and 
Queensland include a subjective standard of culpability, they are not confined 
to a socially undesirable purpose.  However, this is of no consequence because 
a person engaging in this conduct is unlikely to be successful in arguing that 
they are doing so for a socially desirable purpose.  Criminalising up-skirt 
filming and distributing such film without consent is also rightly supported by a 
principled approach to criminalisation.  In contrast, Canada, the United 
Kingdom and New South Wales do not specifically criminalise making and/or 
distributing up-skirt films without consent.1031  This conduct should definitely 
be criminalised, and Canada, the United Kingdom and New South Wales 
                                                 
1026 Australia, Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information:  Australian Privacy 
Law and Practice, Report No. 108 (2008) [69.131].  Note that making and/or distributing visual 
recordings was not a primary focus of the Australian Law Reform Commission, but a small 
section of the report focused on visually recording children. 
1027 Ibid. 
1028 Ibid.  Note that the Australian Law Reform Commission did not explore the notion of 
‘acceptable visual recordings’. 
1029 Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) s 216G(1)(b)(i); and Criminal Code (Qld) s 227A(2).  See also 
Kelley Burton, Naked and Digital Eyes (2006) Online Opinion 
<http://www.onlineopinion.com.au> at 7 December 2006 and Kelley Burton, 'New Visual 
Recording Offences' (2006) 26 Queensland Lawyer 188 regarding the scope of the relevant 
Queensland criminal laws. 
1030 Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) s 216J; and Criminal Code (Qld) s 227B(1). 
1031 See generally Criminal Code (Can); Sexual Offences Act 2003 (UK); and Summary 
Offences Act 1988 (NSW). 
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should take a stand to extend the boundaries of the criminal law to prohibit this 
conduct.   
 
In relation to making a visual recording of a housemate showering in a 
bathroom without consent, this is an offence in New Zealand, Queensland, 
Canada, the United Kingdom and New South Wales.1032  While the provisions 
include a subjective standard of culpability, they are not confined to a socially 
undesirable purpose.  In contrast, the equivalent offences in the United 
Kingdom and New South Wales are more limited than the provisions in New 
Zealand, Queensland and Canada because the United Kingdom offence requires 
the visual recording to be made for sexual gratification, while the New South 
Wales provision requires the visual recording to be made for sexual arousal or 
sexual gratification.   
 
A principled approach to criminalisation appropriately supports the 
criminalisation of making a visual recording of a housemate showering in a 
bathroom without consent for a socially undesirable purpose.  Thus, the United 
Kingdom and New South Wales should certainly expand their offences in this 
area to criminalise this conduct if it occurs for other socially undesirable 
purposes such as humiliation or embarrassment.  The fact that the New 
Zealand, Queensland and Canadian provisions do not refer to a socially 
undesirable purpose is of no consequence because it is unlikely that a person 
could argue that they engaged in this conduct for a socially desirable purpose 
and thus these provisions can remain the same. 
 
It is also an offence to distribute a visual recording of a housemate showering in 
a bathroom without consent in New Zealand, Queensland and Canada.1033  
These offences include a subjective culpability and it does not matter that they 
are not limited to socially undesirable purposes because a person engaging in 
this conduct is almost never likely to be doing so for an acceptable reason.  
However, distributing such an image is not a specific offence in the United 
Kingdom and New South Wales,1034 and these jurisdictions need to step in and 
ensure that this conduct is prohibited.   
 
Determining the boundaries of the criminal law is problematic when done on an 
ad hoc basis rather than a principled one.  Using a principled approach to 
criminalisation in the context of making and/or distributing visual recordings 
has illustrated that some examples of this conduct should fall within the realm 
of the criminal law and that the criminal law in New Zealand, Queensland, 
Canada, the United Kingdom and New South Wales should be expanded in a 
principled manner to deal with this issue. 
                                                 
1032 Crimes Act 1966 (NZ) s 216G(1)(a)(iii); Criminal Code (Qld) s 227A(1)(b)(ii);  Criminal 
Code (Can) s 162(1)(b); Sexual Offences Act 2003 (UK) s 67(3); and Summary Offences Act 
1988 (NSW) s 21G(1). 
1033 Crimes Act 1966 (NZ) s 216J(1); Criminal Code (Qld) s 227B(1); and Criminal Code (Can) 
s 162(4). 




Whether legislatures should criminalise making and/or distributing visual 
recordings is a timely topic given the growing importance of this conduct in the 
21st century, the inconsistent national and international legislative responses to 
it, and the fact that it is an example of conduct that does not sit clearly within 
the core of the criminal law.  The principles of harm, morality, individual 
autonomy, and punishment do not support the criminalisation of this conduct, 
but the principle of social welfare does suggest that in some examples, the 
conduct should be criminalised because privacy should be prioritised over 
freedom of expression.  Legislatures across the world should reflect on their 
current criminal laws pertaining to making and/or distributing visual recordings 
and, take action to advance the criminal law in a principled, rather than random 
manner.  Legislation in this area needs to be specifically tailored so as not to 
totally prohibit the ability to make and/or distribute visual recordings.  The 
following model legislation reflects the discussion in this thesis. 
 
Any person who intentionally or recklessly: 
 
(a) makes a visual recording of another person whilst they are engaging in a 
private act without their consent; 
(b) distributes a visual recording of another person whilst they are engaging in 
a private act without their consent; 
(c) distributes a visual recording, for a socially undesirable purpose, of another 
person whilst they are present in a public place without their consent;  
(d) up-skirt films another person without their consent; or 
(e) distributes an up-skirt film of another person without their consent;  
 
is guilty of an offence.1035 
 
For the purposes of this section: 
 
visual recording means a moving or still image.1036 
 
distributes includes (a) communicates, exhibits, sends, supplies or transmits to 
someone, whether to a particular person or not;  (b) makes available for access 
by someone, whether by a particular person or not;  and (c) enters into an 
                                                 
1035 The person making and/or distributing the visual recording in the model legislation must 
intend or be reckless as to the conduct specified in (a), (b), (d) and (e), and with regard to (c) 
they must intend or be reckless as to a socially undesirable purpose.  Intention is not necessary 
and recklessness will suffice. 
1036 This is based on the definition of visually record in Criminal Code (Qld) s 207.  As noted in 
chapter 1 at 1.2.8, Queensland and New Zealand provided the most recent legislative responses 
to this conduct compared to the other jurisdictions discussed in this thesis, and they use the term 
visually record.  The comparative conceptions in the other jurisdictions discussed in this thesis 
are outlined at 1.2.8.  As a result, the model legislation utilises the contemporary notion of 
visual recording in preference to a lengthy list including photographs and films.  
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agreement or arrangement to do something in paragraph (a) or (b);  and (d) 
attempts to distribute.1037 
 
public place includes a place accessible by the public.1038 
 
private act means (a) showering or bathing; (b) using a toilet; or (c) another 
activity when a person is in a state of undress or (d) intimate sexual activity that 
is not ordinarily done in public.1039 
 
socially undesirable purpose includes sexual gratification, voyeurism, 
humiliation and embarrassment.1040 
 
 
In constructing offences in context of making and/or distributing visual 
recordings, the offender’s culpability, in the sense of whether they engaged in 
this conduct for a socially undesirable purpose, and the victim’s lack of 
consent, are vital elements.  While this thesis has focussed on a specific type of 
conduct at the margins of the criminal law today, its usefulness stems well 
beyond today and equips the legislatures of tomorrow, across the globe, with a 
criminalisation framework that can be applied to emerging types of conduct, 
and provides a fresh approach on how to determine the appropriate boundaries 













                                                 
1037 This is identical to Criminal Code (Qld) s 227B(2).  As discussed at 1.2.9, this conception is 
preferred over the definitions in the other jurisdictions canvassed in this thesis because it is 
more encompassing. 
1038 As the literature discussed at 5.2.6.1.1 noted that the term public place is frought with 
difficulty, a broad inclusive definition of public place has been preferred in the model 
legislation.  The current legislative responses to this conduct do not define public place. 
1039 This definition mirrors the definition of private act in Criminal Code (Qld) s 207A.  As 
discussed at 5.2.6.1.1, the other jurisdictions discussed in this thesis provide a consistent 
definition, but their provisions are generally more verbose. 
1040 Defining sexual gratification, voyeurism, humiliation and embarrassment expressly in the 
legislation is unnecessary because the broader notion of socially undesirable purpose is 
inclusive rather than exhaustive.  Further, restrictive definitions may not enable this legislation 
to shift with changes in society.  The ordinary meanings of these notions should be applied in 
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